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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three independent but highly related essays that investigate
the effects of tax planning and/or earnings management. The first essay investigates how high
tax planning and/or aggressive earnings management affect the relative and incremental valuerelevant information of taxable income, book income, and cash flows from operations (CFO).
Regarding the effects of tax planning, first, I postulate and show that high tax planning reduces
the relative and incremental information of taxable income to CFO. Second, high tax planning
increases the relative and incremental information of CFO to the combined information set of
taxable income and book income. Third, high tax planning also increases the relative and
incremental information of CFO to book income. Concerning the effects of aggressive earnings
management, I predict and show that the incremental information of CFO to book income and
the combined information set of taxable income and book income, respectively, is increased for
firms aggressive in earnings management. With respect to the combined effects of high tax
planning and aggressive earnings management, I conjecture and find strong evidence that the
relative and incremental information of CFO to either book income or the combined information
set of taxable income and book income is increased for firms aggressive in both tax planning and
earnings management.
The second essay examines aggressive earnings management, high tax planning, and
their joint impacts on the persistence of book income and its components. First, I predict and
show that aggressive earnings management reduces the persistence of discretionary accruals and
thus the persistence of total accruals and book income. Second, I postulate and demonstrate that
high tax planning reduces the persistence of CFO and thus the persistence of book income.
Third, I find that, jointly, aggressive earnings management and high tax planning reduce the
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persistence of discretionary accruals and CFO and thus the persistence of book income. Finally, I
demonstrate that firms aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning exhibit the
least persistent total accruals, CFO, and book income.
The third essay investigates how tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable
income for firms’ future operating performance. Prior studies show that taxable income contains
information about future earnings and positively predicts firms’ future performance. However, I
postulate and find that high tax planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable income for
future performance, which is proxied by one-, two-, and three-years-ahead CFO and book
income. This finding suggests that investors should take into account the level of the firm’s tax
aggressiveness when using taxable income to predict a firm’s future performance. In sum, the
findings of this dissertation are of interest to both the accounting professionals and the capital
market participants. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the earnings management literature
and tax planning research.
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Chapter 1: Executive Summary
This dissertation examines tax planning, earnings management, and their combined
impacts on the informativeness of taxable income, book income, and cash flows from operations
(CFO), three summary performance measures all based on financial statements. It consists of
three independent but highly related essays. Besides investigating the individual consequences of
tax planning and earnings management, my first two essays also examine the combined effects
of tax planning and earnings management. Most prior studies in tax planning or earnings
management focus on the effects of only one of these two activities. Investigating the combined
effects of tax planning and earnings management is germane to both the tax planning literature
and earnings management literature. This investigation is nontrivial, especially after Frank,
Lynch, and Rego (2009) have shown that tax aggressiveness is positively associated with
financial reporting aggressiveness. Furthermore, my first two essays examine the impacts of tax
planning and earnings management on the informativeness of CFO, which traditionally is a very
important performance measure for equity valuation but largely left out in the analyses of the
consequences of tax planning and earnings management.
Essay One investigates how tax planning and earnings management affect the relative
and incremental value-relevant information contained in taxable income, book income, and CFO.
Extending Ayers et al.’s (2009) finding that high tax planning reduces the relative and
incremental information of taxable income to book income, I predict and show that, first, the
relative and incremental information of taxable income to CFO is lower for high tax-planning
(HTP) firms than Non-HTP firms. Second, the relative and incremental information of CFO to
the combined information set of taxable income and book income is higher for HTP firms than
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Non-HTP firms. Third, the relative and incremental information of CFO to book income is also
higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. These results are consistent with two possible
explanations. The first one is that high tax planning reduces taxable income’s ability to faithfully
reflect the firm’s underlying performance and thus its information content. The second one is
that investors of HTP firms discount the information content of taxable income and book income
more than that of CFO due to the higher information asymmetry of HTP firms.
Regarding the effects of aggressive earnings management, I postulate and show that, first,
the incremental information of book income to CFO is lower for low earnings-quality (LEQ)
firms than Non-LEQ firms. Second, the incremental information of CFO to the combined
information set of taxable income and book income is higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.
Finally, though I predict that the relative information of CFO to either book income, taxable
income, or the combined information set of taxable income and book income will be higher for
LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms, neither of these predictions is statistically supported. The main
underlying reason is that the standard deviations of the R2 ratios for LEQ firms are much higher
than the standard deviations of the R2 ratios for Non-LEQ firms. This evidence is consistent with
the notion that aggressive earnings management makes it more difficult for investors to process
the value-relevant information contained in reported accounting numbers, specifically, taxable
income, book income, and CFO in this study.
Concerning the combined effects of high tax planning and aggressive earnings
management, I predict and show that the relative and incremental information of CFO to either
book income or the combined information set of taxable income and book income is higher for
high tax-planning firms with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. This
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finding suggests that when firms are aggressive in both tax planning and earnings management,
CFO become a relatively more important performance measure for valuation.
Essay Two examines aggressive earnings management, high tax planning, and their
combined impacts on the persistence of book income and its components. First, I predict and
show that earnings management reduces the persistence of discretionary accruals and thus the
persistence of total accruals and book income. Second, I find that high tax planning reduces the
persistence of CFO and thus the persistence of book income. Third, I demonstrate that,
aggregately, aggressive earnings management and high tax planning reduce the persistence of
discretionary accruals and CFO and thus the persistence of book income. Finally, I show that
firms aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning exhibit the least persistent total
accruals, CFO, and book income. This finding supports the conjecture that firms aggressive in
both earnings management and tax planning are systematically different from other firms,
including firms aggressive in earnings management or tax planning but not both.
Essay Three investigates how tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income
for firms’ future operating performance. I predict and show that high tax planning reduces the
predictive ability of taxable income for firms’ future performance, which is measured by both
one-, two-, and three-years-ahead CFO and book income. This finding has implications for
fundamental analysis as predicting firms’ future performances is the central task of fundamental
analysis. It suggests that, when using taxable income to predict a firm’s future performance,
analysts and investors should take into account the level of the firm’s tax aggressiveness. This
study contributes to the tax planning literature in general and the relatively new stream of studies
examining the informativeness of estimated taxable income in particular by showing that, though
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taxable income positively predicts firms’ future performances, its predictive ability is
significantly reduced by high tax planning.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the earnings management literature and tax
planning research in several ways by (1) investigating the combined effects of tax planning and
earnings management, (2) examining the impacts of tax planning and earnings management on
the informativeness of CFO, (3) showing that discretionary accruals are less persistent for firms
aggressive in earnings management than firms that are not so aggressive in earnings
management, (4) providing direct evidence that high tax planning reduces the persistence of CFO
and thus the persistence of book income, and (5) showing that tax planning reduces the
predictive ability of taxable income for firms’ future operating performances. The results of this
dissertation are of interest to participants in the capital markets, such as investors, financial
analysts, accountants, academics in accounting and finance, regulators, and standard setters.

References
Ayers, B., Jiang, J., Laplante, S., 2009. Taxable income as a performance measure: the effects of
tax planning and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 26(1), 15-54.
Frank, M., Lynch, L., Rego, S., 2009. Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive
financial reporting. The Accounting Review 84(2), 467-496.
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Chapter 2: Essay One

The Consequences of Tax Planning and Earnings Management: The Information Content
of Taxable Income, Book Income, and Cash Flows from Operations
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Abstract
This study examines how tax planning and earnings management affect the relative and
incremental value-relevant information of taxable income, book income, and cash flows from
operations. First, besides confirming Ayers, Jiang, and Laplante’s (2009) conclusion that high
tax planning decreases the relative and incremental information of taxable income to book
income, I predict and show that high tax planning increases the relative and incremental
information of cash flows from operations to taxable income, book income, and the combined
information set of taxable income and book income, respectively. Second, besides confirming
Ayers et al.’s (2009) finding that the incremental information of book income to taxable income
is reduced for firms aggressive in earnings management, I postulate and show that the
incremental information of cash flows from operations over book income and the combined
information set of taxable income and book income, respectively, is increased for firms
aggressive in earnings management. Finally, I predict and find strong evidence that the relative
and incremental information of cash flows from operations to either book income or the
combined information set of taxable income and book income is significantly increased for firms
aggressive in both tax planning and earnings management. This study contributes to both the
literature of tax planning and literature of earnings management. The results of this study are of
interest to capital market participants and academics in finance and accounting.

Keywords: tax planning, earnings management, relative and incremental information, book
income, taxable income, and cash flows from operations
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2.1. Introduction
The main objective of this study is to assess high tax planning, aggressive earnings
management, and their combined impacts on the relative and incremental information of taxable
income, book income, and cash flows from operations (CFO). In other words, this study
investigates how firms’ behaviour in tax aggressiveness and/or financial reporting aggressiveness
affect the value-relevant information contained in taxable income, book income, and CFO. The
motivation for this investigation comes from several sources. First, Ayers et al. (2009) find that
high tax planning (earnings management) reduces (increases) the relative and incremental
information of taxable income to book income. However, in their analyses, Ayers et al. (2009)
leave out CFO, a widely used important performance measure for equity valuation. Second,
plenty of studies examine and compare the value relevance of book income and CFO; and
extensive research investigates how earnings management affects the value relevance of book
income. Nevertheless, limited attention has focused on the impact of earnings management on
the informativeness of CFO. Finally, while extant research investigates the individual impacts of
earnings management or tax planning on the informativeness of taxable income and book
income, little is known about the combined impacts of tax planning and earnings management on
the informativeness of taxable income, book income, and CFO. This study fills up these voids in
empirical accounting research.
The value relevance of book income and CFO has been long established (e.g., Ball and
Brown, 1968; Beaver, 1968; Wilson, 1986; Kothari, 2001). Comparing the informativeness of
book income and CFO, both Wilson (1986) and Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1987) find that
cash flows contain incremental information over earnings. Dechow (1994) and Dechow, Kothari,
and Watts (1998) have formally established that book income is a superior summary measure of
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firms’ fundamentals than CFO. However, these results reflect the average value relevance of
book income and CFO because the conclusions are mainly based on empirical results from
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. It leaves the question open whether the
informativeness of book income and CFO will change if managers opportunistically use the
discretion available in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to manipulate the
reported earnings and thus make book income misrepresent firms’ fundamentals.
Investigating the impacts of earnings management on the informativeness of net income,
Elliott and Hanna (1996) find that earnings management reduces the value-relevant information
contained in earnings. Specifically, the earnings response coefficient (ERC) is significantly
reduced for firms engaging in repeated write-offs. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) find that
earnings management reduces the value relevance of net income. However, few studies have
assessed and compared the impacts of earnings management on the relative and incremental
information of CFO to book income.
Compared with the extensive research on the value relevance of book income and CFO,
research investigating the information content of taxable income is a comparatively new but
growing stream of literature.1 Lev and Nissim (2004) find that taxable income contains
information about earnings quality. Specifically, they find that the tax-to-book income ratio can
predict future earnings growth up to five years.2 Similarly, Hanlon (2005) finds that book-tax
differences (BTDs) indicate earnings quality, in which firms with large BTDs tend to have less
persistent earnings than firms with small BTDs. After assessing and comparing the information
contained in book income and taxable income, Hanlon, Laplante, and Shevlin (2005) draw three

1

As in most studies on corporate taxation, taxable income in this study is estimated from the financial statements.
Unless otherwise stated, taxable income refers to estimated taxable income throughout this dissertation.
2
Essentially, the tax-to-book income ratio is another way to measure the book-tax difference.
Page 8 of 217

conclusions: (1) both measures have explanatory power for stock returns; (2) book income
contains much more value-relevant information than taxable income; and (3) taxable income
contains incremental information beyond book income.
Building upon Hanlon et al. (2005), Ayers et al. (2009) find that high tax planning
(aggressive earnings management) reduces (increases) the relative and incremental information
of taxable income to book income. Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley (2012) further show that, first,
after controlling for tax planning, earnings management reduces the value relevance of both book
income and taxable income. Second, aggressive tax planning reduces the value relevance of book
income too. Third, after controlling for earnings management, tax planning has no significant
impact on the value relevance of taxable income.
However, both Ayers et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2012) leave out CFO in their analyses,
an important and widely used performance measure for stock valuation. In addition, Ayers et al.
(2009) have not conducted their analyses under the unique reporting setting in which firms have
engaged in both high tax planning and aggressive earnings management in the same reporting
period. Investigating the information content of taxable income and book income in this
reporting setting is nontrivial, especially after Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) have shown that
tax planning aggressiveness is positively associated with financial reporting aggressiveness. One
of the main objectives of this study is to assess and compare the value relevance of taxable
income, book income, and CFO when firms engage in both high tax planning and aggressive
earnings management.
Building upon Ayers et al. (2009), I assign firm-years into six reporting-type subgroups:
(1) high tax-planning (HTP) firms, which are firms relatively aggressive in tax planning, (2)
Non-HTP firms, which are firms not so aggressive in tax planning, (3) low earnings-quality
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(LEQ) firms, which are firms relatively aggressive in earnings management, (4) Non-LEQ firms,
which are firms not so aggressive in earnings management, (5) high tax-planning with low
earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) firms, which are firms relatively aggressive in both tax planning
and earnings management, and (6) Non-HTP&LEQ firms, which are firms not classified as
HTP&LEQ.3 Since high tax planning directly reduces the information content of taxable income,
my primary prediction on the effects of high tax planning is that the relative and incremental
information of taxable income to CFO will be lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.4
Second, since the information content of taxable income is reduced, I further predict that the
relative and incremental information of CFO to the combined information set of taxable income
and book income will be higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. Third, because high tax
planning obscures a firm’s information environment and reduces its earnings quality (e.g., Chen
et al., 2012; Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay, 2019), I postulate that the relative and incremental
information of CFO to book income will be higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.
Since earnings management reduces the information content of book income, my primary
prediction on the consequences of aggressive earnings management is that the relative and
incremental information of book income to CFO will be lower for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ
firms. Second, since the information content of book income is reduced, my first extension on
the primary hypothesis of the consequences of aggressive earnings management is that the

Following Ayers et al. (2009), I use the term “high tax-planning” (HTP) to refer to firms with relatively high levels
of tax aggressiveness. Earnings management and earnings quality are interchangeably used in the literature of
earnings management. Following Sloan (1996), Ayers et al. (2009), and Chen et al. (2012), I use the term “low
earnings-quality” (LEQ) to refer to firms that are likely to have engaged in aggressive earnings management.
However, I would like to emphasize that not all firms classified as LEQ are in fact engaged in aggressive earnings
management due to the limitation of the discretionary accrual models to capture the “true” manipulated accruals
(e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1996; Kothari et al., 2005; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010).
4
Since high tax planning indicates a higher level of information asymmetry, other things being equal, the
informativeness of all the three performance measures will be lower for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms.
However, due to its straightforward recording rules, CFO will be the least affected summary performance measure
by high tax planning among the three.
3
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relative and incremental information of CFO to the aggregate information contained in taxable
income and book income will be higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.
Third, my second extension on the primary hypothesis of the consequences of aggressive
earnings management is that aggressive earnings management will increase the relative and
incremental information of CFO to taxable income. This extension is based on three arguments.
First, since taxable income is estimated from the financial statements, earnings management,
especially conforming earnings management, will inevitably affect the estimated taxable income.
Second, because earnings management increases the level of information asymmetry between
insiders and other investors, investors will generally discount all reported accounting numbers
besides book income. However, CFO are the least affected by earnings management among the
three performance measures. Hence, I predict that the relative and incremental information of
CFO to taxable income will be higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.
Finally, my primary prediction on the combined effects of high tax planning and
aggressive earnings management is that the relative and incremental information of CFO to
either book income or taxable income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ
firms. Moreover, my extension on the primary hypothesis of the combined effects of high tax
planning and earnings management is that the relative and incremental information of CFO to the
collective information of taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms
than Non-HTP&LEQ firms.
Following Hanlon et al. (2005) and Ayers et al. (2009), I conduct association tests to
assess and compare the relative and incremental information of taxable income, book income,
and CFO. Similar to Hanlon et al. (2005) and Ayers et al. (2009), I use market-adjusted stock
return as the benchmark against which to compare the information content of the three summary
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performance measures. For each fiscal year, I run two sets of regressions for each of the six
subgroups. First, I run three univariate regressions using the market-adjusted return as the
dependent variable and the first difference in taxable income, book income, and CFO,
respectively, as the independent variable. Second, I regress market-adjusted returns on two or all
of the first differences in the three summary performance measures. Finally, I conduct both the
relative information test (the R2 ratios analyses) and the incremental information test (the
incremental R2s analyses) to compare the variations in the value relevance of taxable income,
book income, and CFO when firms engage in high tax planning, aggressive earnings
management, or both.
For the consequences of high tax planning, I find that, first, consistent with Ayers et al.
(2009), high tax planning reduces the relative information of taxable income to book income.
Second, as predicted, high tax planning reduces the incremental information of taxable income
over CFO. Third, high tax planning increases both the relative and incremental information of
CFO to book income. Finally, high tax planning increases both the relative and incremental
information of CFO to the aggregate information set of taxable income and book income. The
last two findings support my conjecture that high tax planning not only reduces the value
relevance of taxable income but also has a stronger negative impact on the value relevance of
book income than CFO. They are consistent with Balakrishnan et al.’s (2019) conclusion that
high tax planning obscures a firm’s information environment and thus reduces its earnings
quality. Moreover, these two findings corroborate Chen et al.’s (2012) finding that high tax
planning reduces the value relevance of book income after controlling for earnings management.
Regarding the consequences of aggressive earnings management, the incremental
information tests show that, first, consistent with Ayers et al. (2009), aggressive earnings
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management reduces the incremental information of book income over taxable income. Second,
as predicted, aggressive earnings management reduces the incremental information of book
income over CFO. Finally, consistent with my prediction, aggressive earnings management
increases the incremental information of CFO over the aggregate information contained in
taxable income and book income. However, neither of my predictions on the relative information
tests is statistically supported. Further analyses show that the standard deviations of the R2 ratios
for LEQ firms are much higher than those of Non-LEQ firms. This finding is consistent with the
conjecture that aggressive earnings management makes it more difficult for investors to assess
and extract the value-relevant information contained in taxable income, book income, and CFO.
Finally, for the combined effects of high tax planning and aggressive earnings
management, I find that, first, high tax planning and aggressive earnings management increase
both the relative and incremental information of CFO to book income. Second, high tax planning
and aggressive earnings management increase both the relative and incremental information of
CFO to the collective information contained in taxable income and book income. These results
suggest that CFO become a relatively more important summary performance measure for firms
aggressive in both tax planning and earnings management.
This study makes several contributions to the literature in tax planning and earnings
management and research investigating the value relevance of accounting numbers. First,
extending Ayers et al. (2009), I add CFO, a traditionally very important summary performance
measure for stock valuation, to the information set of taxable income and book income when
assessing the impacts of high tax planning and aggressive earnings management. Corroborating
Chen et al.’s (2012) finding that aggressive tax planning reduces the informativeness of book
income after controlling for earnings management, I further show that high tax planning
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increases the relative and incremental information of CFO to book income. This finding supports
the conjecture that CFO are the least affected performance measure by high tax planning among
taxable income, book income, and CFO. It is also consistent with Balakrishnan et al.’s (2019)
conclusion that high tax planning obscures a firm’s information environment and thus reduces its
accruals and earnings quality.
Second, few studies have assessed and compared the relative and incremental information
of CFO to book income when firms engage in either tax planning or earnings management.
Filling up this void, I show that the incremental information of CFO over either book income or
the collective information set of taxable income and book income is increased for firms engaging
in high tax planning or aggressive earnings management. These findings are consistent with the
conjecture that high tax planning or aggressive earnings management affects the informativeness
of taxable income, book income, and CFO differentially. Among the three summary performance
measures, CFO are likely the least affected by high tax planning or aggressive earnings
management.
Third, this study examines the combined impacts of tax planning and earnings
management on the value relevance of taxable income, book income, and CFO. I find consistent
evidence that the relative and incremental information of CFO to book income and the combined
information set of taxable income and book income, respectively, is significantly increased for
firms aggressive in both tax planning and earnings management. These findings are consistent
with the conjecture that high tax planning and aggressive earnings management reduce the
informativeness of taxable income and book income more than CFO. Consequently, CFO
become a relatively more important performance measure for equity valuation for firms engaging
in both high tax planning and aggressive earnings management.
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Finally, this study sheds some light on the debate over conforming and nonconforming
earnings management and tax planning. On the one hand, the relatively small sample size of
HTP&LEQ firms (1,082 firm-years) suggests that, in general, there are limited tax planning and
earnings management strategies to report a lower taxable income and a higher book income
within the same reporting period.5 On the other hand, some firms do successfully maintain a very
low current effective tax rate while aggressively manipulating accounting earnings, supporting
the argument of nonconforming tax planning and earnings management. Specifically, the mean
current effective tax rate of HTP&LEQ firms is lower than that of HTP firms at the 1%
significance level (one-tailed t-test), suggesting that, on average, HTP&LEQ firms are even more
aggressive than HTP firms in tax planning. Furthermore, while there is no significant difference
in the means of pretax book income between HTP&LEQ firms and Non-HTP&LEQ firms, the
mean after-tax book income of HTP&LEQ firms is greater than that of Non-HTP&LEQ firms at
the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test), suggesting that, for the similar pretax performances,
HTP&LEQ firms are able to report better after-tax performances than Non-HTP&LEQ firms,
probably through their unique tax planning and financial reporting strategies.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 is a literature review; section
2.3 is hypotheses development; section 2.4 describes the research methods; section 2.5
demonstrates the descriptive statistics and testing results; section 2.6 presents the results of
robustness tests; and section 2.7 concludes and discusses some potential future studies.

This finding seems inconsistent with Frank et al.’s (2009) conclusion that tax planning aggressiveness is positively
associated with aggressive financial reporting. However, while I use the current effective tax rate to measure tax
aggressiveness, a measure capturing the effects of both permanent and temporary tax planning strategies, Frank et al.
(2009) measure tax aggressiveness using the discretionary permanent book-tax differences, a measure excluding the
effects of deferral-based tax planning strategies, which generates temporary book-tax differences. They have pointed
out that “our conclusions of the positive relation between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness may not
generalize to tax planning through deferral” (p. 472).
5
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2.2. Literature review
Evidence that accounting numbers generated on the basis of GAAP contain valuerelevant information can be traced back as early as Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968),
two of the earliest market-based empirical studies in accounting research.6 Ball and Brown
(1968) show that changes in stock returns are positively correlated with the changes in net
income. Beaver (1968) finds that trading volume and the magnitude of price changes are
positively associated with earnings announcements. During the week in which firms release their
annual financial statements, the mean trading volume for these firms is about 30% higher than
during the nonreporting weeks. Moreover, the magnitude of price changes during the reporting
week is significantly greater (about 67%) than price changes during the nonreporting weeks.
In the following three decades, more than 1,000 papers studying the relation between
accounting variables and the capital markets have been published in leading academic journals in
finance and accounting (Kothari, 2001). Papers specifically related to this study are those that
investigate the value relevance of earnings, accruals (including total accruals, nondiscretionary
accruals, and discretionary accruals), CFO, and, more recently, taxable income.
2.2.1. Value relevance of book income and CFO and the effects of earnings
management
2.2.1.1.

The value relevance of book income and CFO

Wilson (1986) finds that, while total accruals contain incremental information beyond
CFO, both CFO and total accruals contain incremental information beyond earnings. Similarly,

6

However, the value relevance of accounting numbers was not so apparent as it was prior to Ball and Brown (1968)
and Beaver (1968), during which time information contained in financial statements was mostly regarded as
meaningless to the capital markets (e.g., Kothari, 2001; Ball and Brown, 2014).
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Bowen et al. (1987) find that, while accruals contain incremental information over CFO, CFO
have incremental information over book income. These early studies provide empirical evidence
that cash earnings, accrued earnings, and book income are all value relevant but with no
conclusion on which one is the most value relevant.
Dechow (1994) and Dechow et al. (1998) conclude that book income is a superior
summary measure of firms’ fundamentals than CFO. Dechow (1994) illustrates how accruals
make current book income a better predictor of future CFO than current CFO themselves by
mitigating the timing and matching problems in current CFO. Building upon Dechow (1994),
Dechow et al. (1998) further demonstrate why changes in CFO are negatively serially correlated
and how accruals offset this negative correlation and thus make changes in book income less
serially correlated. They also show that book income better forecasts future CFO than current
CFO. Consistent with their conclusions, Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2007) find that accounting
earnings dominate CFO in explaining stock prices. These results also explain why book income
is widely used in stock valuation despite the far-famed discounted cash flow valuation model
(e.g., Dechow, 1994; Liu et al., 2007).
Sloan (1996) discovers the accruals anomaly, the negative association between accruals
and subsequent long-window stock returns. By decomposing earnings into accrual and cash flow
components, he shows that the accrual component is less persistent than the cash flow
component of earnings. Nevertheless, investors seem to “fixate” on earnings and fail to
distinguish the difference in persistence between accrued earnings and cash earnings. As a result,
the equity market overprices firms with a relatively higher portion of accruals in reported
earnings. However, this difference in persistence will be ultimately reflected in future earnings;
accordingly, the stock market will gradually make price corrections for these overpriced firms.
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Sloan (1996) further demonstrates that a trading strategy that takes a long position on firms in the
lowest decile of accruals and a short position on firms in the highest decile of accruals will
generate abnormal returns of 10.4% and 4.8%, respectively, in the first and second year
following the formation of the hedge portfolio.
Building on Sloan (1996), Xie (2001) further decomposes total accruals into
nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals and finds that the mispricing of accruals
documented by Sloan (1996) is due largely to the overpricing of discretionary accruals. Xie
(2001) shows that CFO are the most persistent among the three earnings components, followed
by nondiscretionary accruals and then discretionary accruals.
In sum, the information content of book income and CFO has been well studied in
accounting research that examines the relation between financial statements and the capital
markets (Kothari, 2001). Based on the results from both empirical studies and theoretical
modelling, the relationship between these two summary measures is that, while book income is
superior to CFO, CFO contains incremental information beyond book income (e.g., Bowen et al.,
1987; Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1998; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2003). However,
these results reflect the mean value relevance of book income and CFO since they are mainly
based on the analyses of OLS regressions. It leaves the question open whether the explanatory
power for stock prices (returns) of book income (changes in book income) and CFO (changes in
CFO) varies if managers opportunistically use the discretionary choices available in GAAP to
manipulate reported earnings and thus make earnings misrepresent firms’ fundamentals.

Page 18 of 217

2.2.1.2.

The impacts of earnings management on the value relevance of book

income
Like the value relevance of book income and CFO, earnings management and its impacts
on the value relevance of book income are also extensively studied in accounting and finance.
While discretion in GAAP provides managers with the avenue to better communicate their
private information to the capital markets (e.g., Subramanyam, 1996; Rao, Teoh, and Wong,
1998), it also renders managers the opportunities to exploit the discretion for the best of their
own interests (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998; Bergstresser
and Philippon, 2006). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find evidence that firms manipulate
reported earnings to avoid a loss or earnings decrease. Teoh et al. (1998) show that initial public
offering (IPO) issuers with higher positive discretionary accruals tend to have lower stock
returns in the subsequent three years. Rao et al. (1998) document that IPO-year earnings and
discretionary accruals are unusually high, followed by lower post-IPO earnings performance.
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that high accruals are associated with chief executive
officers’ stock selling and options exercises. These empirical results suggest that opportunistic
earnings management is not uncommon and has consequences for capital markets and managers’
compensations.
Elliott and Hanna (1996) find that when firms are engaged in earnings management, such
as repeated write-offs, the ERCs from a regression of market-adjusted returns on unexpected
earnings decrease. In other words, the value relevance of book income decreases for firms that
engage in earnings management. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) find that earnings management
reduces the value relevance of net income by investigating a subsample of firms whose managers
have sold their shares through secondary stock offerings. Furthermore, they show that, while the
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value relevance of both nondiscretionary and discretionary components of earnings decreases,
discretionary accruals are not even priced in the year of issuing secondary stock. They also find
that, when the value relevance of net income decreases due to earnings management, the value
relevance of book equity increases. This latter finding indicates that the balance sheet becomes
relatively more important than the income statement in valuating equity for firms engaging in
aggressive earnings management. It is consistent with the conjecture that investors adjust their
ways of extracting the information contained in financial statements according to the creditability
of the reported accounting numbers.
In sum, studies assessing and comparing the value relevance of book income and CFO
suggest: (1) both performance measures are value relevant; (2) book income contains more
value-relevant information than CFO; and (3) CFO contain incremental information beyond
book income. Research in earnings management shows that earnings management is not
uncommon, and it reduces the value relevance of book income. However, little is known on the
impacts of earnings management on the value relevance of CFO.
2.2.2. The value relevance of taxable income and book income and the impacts of
tax planning
2.2.2.1.

The value relevance of taxable income and book income

Compared with the studies examining and comparing the information content of book
income and CFO, the research investigating the value relevance of taxable income is a
comparatively new but growing stream of literature. There are several potential explanations for
this relatively late but growing interest in the value relevance of taxable income. First, corporate
tax returns are confidential. As a result, except for some sporadic case studies, it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to get the required dataset that is large enough to
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conduct a meaningful empirical study. Second, taxable income is not prepared for the capital
markets but primarily for the tax authorities. Hence, conveying value-relevant information to the
capital markets, which is one of the most important goals of financial statements, is never an
objective of corporate tax returns. Finally, the recent interest in the value relevance of taxable
income is likely triggered by the results of two lines of research in accounting. One is the
decrease in the value relevance of accounting earnings through the past decades that started in
the 1970s (e.g., Collins, Maydew, and Weiss, 1997; Brown, Lo, and Lys, 1999; Lev and
Zarowin, 1999). The other is the expanding gap between book income and taxable income that
started in the 1990s (e.g., Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock, 1996; Manzon and Plesko, 2001; Desai, 2003;
Leve and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005).
Using the ratio of taxable income to book income as a comprehensive proxy for earnings
quality, Lev and Nissim (2004) find that the tax-to-book income ratio can predict earnings
growth up to five years. They conclude that, as a benchmark for book income, taxable income
contains information about earnings quality, specifically earnings persistence and growth.
However, the forward-looking information about future earnings contained in the tax-to-book
income ratio was largely ignored by investors in the pre-SFAS No. 109 period. This forwardlooking information was impounded, though not fully, into prices in the post-SFAS No. 109
period.7 Lev and Nissim (2004) also find evidence that investors assign a higher valuation to
firms with higher cash earnings in reported book income. Similarly, Hanlon (2005) shows that
firms with large BTDs have less persistent earnings than firms with small BTDs, and investors
impound the information contained in BTDs into stock prices. These two studies suggest that

7

This finding suggests that the capital markets have been evolving and becoming more efficient as investors learn
how to use the information contained in the tax-to-book income ratio to value common stocks.
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taxable income contains information about earnings quality and BTDs are associated with
earnings characteristics, such as earnings persistence and growth, and thus has implications for
the stock prices and returns.
To support their argument that the conformity of book income and taxable income will
result in the loss of value-relevant information to investors, Hanlon et al. (2005) have assessed
and compared the information content of book income and taxable income. They find that, while
both measures have significant explanatory power for stock returns, the explanatory power of
book income is significantly greater, both economically and statistically, than taxable income.
Consistently, the adjusted R2 generated from the univariate regression of returns on the changes
in book income is significantly higher than that from the univariate regression of returns on the
changes in taxable income. Hanlon et al. (2005) also show that an investment decision based on
the full knowledge of the changes in book income will generate a higher one-year return than a
decision based on the full knowledge of the changes in taxable income. Based on these results,
they conclude that book income contains much more value-relevant information than taxable
income, which supports their argument against the proposal to conform book income and taxable
income, especially if book income is generated following the tax codes.
2.2.2.2.

The impacts of high tax planning and aggressive earnings

management on the value relevance of taxable income and book income
Compared with the studies investigating the informativeness of taxable income, there are
even fewer studies that examine the effects of tax planning on the value relevance of taxable
income and book income. Among these few studies are Ayers et al. (2009) and Chen et al.
(2012). Exploiting two reporting settings in which firms engage in either aggressive tax planning
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or earnings management, Ayers et al. (2009) find that the relative information of estimated
taxable income to book income is significantly higher (lower) for firms with low earnings quality
(high level of tax planning) than for all other firms. In their incremental information content
tests, the results are also consistent with their hypothesis that high tax-planning (low earningsquality) reduces (increases) the incremental information of taxable income over book income.
These results suggest that aggressive tax planning (earnings management) deteriorates the ability
of taxable income (book income) to summarize the firm’s financial performance faithfully.
Consequently, both the relative and incremental information of taxable income over book
income decreases (increases) for high tax planning (low earnings quality) firms.
Chen et al. (2012) adopt a set of testing methods different from those of Ayers et al.
(2009) to examine the impacts of tax planning and earnings management on the value relevance
of taxable income and book income. They find: (1) earnings management reduces not only the
value relevance of book income but also the information content of taxable income after
controlling for tax planning; (2) high tax planning reduces the value relevance of both taxable
income and book income; and (3) the impacts of high tax planning on the value relevance of
taxable income are subsumed by earnings management. In other words, after controlling for
earnings management, tax planning has no significant impacts on the value relevance of taxable
income. The last finding is inconsistent with Ayers et al.’s (2009) result that high tax planning
reduces the value relevance of taxable income. However, when testing their tax planning
hypothesis, Ayers et al. (2009) do not control for earnings management.
2.2.3. Tax research under the principal-agent framework
Corporate income taxes represent one of the largest business costs and cash outflows to
firms and their shareholders (e.g., Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker, 2012; Chen, Chen, Cheng,
Page 23 of 217

and Shevlin, 2010). Therefore, the traditional view on corporate taxation believes that tax
planning enhances shareholders' welfare and predicts that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness.
As a result, firms use high-powered incentive compensation to encourage risk-averse managers
to take more aggressive positions on tax planning (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Rego and
Wilson, 2012). Rego and Wilson (2012) find that equity risk incentives are positively associated
with tax aggressiveness. Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2015) find that the
incentive compensation of tax directors is negatively correlated with GAAP effective tax rate.
The ultimate goal of high-powered incentive compensation is to better align managers’
interests with those of shareholders. Hence, it is supposed that high-powered incentive
compensation will reduce managerial diversion but increase the aggressiveness in tax planning.
However, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) show that there might be a complementary relationship
between rent extraction and tax avoidance, which results in a negative association between highpowered incentive compensation and tax aggressiveness, especially for firms with weak
corporate governance. Contrary to its intended goal to increase managers’ aggressiveness in tax
avoidance, high-powered incentive compensation reduces the level of tax avoidance for these
firms. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggest that the decisions on tax avoidance and rent
extraction are likely made simultaneously and thus are interdependent on each other.
Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) findings highlight that it is not the “firm” but managers
that ultimately make the decisions on tax planning. Consistent with Desai and Dharmapala (2006),
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) show that, under the principal-agent framework, penalties imposed on tax
managers instead of shareholders are more effective in reducing tax evasion. Hence, the investigation

of tax planning and its effects could be better conducted under the principal-agent framework.
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agent framework. Chen et al. (2010) is one of these few studies that examine tax planning within
an agency context. Exploiting a unique setting in which family firms face the agency conflict
between family owners and other shareholders, Chen et al. (2010) find that family firms,
counterintuitively, are less aggressive in tax planning than their non-family counterparts. Due to
their higher percentage of holdings, family owners tend to gain more than other shareholders
from the direct tax savings of tax aggressiveness. Besides, family owners may further benefit
from rent extraction masked by high tax planning activities at the cost of other shareholders.
Nevertheless, minority shareholders will see through this and thus price protect themselves by
bidding the stock price down, which results in a higher non-tax cost for family owners to engage
in aggressive tax planning. As a result, rational family owners willingly forgo some tax benefits
from tax planning to avoid the potential price discount. Chen et al.’s (2010) findings are
consistent with the fact that the benefits of tax aggressiveness come at a cost other than the direct
transaction costs of tax planning.
The results from prior corporate tax studies, such as Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and
Chen et al. (2010), highlight the complexity of tax planning, which involves many dimensions of
a firm’s business and sometimes has unintended consequences. For example, in addition to
complicating tax reporting, aggressive tax planning increases the complexity of the firm’s
organizational structure, transaction arrangement, and financial reporting (e.g., Graham, 2003;
Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Balakrishnan et al., 2019). Balakrishnan et al. (2019) find that tax
aggressiveness is associated with lower corporate transparency. They show that aggressive tax
planning obfuscates the firm’s information environment and reduces accruals quality. Frank et al.
(2009) find that tax planning aggressiveness is positively associated with financial reporting
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aggressiveness.8 Their findings indicate that firms, at least some firms, have the opportunities
and means to engage in both aggressive tax filing and financial reporting activities in the same
reporting period.
In sum, research that investigates and compares the value relevance of taxable income
and book income suggests that taxable income is value relevant and contains incremental
information over book income. However, aggressive tax planning reduces the value relevance of
taxable income to book income, obfuscates firms’ information environments, increases the
information asymmetry between insiders and other stakeholders, and reduces the quality of
reported accounting earnings.
2.3. Hypotheses development
2.3.1. Information content of taxable income, book income, and CFO
Extensive research has shown that taxable income, book income, and CFO are all value
relevant (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Bowen et al., 1987; Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996; Dechow
et al., 1998; Francis et al., 2003; Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon et al., 2005; Ayers et al., 2009).9
CFO are generated on a set of cash-based rules, in which revenues are recognized when cash is
received, and expenses are recorded when cash is paid out. On the contrary, book income is
generated based on GAAP, a set of accrual-based accounting principles, in which both revenues
and expenses are recorded when transactions happen. Book income comprises cash earnings and

Besides confirming Frank et al.’s (2009) finding, Chen, Fan, and Mawani (2021) show that closely-held firms are
less aggressive than widely-held firms in simultaneously pursuing tax planning and earnings management to reduce
the agency costs between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders.
9
As Dechow et al. (2010) have pointed out, the relevance and quality of accounting earnings are conditioned on the
purpose and the user of the information. In this study, when considering the information content of the three
performance measures, I focus on their relevance to equity investors for stock valuation purpose.
8
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accrued earnings, which can be further decomposed into nondiscretionary accruals and
discretionary accruals.
Lastly, taxable income is prepared under the internal revenue code (IRC), a set of rules
mainly on accrual-basis but combined with some cash-basis principles (e.g., the IRC; Hanlon,
2005). For example, the recognition of revenue and expense is partially cash-based. There are no
such concepts as unearned revenues and allowance for doubtful accounts under the IRC (e.g.,
Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005). In addition, conservatism is not an objective of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Hanlon, 2005). Under the IRC, there are no such accounts as
allowance for doubtful accounts, warranty reserves, etc., which require a lot of managerial
subjective estimates. Certain expenses, such as bad debt expenses, warranty expenses, goodwill
impairment etc., can only be deducted when the events occur or when the accounts are written
off. Though the recognition of depreciation and amortization is accrual-based under the IRC, it
follows a set of rules much stricter than those of GAAP, which leaves less leeway for managers
to manipulate earnings through the depreciation expense of property, plant, and equipment
(PPE).
Due to these differences in recording rules between the IRC and GAAP, taxable income
contains fewer subjective estimates than book income. It thus is more reliable than book income
in the absence of tax planning and earnings management. Following the same logical reasoning,
the methods and approaches for managing taxable income are generally different from those for
managing book income (Lev and Nissim, 2004). Specifically, managers will have less room to
manage income through manipulating accruals under the IRC than GAAP.
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Overall, since CFO are free of accruals (by definition), it is the most primitive and
verifiable performance measure among the three.10 In the absence of tax avoidance and earnings
management, taxable income is a more reliable performance measure because taxable income
contains fewer estimates than book income and follows the IRC with more stringent rules on
accruals than GAAP. Because of all the aforementioned differences among the three reporting
systems, besides containing some common information on firms’ fundamentals, each of these
measures will naturally contain some different information about the firms’ performances that is
incremental to each other in the absence of tax planning and earnings management. For example,
conditioning on no managerial intention to manipulate earnings, a change in the estimated useful
life of a fixed asset will have no impact on either taxable income or CFO. However, this valuerelevant information will be reflected in the book income and on the balance sheet.
Though CFO are the most primitive and thus the most reliable summary measure of
firms’ performances among the three, it is not necessarily the most value-relevant performance
measure. On the contrary, book income has a stronger correlation with firm value than CFO
(e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2007). Dechow
(1994) and Dechow et al. (1998) have demonstrated how accruals make current book income a
better predictor of future CFO than current CFO by mitigating the timing and matching problems
in current CFO. They conclude that, in general, book income is a better summary measure for
firms’ performances than CFO. It is why book income is widely used in stock valuation even
though theoretically, the firm value is determined by its discounted cash flows (e.g., Dechow et
al., 1998; Liu et al., 2007).

10

As is inevitable in most empirical studies, there are measurement errors in measuring CFO even when it is drawn
directly from the statement of cash flows. In some cases, firms may misclassify financing cash flows as operating
cash flows (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).
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Compared with the extensive research in the value relevance of book income and cash
flows, few studies specifically investigate the informativeness of taxable income. Assessing and
comparing the value relevance of taxable income and book income, Hanlon et al. (2005) find
that, while both measures have incremental explanatory power for returns, book income contains
much more value-relevant information than taxable income. Since taxable income is not
prepared for the capital markets and no theory or empirical evidence suggests whether taxable
income or CFO are more value-relevant, I conjecture that taxable income is generally less valuerelevant than CFO.11 In summary, in the absence of tax planning and earnings management, the
information contained in book income is the highest among the three summary performance
measures, followed by CFO and then taxable income (see Figure 1).
However, all aforementioned conclusions on the value relevance of taxable income, book
income, and CFO rely on the presumption that managers objectively follow the IRC and GAAP,
respectively, when filing the tax returns and preparing the financial statements. More precisely, if
all firms engage in tax avoidance and earnings management to a certain degree, these
conclusions are conditioned on that firms engage in the average level of tax avoidance and
earnings management because these conclusions are mainly based on the results from OLS
regressions. Nevertheless, due to the differences in reporting rules, if firms deviate from the
mean or “normal” level of tax avoidance and earnings management, the information content of
these three performance measures will vary differently from each other in a systematic way

It could be argued that the “true” unobservable taxable income is more value-relevant than CFO since taxable
income is calculated based on a combination of accrual and cash methods. However, as in most studies in corporate
taxation, taxable income in this study is estimated from the financial statements. Inevitably, some value-relevant
information is lost along the way. Furthermore, this presumption will have no impact on the testing results since I
am assessing and comparing the changes in the relative and incremental information of the three summary
performance measures conditioning on tax planning and earnings management, the location of the benchmark value
relevance of the three measures is irrelevant.
11
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according to the aggressiveness of tax planning and earnings management. In other words, tax
planning and earnings management will have different impacts on the value relevance of taxable
income, book income, and CFO.
2.3.2. How investors extract information from the three summary performance
measures
In a semi-strong efficient market, stock prices reflect all available public information.
Accounting numbers are only one of the information sources that compound the total
information set in the stock market. In empirical finance and accounting studies, the complete
information set (“new” information) is usually proxied by stock prices (returns) since the
intrinsic value of any stock is unobservable. Furthermore, taxable income, book income, and
CFO collectively are only one of the subsets, though perhaps the most important one, within the
accounting information set. Compared with other sources of information, accounting numbers
are generally not a timely information source in valuating stocks (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968;
Kothari, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). As Ball and Shivakumar (2008) have pointed out,
while the stock price is based on all available information, book income is primarily based on
backward-looking information. For example, if a firm announces that it has just secured a
lucrative long-term sales contract, the capital market will react to this news immediately. The
forward-looking information contained in this contract will be impounded into the stock price
right away. However, it takes time for the positive effects of this newly signed contract to affect
the firm’s bottom line. As a summary performance measure, book income mainly plays a
confirmative role in verifying prior information (e.g., Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Ball, 2001; Ball
and Shivakumar, 2008). So do taxable income and CFO.
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Logically, if the equity market’s aggregate reactions to all previous information are
correct and precise, i.e., no earnings surprises, then stock prices will not react to earnings
announcements. In an efficient market, investors seek and process information in a cost-benefit
efficient way. While some information sources may carry unique information that cannot be
replaced by other sources, most information sources collectively reflect the same underlying
economic factors from different perspectives. Therefore, the relationship between these
information sources has two dimensions. One is substitutional, in which different information
sources can be replaced or substituted by each other. And the other is complemental, in which
different sources add supplemental information to each other to make up the whole information
set. On the substitutional dimension, when competing information sources cover the same
underlying economic factors, investors will extract the value-relevant information from the most
reliable source(s) with the least information processing costs.
On the one hand, since taxable income, book income, and CFO are all based on the same
underlying firms’ performances, they can substitute each other in capturing the firms’
fundamentals. On the other hand, since they are generated following different recording rules,
each adds some supplemental information to the accounting information set about the firms’
underlying performances. When two (one) of the three summary measures become(s) obfuscated
and less reliable, investors will rationally turn to the other one (two) measure(s) to extract the
value-relevant information. Hence, the three performance measures’ relative and incremental
informativeness to each other will vary accordingly based on firms’ aggressiveness in tax
planning and earnings management.
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2.3.3. Hypotheses for the effects of high tax planning
Due to the differences in reporting objectives and targeted users, managers face different
reporting incentives when preparing financial statements and filing tax returns. The financial
statements are primarily prepared for the capital markets, with equity investors as the primary
users. To minimize the cost of capital, both equity and debt, managers as the agents of the
shareholders generally have the incentives to report higher accounting earnings to the capital
markets. In addition, since accounting earnings are extensively used in executive compensation
contracts (Dechow, 1994), managers usually have the incentives to report a higher book
income.12 On the contrary, as the agents of shareholders, managers generally have the incentives
to report a lower taxable income when filing the tax return because reduced tax payments
directly increase shareholders’ after-tax wealth.13
Since taxable income, book income, and CFO all measure the same underlying firm
performance, the three summary measures are not independent but inevitably linked to each
other, at least to a certain degree. Among the three, CFO are the most primitive measure, which
sets the limits to which the other two measures can be manipulated without being noticed by
investors, the tax authorities, or both. Meanwhile, book income and taxable income each play a
check on the other, setting up the boundary to which the other can be manipulated without
raising a red flag to investors, the tax authorities, or both. For example, Mills (1998) finds that

12

Sometimes, managers have the incentives to smooth earnings (e.g., Moses, 1987; Kirschenheiter and Melumad,
2002; Grant, Markarian, and Parbonetti, 2009). However, I conjecture that the magnitude of earnings smooth is
unlikely to make a firm fall into the category of LEQ, which proxies for aggressive earnings management in this
study. Furthermore, firms have the incentives to report lower earnings under certain circumstances (e.g., Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986; Jones, 1991; Key, 1997).
13
Under the principal-agent framework, managers may adjust their aggressiveness in tax planning, for example, to
cover up their “tunnelling” activities (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Bauer, Fang, Pittman, Zhang, and Zhao,
2020) or to avoid other non-tax costs (Chen et al. 2010). In addition, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004) find
that some firms report higher taxable income to cover up overstated accounting earnings. However, cases in
Erickson et al. (2004) are extremely rare and mostly involved with financial reporting frauds.
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the IRS proposed audit adjustments are positively associated with the magnitude of book-taxdifferences. Furthermore, there are limited tax planning strategies that lower taxable income
without decreasing book income (e.g., Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Chen
et al., 2012). Similarly, there are limited financial reporting choices that increase book income
but keep taxable income unchanged (Cloyd et al., 1996).
Finally, with three different sets of complicated reporting systems, it is extremely costly
and challenging, if not possible, to successfully manage all three measures simultaneously
without being caught by the capital markets, the IRS, or both, especially in the long run.14 In
sum, due to the differences in recording rules, any shocks to a firm’s performance will have
different impacts on its book income, taxable income, and CFO (Lev and Nissim 2004; Ayers et
al., 2009). For instance, changes in accounting estimates will affect taxable income, book
income, and CFO differently. Similarly, a specific tax avoidance or earnings management
strategy will mechanically have different impacts on the three performance measures. For
example, accelerated revenue recognition or increased sales on credit will boost book income but
may have little to no impact on either taxable income or CFO. Based on these arguments, I
conceive that the variation in the aggressiveness of tax planning and earnings management will
have systematically different impacts on the value relevance of the three summary performance
measures.
For each firm, there is an equilibrium of tax planning and earnings management that
maximizes the firm value. Any deviation from this equilibrium will impair the firm value and
likely reduce the total information contained in reported accounting numbers, specifically taxable

14

The main approach to manipulating CFO is through real earnings management, a complex issue beyond the scope
of this study. In addition, high tax planning will inevitably affect CFO. However, the objective of high tax planning
is not to manage accounting earnings but to manipulate taxable income.
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income, book income, and CFO in this study. As a result, investors may turn to other competing
information sources when valuing firms’ common equity.15 In other words, high tax planning or
aggressive earnings management will reduce the collective information of taxable income, book
income, and CFO. However, among these three summary measures, the magnitude of the
reduction in information content varies systematically from one measure to another based on the
aggressiveness of tax planning and earnings management.
In particular, high tax planning makes reported taxable income distortedly depict a firm’s
fundamentals and thus directly reduces the information content of taxable income. Second, high
tax planning obfuscates a firm’s transactions and thus increases the information asymmetry
between insiders and other investors (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Inger, Meckfessel,
Zhou, and Fan, 2018; Balakrishnan et al., 2019), which makes investors discount the information
contained in taxable income. Third, Balakrishnan et al. (2019) find evidence that high tax
planning obscures the information environment and reduces accruals quality. Finally, Chen et al.
(2012) demonstrate that high tax planning also reduces the value relevance of book income after
controlling for earnings management. Based on these findings, I conceive that high tax planning
will reduce the informativeness of both taxable income and book income. Furthermore, since
high tax planning indicates a relatively higher level of information asymmetry, other things being
equal, the informativeness of CFO will also be lower for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms.
However, due to its straightforward recording rules, CFO will be the least affected performance
measure by high tax planning among the three. In other words, high tax planning reduces the
informativeness of taxable income the most, followed by book income and then CFO.

15

I conceive that, collectively, the information of taxable income, book income, and CFO will be lower for high taxplanning and low earnings-quality firms, respectively, than that of all other firms. However, I leave the tests for this
hypothesis to another study.
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Ayers et al. (2009) hypothesize and show that the relative and incremental information of
taxable income to book income is significantly lower for HTP firms than for all other firms.
However, my development of the hypothesis for the impacts of high tax planning is slightly
different from theirs. Their hypothesis is based on the logic that high tax planning impairs the
value relevance of taxable income, resulting in the decrease in the relative and incremental
information of taxable income to book income. On the contrary, my hypothesis is based on the
reasoning that high tax planning reduces the value relevance of taxable income the most among
the three performance measures. As a result, the relative and incremental information of taxable
income to CFO is reduced for HTP firms.16 My first hypothesis regarding the effects of high tax
planning is (Figures 2 and 5 illustrate the effects of high tax planning):
Hypothesis 1a: The relative and incremental information of taxable income to CFO will
be lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.
The direct effect of high tax planning is reduced information content of taxable income.
Moreover, since high tax planning reduces the information content of book income more than
CFO, a natural extension on Hypothesis 1a is that the relative and incremental information of
CFO to the collective information contained in taxable income and book income will be higher
for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. Hence, my second hypothesis for the effects of high tax
planning is (Figures 2 and 5 illustrate the effects of high tax planning):

16

I also predict that the relative and incremental information of taxable income to book income will be reduced for
HTP firms. However, since this prediction is already shown by Ayers et al. (2009), I will focus on the relation
between taxable income and CFO.
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Hypothesis 1b: The relative and incremental information of CFO to the aggregate
information contained in taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP firms
than Non-HTP firms.
Besides the aforementioned arguments, I would like to highlight three lines of reasoning
for my third hypothesis on the effects of high tax planning. The first is that CFO are the most
primitive and reliable measure among the three performance measures. Hence, it is likely the
least affected performance measure by tax planning among the three. The second point is based
on previous empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness obscures the firm’s information
environment and thus reduces earnings quality (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Balakrishnan
et al., 2019). In general, increased information asymmetry will reduce the credibility of all
accounting information. Still, high tax planning impairs the value relevance of book income
more severely than CFO. Third, Chen et al. (2012) present direct evidence that high tax planning
reduces the informativeness of book income. Hence, I predict that the relative and incremental
information of CFO to book income will be increased for HTP firms (see Figure 5 for the
illustration of the direct and indirect impacts of high tax planning on the information content of
the three performance measures). And my third hypothesis for the effects of high tax planning is
(Figures 2 and 5 illustrate the effects of high tax planning):
Hypothesis 1c: The relative and incremental information of CFO to book income will be
higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.
2.3.4. Hypotheses for the effects of aggressive earnings management
The earnings management literature provides extensive evidence that managers
sometimes opportunistically use the discretion available in GAAP to manipulate accounting
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earnings (e.g., Jones, 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Teoh et al., 1998; Bergstresser and
Philippon, 2006). Elliott and Hanna (1996) find that repeated write-offs decrease the information
content of earnings. Teoh et al. (1998) show that initial public offering (IPO) issuers with higher
positive discretionary accruals tend to have lower stock returns in the subsequent three years.
Ayers et al. (2009) find that the relative and incremental information of taxable income to book
income is significantly higher for firms with low earnings quality than for all other firms. These
results suggest that aggressive earnings management deteriorates the ability of book income to
faithfully reflect a firm’s fundamental performance and thus reduces the value relevance of book
income.
However, the underlying reasons supporting my hypotheses for the effects of earnings
management on the value relevance of taxable income, book income, and CFO, respectively, are
again slightly different from those of Ayers et al. (2009). Ayers et al. (2009) argue that
manipulated book income misrepresents a firm’s underlying performance, thus reducing the
information content of book income. Consequently, the information content of taxable income is
enhanced relative to book income. On the contrary, my argument is that aggressive earnings
management reduces the information content of all three performance measures. Nevertheless,
the reduction in information content is the greatest for book income, followed by taxable income
and then CFO. Hence, the relative and incremental information of book income to CFO is
reduced for LEQ firms. My first hypothesis on the effects of aggressive earnings management is
(Figures 3 and 6 illustrate the effects of aggressive earnings management):
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Hypothesis 2a: The relative and incremental information of book income to CFO will be
lower for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.17
Since taxable income in this study is estimated from the financial statements, earnings
management will inevitably affect the estimated taxable income. While nonconforming earnings
management strategies affect book income and taxable income differently, conforming earnings
management will have the same impact on book income and taxable income and thus affect the
value relevance of book income and taxable income similarly. However, for firms engaging in
aggressive earnings management, it is hard to believe that managers will adopt only one earnings
management strategy when there are two available in their toolbox. Hence, the value relevance
of taxable income will also be negatively affected by aggressive earnings management but in a
smaller magnitude than that of book income.
Furthermore, the aggressiveness of earnings management is a barometer of information
asymmetry.18 Information asymmetry is a necessary condition for earnings management because,
in a transparent information environment, investors can see through managers’ motives and
objectives of earnings management and thus undo the effects of earnings management (Fischer
and Verrecchia, 2000). I argue that there is a feedback effect between information asymmetry
and earnings management. While information asymmetry makes it possible for earnings
management, earnings management increases the level of information asymmetry between

17

I also predict that the relative and incremental information of taxable income to book income will be increased for
LEQ firms. However, since this prediction is already shown by Ayers et al. (2009), I will focus on the relation
between book income and CFO.
18
Though it is beyond the scope of this study, investigating the differences in information asymmetry between HTP
firms and LEQ firms is an interesting research topic. HTP firms may have higher information asymmetry than LEQ
firms. First, book income is always audited for public firms. Second, for most LEQ firms, earnings management is
still within GAAP, which is relatively more transparent and easier to understand than tax codes. On the contrary,
high tax planning is very complicated; and filed tax returns are not always audited by the tax authorities.
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insiders and other investors. Dye (1988) and Richardson (2000) find that firms involved in
aggressive earnings management tend to have higher information asymmetry between insiders
and outside investors, resulting in investors discounting the information contained in accounting
numbers. Finally, since CFO is the least affected performance measure by earnings management
among the three, my second and third hypotheses for the effects of aggressive earnings
management are as follows (Figures 3 and 6 illustrate the effects of aggressive earnings
management):
Hypothesis 2b: The relative and incremental information of CFO to the aggregate
information contained in taxable income and book income will be higher for LEQ firms
than Non-LEQ firms.
Hypothesis 2c: The relative and incremental information of CFO to taxable income will
be higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.
2.3.5. Hypotheses for the combined effects of high tax planning and aggressive
earnings management
Finally, for firms engaging in both high tax planning and aggressive earnings
management, the value relevance of CFO to either book income or taxable income will be
significantly increased. Hence, the first hypothesis for the collective effects of high tax planning
and aggressive earnings management is (Figures 4 and 7 illustrate the collective effects of high
tax planning and aggressive earnings management):
Hypothesis 3a: The relative and incremental information of CFO to either taxable
income or book income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms.
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Since the information content of both taxable income and book income is significantly
reduced, the relative and incremental information of CFO to the combined information of taxable
income and book income is increased for HTP&LEQ firms. Hence, my second hypothesis on the
collective effects of high tax planning and aggressive earnings management is (Figures 4 and 7
illustrate the collective effects of high tax planning and aggressive earnings management):
Hypothesis 3b: The relative and incremental information of CFO to the collective
information contained in taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP&LEQ
firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms.
2.4. Research methods
2.4.1. Classifying a firm’s reporting-type
My research design builds upon Ayers et al. (2009). To test my hypotheses, I assign firms
into six different reporting-type groups based on the mean five-year current effective tax rate and
estimated absolute discretionary accruals. First, I rank firm-years into quintiles according to their
respective current effective tax rate for each fiscal year and the two-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) industry. Firm-years falling into the lowest quintile of the current effective
tax rate are classified as high tax-planning (HTP) firms. Firm-years falling into the other four
quintiles are classified as Non-HTP firms. Second, I divide firm-years into quintiles based upon
their respective absolute discretionary accruals estimated from a modified Jones model in the
same two-digit SIC industry and fiscal year. Firm-years falling into the highest quintile of
absolute discretionary accruals are classified as low earnings-quality (LEQ) firms. Firm-years
falling into the other four quintiles are classified as Non-LEQ firms. Finally, firm-years falling
into both the lowest quintile of current effective tax rate and the highest quintile of absolute
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discretionary accruals are classified as HTP&LEQ firms. And the rest are classified as NonHTP&LEQ firms.
2.4.1.1.

Identifying high tax-planning (HTP) firms

Following Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), I
define tax planning broadly as any activity that reduces or defers tax liability. Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010) define tax avoidance as a continuum of tax planning strategies from perfectly
legal activities, such as investing in municipal bonds, to noncompliance activities, such as tax
sheltering and tax evasion. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) state that: “A tax planning activity or a
tax strategy could be anywhere along the continuum depending upon how aggressive the activity
is in reducing taxes” (p. 137). Similar to Ayers et al. (2009), I classify HTP firms as firm-years
falling into the lowest quintile of the mean accumulated five-year GAAP current effective tax
rate (ETR) for each fiscal year and the two-digit SIC industry.
Using the current effective tax rate to measure tax aggressiveness captures the effects of
deferral tax planning strategies besides permanent tax avoidance strategies after controlling for
deferred tax expenses. One of the main benefits of using the long-run effective tax rate (fiveyear) to measure high tax planning is that it avoids the high volatility of the annual current
effective tax rate. The other benefit is that accruals usually reverse over the long run. Hence, the
long-run effective tax rate measure mitigates the concern that the low current effective tax rate is
not the result of tax planning but of upward earnings management (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008;
Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Following previous studies in corporate tax planning (e.g., Dyreng
et al., 2008; Ayers et al., 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), I require both the numerator and
denominator to be positive and winsorize the effective tax rate to be within [0,1]. Specifically,
the effective tax rate for firm i in fiscal year t is calculated as:
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𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑𝑡𝑚=𝑡−4 𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑚 ⁄∑𝑡𝑚=𝑡−4 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑚

(1)

where CTEit is current income tax expense that equals the sum of current federal income tax
expense (TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO) for firm i in fiscal year t;19 and PIit is
pretax book income (PI) for firm i in fiscal year t. Since the numerator is the current tax expense,
this measure of tax aggressiveness captures the effects of both permanent and deferral tax
planning strategies. However, as Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) have pointed out, like many other
measures on tax aggressiveness, this measure does not capture the effects of conforming tax
planning strategies because the denominator is pretax GAAP earnings.
2.4.1.2.

Identifying low earnings-quality (LEQ) firms

Following Sloan (1996) and Ayers et al. (2009), I define LEQ firms as firm-years ranked
in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and the two-digit
SIC industry. Discretionary accruals models are frequently used in studies on earnings
management (e.g., Jones, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996; Ayers et al., 2009). They capture the
aggregate effects of earnings management through all different accounts, which individually may
have unnoticeable impacts but collectively make a big difference on reported earnings. The
difference between actual total accruals and estimated or expected accruals is the proxy or
measure for manipulated earnings.
Specifically, I estimate nondiscretionary accruals using a cross-sectional variation of the
modified Jones model (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley,
2005; Ayers et al., 2009). Discretionary accruals are defined as the differences between total
19

Consistent with previous research (e.g., Lev and Nissim, 2004), when either current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) or current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, I estimate current tax expense as the differences
between total income tax expense (TXT) and the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is
missing, I set TXDI as the sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax
expense (TXDFO).
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accruals and the estimated nondiscretionary accruals. Subramanyam (1996) shows that the
parameters estimated from the cross-sectional versions are better specified than those from the
time-series versions of the modified Jones model. The other two main advantages of adopting the
cross-sectional instead of the time-series accrual model are maximizing the sample size by
including younger firms and mitigating the concern regarding the nonstationarity of the
parameters. Besides, Collins and Hribar (2002) conclude that measuring accruals directly from
the statement of cash flows is better than estimating accruals indirectly from the balance sheet.
Nondiscretionary accruals estimated by the latter contain more measurement errors due to nonarticulation events, such as mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, foreign currency translations,
accounting changes, etc. Following their recommendation, I estimate nondiscretionary accruals
directly from the statement of cash flows.
Finally, I follow Kothari et al. (2005) to use net PPE instead of gross PPE in my
estimation model. Jones (1991) includes PPE in her accruals model “to control for the portion of
total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expense” (p. 212). In general, higher
depreciation expense leads to lower accounting earnings and thus lower nondiscretionary
accruals. However, the portion of accumulated depreciation in gross PPE cannot be depreciated
again. In other words, theoretically, there is no direct association between nondiscretionary
accruals and the accumulated portion of depreciation in reported gross PPE. Specifically, I crosssectionally estimate the nondiscretionary accruals at the two-digit SIC industry level with at least
ten observations in each fiscal year. And the estimating equation is as follows:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 ⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + [𝛼1 (1⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 )] + 𝛼2 [(∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 )⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 ] + 𝛼3 (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(2)
where:
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TACCit: total accruals for firm i in year t measured as 𝐼𝐵 − (𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹 − 𝑋𝐼𝐷𝑂𝐶), in which IB is
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; OANCF is cash from
operations; and XIDOC is extraordinary items and discontinued operations from the statement of
cash flows20
ΔSalesit: the change in sales (SALE) for firm i from fiscal year t-1 to t
ΔRECit: the change in accounts receivable (RECT) for firm i from fiscal year t-1 to t
PPEit: net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) for firm i in fiscal year t
TAit - 1: total assets (AT) for firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t
All the regressors in the model are deflated by lagged total assets to mitigate
heteroskedasticity in residuals (e.g., Jones, 19991; Subramanyam, 1996; Kothari et al., 2005).
Following Kothari et al. (2005) and Ayers et al. (2009), I include a constant in the accrual model,
first to alleviate heteroskedasticity that is not controlled for by using lagged total assets as the
deflator, second to mitigate the concern for an omitted size (scale) variable, and third to generate
a more symmetric estimate of discretionary accruals.
2.4.1.3.

Identifying HTP firms with LEQ (HTP&LEQ firms)

HTP&LEQ firms are defined as firm-years ranked in both the lowest quintile of the
accumulated five-year effective tax rate and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals at the two-digit SIC industry level for each fiscal year. Compared with all other firms,
these firms are aggressive in both tax planning earnings and management.

20

This estimation of nondiscretionary accruals is consistent with that of Subramanyam (1996) and Collins and
Hribar (2002).
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2.4.2. Association tests
Following previous studies (e.g., Bowen et al., 1987; Subramanyam, 1996; Hanlon et al.,
2005; Ayers et al., 2009), I conduct long-window associate tests to examine the variations in the
information content contained in taxable income, book income, and CFO across different
reporting-type groups. Unlike the definition of information content in an event study, in which
the information content is “new” information, such as earnings surprise or unexpected earnings,
the information content in this study is defined as the ability of these three measures to
summarize the information that is relevant to a firm’s stock market performance. While there is a
causal relationship between the “new” information and stock return in an event study, this study
has no intention to establish a causal relationship between the three performance measures and
stock returns. Rather, the objective of the association tests here is to examine whether these three
performance measures capture the changes in the information sets about a firm’s fundamentals,
which are reflected in the firm’s stock market performance. The information content is defined
as the ability of these three performance measures to capture the firm’s fundamentals, which is
proxied by market-adjusted stock return (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Hanlon et al., 2005; Ayers et al.,
2009).
Sloan (1993) shows that one-third of the variation in annual stock returns is associated
with the fluctuations in the market indexes, which suggests that market-wide movements in
equity values are a major source of noise in stock returns measuring a firm-specific performance.
Since the market-wide movements in stock returns are not associated with a firm’s idiosyncratic
underlying performance, deducting market indexes from the stock returns will increase the
power of the empirical test assessing the association between a firm’s change in fundamentals
and its stock return (e.g., Sloan, 1993; Dechow, 1994).
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Specifically, I regress market-adjusted yearly buy-and-hold returns on changes of pretax
book income (ΔBI), change of taxable income (ΔTI), and change of CFO (ΔCFO), respectively. I
select a 12-month window to ensure that the information content matching the stock return is
from fiscal year t.21 The 12-month window starts at the beginning of the fifth month of fiscal
year t. Selecting the end of the fourth month as the beginning and ending point ensures that the
10-K report for fiscal year t is publicly available to investors. According to Alford, Jones, and
Zmijewski (1994), within 120 days of the fiscal year-end, more than 96% of the firms have filed
their annual 10-K report. Moreover, to increase the timeliness of accounting information, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has accelerated the filing for annual 10-K since
December 15, 2003. Finally, due to the advancement in information technology, the information
contained in the 10-K report is likely fully impounded into stock prices within four months after
the fiscal year-end.
Following Ayers et al. (2009), I run two sets of association tests, in which the marketadjusted return is the dependent variable. The first set is three univariate regressions, in which
the changes in book income, taxable income, and CFO, respectively, are the independent
variables. The second set is four multiple regressions using two or all of the three summary
performance measures as the independent variables. The regression models are as follows:
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3)

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∆𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(4)

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(5)

21

Choosing a 12-month return period is consistent with many prior studies (e.g., Bowen et al., 1987; Subramanyam,
1996).
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(6)

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(7)

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(8)

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(9)

where:
Rit: the12-month buy-and-hold return of security i adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted return
starting at the beginning of the fifth month of fiscal year t
ΔBIit: the change in pretax book income (defined in Section 4.5) for firm i from year t-1 to year t
ΔTIit: the change in taxable income (defined in Section 4.5) for firm i from year t-1 to year t
ΔCFOit: the change in pretax CFO (defined in Section 4.5) for firm i from year t-1 to year t
Following prior studies (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Hanlon, 2005), I scale all regressors by total
assets at the beginning of fiscal year t to allow for cross-sectional comparison.22 I pick total
assets instead of the market value of equity (MV) as the deflator mainly for one reason. When
the stock return or market-adjusted return is the dependent variable, deflating any regressor with
the lagged MV is not an optimal choice to control for scale effect because the denominator of the
regressor is negatively correlated with the stock return by design. Hence, even if the independent
variable is, in fact, not associated with the stock return, deflating it by the beginning-year MV
may induce an association between the independent variable and the stock return.23 I run these

22

Both Sloan (1996) and Hanlon (2005) use average total assets as the deflator.
For example, even if x is in fact not associated with the return, 𝑥/𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 will be negatively correlated with the
return in the following regression, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ⁄𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 ) since 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 )⁄𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 . Besides the differences in sample size between Ayers et al. (2009) and this study, this is
another reason that the R2s and adjusted R2s of Ayers et al. (2009) are greater than those of this study.
23
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regressions annually from 1989 to 2016 by reporting-type groups, namely HTP firms, Non-HTP
firms, LEQ firms, Non-LEQ firms, HTP&LEQ firms, and Non-HTP&LEQ firms. After running
these regressions, I collect the R2s from 1989 to 2016 for every reporting-type group and get
seven 28-year time series of R2s.
2.4.3. Relative information tests
In this set of tests, I examine how the relative information between these three summary
performance measures varies when firms engage in high tax planning, aggressive earnings
management, or both. Consistent with Ayers et al. (2009), I use book income as the benchmark
performance measure when comparing the relative and incremental information between taxable
income and book income. Specifically, when calculating the R2 ratios, the R2s from the
regressions of market-adjusted return on change in book income will be the denominator. Since
no prior study has ever compared the value relevance of taxable income and CFO, before
comparing the relative and incremental information of these two performance measures, I use the
entire sample to run Equation (4) and Equation (5) every year. The performance measure that
generates the higher average R2 from the regressions will be the benchmark performance measure
(the denominator).24
2
2
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
Then for each fiscal year, I calculate the following ratios, 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
, 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
,
2
2
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
, and 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for each reporting-type group. The higher the ratio, the higher

the information contained in the numerator relative to the denominator. If the ratio is greater than

24

For all firm-years with no missing observations in taxable income, book income, and cash flows from operations,
the mean R2s from the univariate regressions of market-adjusted return on each of the three summary performance
measures, respectively, are 6.38%, 3.32%, and 2.11% for book income, cash flows from operations, and taxable
income. The differences between each pair of the three performances are all significant at the 1% level two tailed ttest). Hence, when comparing the value relevance between taxable income and CFO, CFO are used as the
benchmark performance measure.
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one, then the value-relevant information of the numerator is higher than that of the denominator.
Following Ayers et al. (2009), I use these ratios as my main statistics to test the relative
information between these three performance measures across different reporting-type groups. I
use t-test to assess the differences in the means of these ratios between HTP firms and Non-HTP
firms, LEQ firms and Non-LEQ firms, and HTP&LEQ firms and Non-HTP&LEQ firms,
respectively.
The R2 ratio test is different from across-sample R2s comparisons, a method that used to
be quite popular in accounting research assessing the value relevance of reported accounting
numbers (e.g., Harris, Lang, and Mőller, 1994; Collins et al., 1997; Nwaeze, 1998; Francis and
Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Francis et al., 2003) but criticized in recent years (e.g.,
Brown et al., 1999; Gu, 2007).25 One of the conclusions on the use of R2s is that, in general,
across-sample R2s are not directly comparable. However, as Ayers et al. (2009) have pointed out,
the R2 ratios compare the relative information content between the three performance measures
for “groups of firms segregated on tax (tax-planning) and accounting (earnings-quality)
characteristics” (p.37). The R2 ratios are calculated within the same sample group for each fiscal
year before they are compared between groups. That is, the relative information test involves two
steps. The first step is equivalent to a within-sample R2s comparison, the numerators versus the
denominators. The second step compares these R2 ratios between different reporting-type groups,
i.e., HTP versus Non-HTP, LEQ versus Non-LEQ, and HTP&LEQ versus Non-HTP&LEQ. Thus,
the R2 ratio comparison avoids the potential caveats of direct across-sample R2 comparison.

25

For example, Collins et al. (1997) use R2s to examine the changes in the value relevance of book income and book
value of equity from 1953 to 1993.
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2.4.4. Incremental information tests
In the second set of tests, first, I assess the incremental explanatory power on returns of
the change in taxable income and CFO, respectively, over the change in book income across
different reporting-type groups. Following Ayers et al. (2009), the statistics for this test are
2
2
2
2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
and 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
, respectively. Second, I assess the incremental

explanatory power on returns of taxable income over CFO across different reporting-type
2
2
groups. The statistics for this test are 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
. Finally, I examine the incremental

explanatory power on returns of CFO over the combined explanatory power of book income and
2
2
taxable income. And the statistics for this comparison are 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼
.

2.4.5. Calculation of main variables
Following Hanlon et al. (2005) and Ayers et al. (2009), all three performance measures
are calculated pretax.
Taxable income:
Because a firm’s filed tax return is private information, as in most prior tax research
studies, taxable income in this study is estimated from the financial statements. Of course, there
will be measurement errors in these estimates of taxable income.26 However, this is not an issue
for this study. Since a firm’s actual taxable income is not publicly available, investors are more
likely to use estimated taxable income as one of the inputs for stock valuation in a semi-efficient
capital market. Above all, the objective of this study is not to examine the value relevance of the
invisible actual taxable income but the estimated taxable income from the financial statements.
Following Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) and Ayers et al. (2009), I deduct the change in the unused

26

See Hanlon (2003) for a detailed discussion on the potential problems of estimating taxable income from the
financial statements.
Page 50 of 217

portion of net operating loss carryforward (ΔTLCF) to get the estimate of a firm’s taxable income
without any effects of the loss carrybacks or carryforwards.27 To be consistent with the pretax
measures of taxable income and book income, I add back cash tax paid (TXPD) to CFO.28
𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 ⁄𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑡 − ∆𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡

(10)

where:

TIit: estimated taxable income for firm i in fiscal year t
CTEit: current tax expenses as previously defined
strt: the top US statutory federal tax rate for year t (34% from 1989 to 1993 and 35% from 1993
to 2016)29
ΔTLCFit: the change in the unused portion of net operating loss carryforward (TLCF) for firm i
from t-1 to t
Pretax book income:
𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡

(11)

where:
BIit: pretax book income for firm i in fiscal year t
PIit : pretax book income (PI) for firm i in fiscal year t
MIIit: minority interest (MII) for firm i in fiscal year t

27

Obviously, there is a concern of endogeneity for this adjustment. Firms with no loss carryforwards probably have
stronger motivation to lower their taxable incomes than firms with loss carryforwards sitting on their balance sheets.
28
All Compustat data items are capitalized and italicized in parentheses.
29
“Corporate Top Tax Rate and Bracket, 1909 to 2020,” accessed February 7, 2020,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/corporate-top-tax-rate-and-bracket
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CFO:30
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑋𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡

(12)

OANCFit: cash from operations (OANCF) for firm i in fiscal year t
TXPDit: cash tax paid (TXPD) for firm i in fiscal year t
2.5. Sample selection and testing results
2.5.1. Sample selection
My targeted sample is US public firms only in the intersection of Compustat and CRSP
databases of 2019.31 I keep firms with complete data on all required items for each firm-year
from 1989 to 2016 plus the prior four years required data items to estimate the five-year average
GAAP current effective tax rate.32 I exclude 2017 and after from my sample to mitigate the
potential undue impact of firms’ dramatic changes in their financial reporting and tax filing
behaviour, such as inter-temporal income shifting, induced by the significant corporate tax rate
cut in 2018, from 35% in 2017 to 21% in 2018 and thereafter; and thus improve the
comparability of all the measures for the whole sample period.33

30

As is inevitable in most empirical studies, there are measurement errors in the measure of cash flows from
operations, especially if it is derived from the income statement and balance sheet. I mitigate this issue by
calculating CFO directly from the statement of cash flows. In addition, though earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is frequently used as a proxy for CFO, it is still an accrual-based
performance measure, net earnings inflated by interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. For example, interest
expense (tax expense) seldom equals interest paid (cash tax). Except for depreciation and amortization, any sources
causing the differences between book income and CFO still exist between EBITDA and CFO. For instance, an
increase in sales will increase EBITDA, other things being equal. However, if the increased sales all end up in
accounts receivable, CFO will not increase.
31
I drop observations whose Incorporation Code does not equal “USA.”
32
Though the cash flow statement is mandatory from 1988, since the change in CFO is required to run the
association tests, the testing period is limited to starting from fiscal year 1989.
33
Both Scholes et al. (1992) and Guenther (1994) find evidence that firms shifted income from the year prior to the
effective date of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to later reporting periods, which reduced the maximum corporate tax
rate from 46% to 34% over a two-year period.
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Following prior studies (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Barber and Lyon, 1996; Hanlon, 2005;
Ayers et al., 2009), I exclude firms in the financial services (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities
(SIC codes 4900-4999) because these two industries are highly regulated. Firms in these two
industries have different reporting incentives and limitations when preparing financial statements
and filing tax returns. Following Subramanyam (1996) and Ayers et al. (2009), I delete any
observations with a fiscal year-end change to ensure that observations are comparable across
fiscal years. Finally, I winsorize all the financial statement variables at the 1% level each year to
mitigate the impact of outliers.
After merging the CRSP return dataset with the Compustat financial statement dataset, I
end up with an overall sample containing 65,062 firm-years from 1989 to 2016. The subsample
with non-missing value in HTP has 36,039 firm-years with 7,790 classified as HTP firm, about
278 observations per fiscal year. The subsample with non-missing value in LEQ contains 55,547
firm-years, with 10,647 classified as LEQ firms, about 380 observations per fiscal year. Finally,
the subsample with non-missing value in HTP&LEQ contains 29,511 firm-years with 1,082
classified as HTP&LEQ firm, about 39 observations per fiscal year.34
2.5.2. Summary statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the sample and main variables. Besides the
empirical proxies for my hypotheses tests, such as market-adjusted return, effective tax rate, the
absolute value of discretionary accruals, and change in taxable income, book income, and CFO, I
include the level measures of the three performance measures and the signed discretionary
accruals to get the big picture of firms’ fundamentals and the relationships between these

34

This finding supports the conjecture that there are limited tax planning and earnings management strategies to
report a lower taxable income and a higher book income at the same time.
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variables. I also include after-tax book income to assess the impacts of tax planning and earnings
management on net income for different reporting-type groups.
Market-adjusted returns:
The average market-adjusted returns are 5.36%, 6.36%, 4.93%, 8.22%, 5.67%, 10.94%,
and 5.00% for the overall sample, HTP, Non-HTP, LEQ, Non-LEQ, HTP&LEQ, and NonHTP&LEQ firms, respectively. The mean market-adjusted returns for HTP, LEQ, and
HTP&LEQ firms are significantly higher than those of their Non-HTP, Non-LEQ, and NonHTP&LEQ counterparts, respectively, all at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test).
Moreover, the mean market-adjusted return for HTP&LEQ is the highest among the six
subgroups. These results may suggest that the systematic risk of HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ
firms are higher than that of their corresponding Non-HTP, Non-LEQ, and Non-HTP&LEQ
counterparts, respectively.35 Hence, investors of these firms are rewarded or compensated for
taking the comparatively higher investment risk. This finding is consistent with Francis, LaFond,
Olsson, and Schipper’s (2005) conclusion that accruals quality is a priced risk factor.
Furthermore, this result is inconsistent with that of Ayers et al. (2009), in which they do not find
any significant difference in the means of market-adjusted return between HTP (LEQ) and NonHTP (Non-LEQ) firms.36
The inconsistency between my results and those of Ayers et al. (2009) might suggest that
the capital markets have been evolving and becoming more efficient recently as investors had
been rewarded for investing in HTP, LEQ, or HTP&LEQ firms during my sample period (from

35

It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate whether the risk tied with high tax planning and aggressive
earnings management is systematic or idiosyncratic.
36
When using cash ETR to classify HTP and Non-HTP firms, Ayers et al. (2009) do find that the mean of marketadjusted returns for HTP firms is significantly higher than that of Non-HTP firms.
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1989 to 2016) but not during the sample period of Ayers et al. (2009) (from 1983 to 2002). This
explanation is consistent with the findings of Green, Hand, and Soliman (2011) and Battalio,
Lerman, Livnat, and Mendenhall (2012). Green et al. (2011) demonstrate that the accruals
anomaly has been diminishing in recent years. Battalio et al. (2012) find evidence that
sophisticated investors, proxied by whose trade size is at least 5,000 shares, trade on accruals
information in the right direction when the 10-K/Q report is released. In addition, the evidence
that LEQ firms have higher market-adjusted returns than Non-LEQ firms supports Francis et al.’s
(2005) conclusion that accruals quality is a priced risk factor and firms with lower accruals
quality tend to have higher costs of capital.
Pretax book income and after-tax book income:
First, the mean pretax book income for HTP firms (0.0867) is lower than that of NonHTP firms (0.1091) at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Based on this summary
measure, on average, Non-HTP firms outperform HTP firms. This result partially explains why
HTP firms have comparatively lower current effective tax rates than Non-HTP firms.
Nevertheless, this result also suggests that HTP firms might be more strongly motivated to
engage in tax planning to reduce tax expenses than their Non-HTP counterparts because HTP
firms are more financially distressed due to relatively poorer performance than their Non-HTP
counterparts.
Second, the mean pretax book income for LEQ firms (-0.0478) is also lower than that of
their Non-LEQ counterparts (0.0506) at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Hence, the
average performance of LEQ firms is worse than that of their Non-LEQ counterparts based on
this summary measure. All firms face the capital market pressures, such as meeting or beating
analysts' forecasts of net earnings. Since an LEQ firm has poorer performance than a Non-LEQ
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firm on average, on the one hand, if the firm has just marginally missed its earnings target, the
managers may manipulate its after-tax book income upward through accruals earnings
management. On the other hand, if the firm has missed its net earnings target for a large amount,
the managers might take a “big bath” to “save earnings” for the future. Either way, firms with
relatively worse performance are more likely to end up in the class of LEQ firms. In addition, if
managers’ compensations are tied with net earnings or stock performances, they tend to act the
same way as they face the pressures from the capital markets.
Similar to pretax book income, the mean after-tax book income of both HTP (0.0625) and
LEQ firms (-0.0676) is lower than their corresponding Non-HTP (0.0699) and Non-LEQ
counterparts (0.0229), respectively, at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Finally, while
there is no significant difference in the means of pretax book income between HTP&LEQ firms
(0.1058) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.1050), the mean after-tax book income of HTP&LEQ
firms (0.0839) is significantly higher than that of Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0683) at the 1%
significance level (two-tailed t-test). This result suggests that HTP&LEQ firms are systematically
different from either HTP or LEQ firms since they can successfully achieve the goal of reporting
a higher after-tax performance through optimizing their tax planning and earnings management
strategies.
Change in pretax book income and after-tax book income:
First, the mean of changes in pretax book income for HTP firms (-0.0050) is higher than
that of Non-HTP firms (-0.0092) at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Based on the
change in pretax book income, HTP firms outperform Non-HTP firms. However, there is no
significant difference in the means of change in after-tax book income between HTP (-0.0060)
and Non-HTP firms (-0.0065). Second, both the means of change in pretax book income
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(-0.0216) and change in after-tax book income (-0.0176) for LEQ firms are lower than those of
their Non-LEQ counterparts (0.0001 and 0.0015), at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test),
respectively. Finally, both the means of change in pretax book income (0.0053) and change in
after-tax book income (0.0093) for HTP&LEQ firms are higher than those of their NonHTP&LEQ counterparts (-0.0090 and -0.0070) at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test),
respectively. Based on these two measures, HTP&LEQ firms outperform their Non-HTP&LEQ
counterparts.
Taxable income and change in taxable income:
First, the mean taxable income of HTP (0.0421), LEQ (-0.0093), and HTP&LEQ (0.0477)
firms are all significantly lower than that of their Non-HTP (0.1005), Non-LEQ (0.0461), and
Non-HTP&LEQ (0.0900) counterparts, respectively, at the 1% significance level (two-tailed ttest). Hence, based on taxable income, HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms, on average, all
underperform their corresponding Non-HTP, Non-LEQ, and Non-HTP&LEQ counterparts,
respectively. Second, the means of change in taxable income for LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms
are -0.0075 and 0.0003, respectively, which are not significantly different from the means of
their Non-LEQ (-0.0040) and Non-HTP&LEQ (-0.0084) counterparts, respectively. Finally, the
mean of change in taxable income for HTP firms (-0.0036) is higher than that of Non-HTP firms
(-0.0092) at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test).
CFO and change in CFO:
First, the means of CFO for HTP (0.1253), LEQ (0.0803), and HTP&LEQ (0.1162) firms
are all lower than those for their Non-HTP (0.1561), Non-LEQ (0.1246), and Non-HTP&LEQ
(0.1520) counterparts, respectively, at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Based on this

Page 57 of 217

summary measure, HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms, on average, under-perform their
corresponding Non-HTP, Non-LEQ, and Non-HTP&LEQ counterparts, respectively. Second, the
mean change in CFO for HTP firms (-0.0040) is not significantly different from that of their
Non-HTP (-0.0047) counterparts. Finally, the means of change in CFO for LEQ and HTP&LEQ
firms are -0.0063 and -0.0156, respectively, which are significantly lower than the means for
their corresponding Non-LEQ (-0.0023) and Non-HTP&LEQ (-0.0043) counterparts at the 5%
and 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test), respectively. Based on this performance measure,
LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms generally underperform their Non-LEQ and Non-HTP&LEQ
counterparts, respectively.
GAAP current effective tax rate:
First, the means of current effective tax rates are significantly higher for LEQ firms than
for Non-LEQ firms at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Second, by construction, the
means of effective tax rates for both HTP and HTP&LEQ firms are lower than those of their
corresponding Non-HTP and Non-HTP&LEQ counterparts, respectively, at the 1% significance
level (two-tailed t-test). An untabulated t-test reveals that the mean effective tax rate of HTP
firms (0.1419) is significantly higher than that of HTP&LEQ firms (0.1285) at the 1% level
(two-tailed t-test), which suggests that HTP&LEQ firms are even more aggressive than HTP
firms in tax planning. This result strongly supports Frank et al.’s (2009) conclusion that
aggressive tax planning is positively associated with aggressive financial reporting.
The absolute value of discretionary accruals and signed discretionary accruals:
By design, the mean absolute discretionary accruals for LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms are
significantly higher than that of their corresponding Non-LEQ and Non-HTP&LEQ counterparts,
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respectively, at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). If converted to a dollar amount, the
difference is about $62 million between LEQ and Non-LEQ firms. The magnitude of the
difference is enormous, especially when considering that the average size of LEQ firms ($1,046
million) is much smaller than that of Non-LEQ firms ($3,114 million). Furthermore, the total
difference between HTP&LEQ and Non-HTP&LEQ firms is about $27 million. The difference is
also economically huge, considering that the average size of HTP&LEQ firms ($1,514 million) is
much smaller than that of their Non-HTP&LEQ counterparts ($3,995 million).
Surprisingly, the mean absolute discretionary accruals of HTP firms are higher than that
of Non-HTP firms at the 5% significance level (two-tailed t-test). The difference is nontrivial
economically, 0.0564 and 0.0544, respectively, for HTP and Non-HTP firms. Converting to
dollar value, it is about a $4.08 million difference in the absolute amount of discretionary
accruals between HTP and Non-HTP firms.37 This result supports Frank et al.’s (2009)
conclusion that tax aggressiveness is positively correlated with financial reporting
aggressiveness.
With regard to signed discretionary accruals, first, the mean discretionary accruals of
HTP firms (0.0153) are higher than that of Non-HTP firms (0.0091) at the 1% significance level
(two-tailed t-test). It is a $24.46 million difference between HTP and Non-HTP firms. Again this
is consistent with Frank et al.’s (2009) conclusion that firms aggressive in tax planning tend to be
also aggressive in financial reporting. Second, the mean discretionary accruals of LEQ firms
(-0.0141) are surprisingly negative and much lower than that of Non-LEQ firms (0.0054) at the
1% significance level (two-tailed t-test), which suggests that LEQ firms are more likely to take a

37

The average total assets for HTP and Non-HTP firms are $4,054 million and $4,128 million, respectively.
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“big bath” than manipulating earnings upwards when managing accruals. On average,
discretionary accruals of LEQ firms are about $31.56 million lower than that of Non-LEQ firms.
Considering the much smaller mean size of LEQ firms ($1,046 million) than Non-LEQ firms
($3,114 million), the difference in dollar amount is economically huge.
On the contrary, the mean discretionary accruals of HTP&LEQ firms (0.0518) are much
higher than that of Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0091) at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test).
Converting to dollar amount, it is a $42.06 million difference between HTP&LEQ and NonHTP&LEQ firms. Considering that the average total assets of HTP&LEQ firms ($1,514 million)
is much smaller than that of Non-HTP&LEQ firms ($3,995 million), this result suggests that
HTP&LEQ firms are very aggressive in using discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward.
This result also suggests that HTP&LEQ firms are not only different from Non-HTP&LEQ firms
but also systematically different from LEQ firms. While LEQ firms tend to manipulate earnings
downward, HTP&LEQ firms aggressively manage earnings upward (Figure 8 illustrates the
different patterns of signed discretionary accruals HTP&LEQ firms and LEQ firms).
Total assets and market value of equity:
Regarding total assets, while there is no significant difference in the means between HTP
and Non-HTP firms, the mean sizes for LEQ ($1,046 million) and HTP&LEQ ($1,514 million)
firms are lower than their corresponding Non-LEQ ($3,114 million) and Non-HTP&LEQ ($3,995
million) counterparts, respectively, at the 1% significance level (two-tailed t-test). Concerning
the market value of equity, HTP ($3,888 million), LEQ ($1,458 million), and HTP&LEQ ($1,892
million) firms are all smaller than their corresponding Non-HTP ($5,415 million), Non-LEQ
($3,794 million), and Non-HTP&LEQ ($5,090 million) counterparts, respectively, at the 1%
significance level (two-tailed t-test).
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2.5.3. Relative information analyses
Table 2 presents the results of relative information tests. Hypothesis 1a predicts that the
relative information of taxable income to CFO will be lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
is predicted to be lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
Strongly supporting Hypothesis 1a, the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for HTP firms (0.5182) is lower

than Non-HTP firms (1.4467) at the 1% significance level (one-tailed t-test).38 In addition,
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
consistent with Ayers et al. (2009), the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for HTP firms (0.1964) is

significantly lower than Non-HTP firms (0.5305) at the 1% level.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that the relative information of CFO to the collective information
of taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. Hence,
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. As
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
predicted, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP firms (0.6024) is higher than Non-HTP firms

(0.4729) at the 10% significance level.
Hypothesis 1c predicts that the relative information of CFO to book income will be
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. As predicted, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP

firms (0.6402) is higher than Non-HTP firms (0.4955) at the 10% significance level. This result,
first, supports my conjecture that high tax planning reduces the information content of book
income more than CFO. Second, it corroborates Chen et al.’s (2012) finding that high tax
planning reduces the value relevance of book income besides impairing the informativeness of
taxable income. Third, this result supports Balakrishnan et al.’s (2019) conclusion that tax

38

Unless otherwise stated, all tests are one-tailed t-test throughout Essay One.
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avoidance reduces accruals quality and thus earnings quality. Finally, it is consistent with prior
findings that high tax planning not only complicates tax reporting but also increases the
complexity of a firm’s organizational structure, transaction arrangement, and financial reporting
(e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Balakrishnan et al., 2019). Overall, the
relative information tests for the hypotheses on the consequences of high tax planning are well
supported.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the relative information of book income to CFO will be lower
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be higher for

LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. However, this prediction is not supported. Though the mean of
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ firms (0.7595) is higher than Non-LEQ firms (0.6620), the difference is not
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
statistically significant. The main reason is that the standard deviations of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ

firms (0.8564) is much greater than their Non-LEQ counterparts (0.4476). For the same reason,
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
even though the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for LEQ firms (0.3507) is higher than Non-LEQ firms
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
(0.3149), the difference is not statistically significant.39 The standard deviations of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
are

0.3973 and 0.2056, respectively, for LEQ and Non-LEQ firms. The higher standard deviations
for LEQ firms indicate that investors are more “puzzled” when extracting the value-relevant
information contained in taxable income, book income, and CFO for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ
firms. These results are consistent with the conjecture that aggressive earnings management
reduces the quality of reported accounting numbers other than book income.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the relative information of CFO to the collective information
contained in taxable income and book income will be higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.

2 ⁄ 2
In their sample, Ayers et al. (2009) find that the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼 is significantly higher for LEQ firms than
Non-LEQ firms.
39
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2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ

firms. However, this prediction is not supported. Contradictory to my prediction, the mean of
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ firms (0.5480) is lower than Non-LEQ firms (0.6152), though not
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
statistically significant. And the standard deviation of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ firms (0.5418) is

greater than Non-LEQ firms (0.4045), which indicates that investors of LEQ firms face more
obstacles in processing the information contained in these firms’ financial statements.
Hypothesis 2c states that the relative information of CFO to taxable income will be
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
is predicted to be

lower for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. However, this prediction is not supported either. On
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
the contrary, the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for LEQ firms (1.4108) is higher than Non-LEQ firms

(0.7383) even though the difference is not statistically significant. Again, the standard deviation
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for LEQ firms (3.1790) is more than quadruple of Non-LEQ firms (0.7007),

which suggests that the information contained in taxable income and CFO is much more volatile
for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms.
Overall, the relative information tests of the hypotheses on the consequences of
aggressive earnings management are not supported. However, the much greater standard
deviations of the R2 ratios for LEQ firms are consistent with the notion that earnings
management reduces the quality of reported accounting numbers, making their associations with
the market-adjusted stock returns volatile. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that
earnings management makes it more difficult for investors to assess the information contained in
taxable income, book income, and CFO.
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Hypothesis 3a predicts that the relative information of CFO to either book income or
taxable income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. Hence, while the
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms,
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
is predicted to be lower for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
firms. The mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP&LEQ firms is 4.6413, which is higher than Non-

HTP&LEQ firms (0.4922) as predicted at the 5% significance level. Contradictory to my
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
prediction, the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for HTP&LEQ firms (1.2631) is higher than Non-

HTP&LEQ firms (1.0972) though the difference is not statistically significant. Again, the
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
standard deviation of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for HTP&LEQ firms (2.2164) is much higher than Non-

HTP&LEQ firms (0.8431). This is consistent with the conjecture that high tax planning and
aggressive earnings management make it more difficult for investors to extract the value-relevant
information contained in taxable income and cash from operations for HTP&LEQ firms than
Non-HTP&LEQ firms.
Hypothesis 3b predicts that the relative information of CFO to the collective information
contained in taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
HTP&LEQ firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be higher for HTP&LEQ
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. As predicted, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP&LEQ

firms (1.4039) is higher than Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.4731) at the 10% significance level.
Overall, the relative information tests of the hypotheses on the combined effects of aggressive
tax planning and earnings management are statistically supported except for one prediction.
In sum, the relative information tests on the effects of high tax planning (Hypothesis 1a,
Hypothesis 1b, and Hypothesis1c) and the combined impacts of high tax planning and earnings
management (Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis3b) on the information content contained in taxable
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income, book income, and CFO are well supported except for two predictions. Though my
predictions on the consequences of aggressive earnings management are not supported, the main
underlying reason is that the standard deviations of the R2 ratios for HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ
firms are much greater than those of their corresponding Non-HTP, Non-LEQ, and NonHTP&LEQ counterparts, respectively. This evidence is conceptually consistent with the notion
that it is more difficult for investors to process the value-relevant information contained in the
financial statements of HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms.
2.5.4. Incremental information analyses
Table 3 presents the results of incremental information tests. Hypothesis 1a states that the
incremental information of taxable income over CFO will be lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP
2
2
firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be lower for HTP firms than Non2
2
HTP firms. Supporting Hypothesis 1a, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP firms (0.0102

and a 31.84% increase in explanatory power) is lower than Non-HTP firms (0.0283 and a
91.32% increase in explanatory power) at the 1% significance level. Though the mean of
2
2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
for HTP firms (0.0023 and a 3.62% increase in explanatory power) is lower

than Non-HTP firms (0.0045 and a 4.84% increase in explanatory power), the difference is not
statistically significant.40
Hypothesis 1b predicts that the incremental information of CFO over the collective
information of taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP
2
2
firms. Therefore, 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
is predicted to be greater for HTP firms than Non2
2
HTP firms. Supporting Hypothesis 1b, the means of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼
is higher for

2
2
Ayers et al. (2009) find that the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
is significantly higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP
firms.
40
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HTP firms (0.0115 and a 20.01% increase in explanatory power) than Non-HTP firms (0.0063
and a 7.81% increase in explanatory power) at the 5% significance level. Hypothesis 1c predicts
that the incremental information of CFO over book income will be higher for HTP firms than for
2
2
Non-HTP firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
will be greater for HTP firms than Non-

HTP firms. This prediction is also supported at the 10% significance level. The means of
2
2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
are 0.0116 (a 21.69% increase in explanatory power) and 0.0073 (a 9.23%

increase in explanatory power), respectively, for HTP and Non-HTP firms. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c are all supported by the results of the incremental information test.
Hypothesis 2a states that the incremental information of book income over CFO will be
2
2
lower for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. Hence, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
is predicted to

be greater for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the means of
2
2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
is significantly lower for LEQ firms (0.0122 and a 39.05% increase in

explanatory power) than Non-LEQ firms (0.0059 and a 13.27% increase in explanatory power) at
2
2
the 5% level. Consistent with Ayers et al. (2009), the means of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
is significantly

higher for LEQ firms (0.0104 and a 14.88% increase in explanatory power) than Non-LEQ firms
(0.0020 and a 3.37% increase in explanatory power) at the 1% level.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the incremental information of CFO over the collective
information of taxable income and book income will be higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ
2
2
firms. Hence, 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼
is predicted to be greater for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ
2
2
firms. Supporting this prediction, the means of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼
is higher for LEQ

firms (0.0125 and a 28.28% increase in explanatory power) than Non-LEQ firms (0.0064 and a
13.78% increase in explanatory power) at the 10% significance level.
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Hypothesis 2c states that the incremental information of CFO over taxable income will be
2
2
higher for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. Hence, 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is predicted to be lower

for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. However, this prediction is not supported. On the contrary,
2
2
the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
is greater for LEQ firms (0.0259 and a 122.61% increase in

explanatory power) than Non-LEQ firms (0.0107 and a 40.86% increase in explanatory power) at
the 10% significance level. Overall, my incremental information tests for the hypotheses of the
consequences of aggressive earnings management are well supported except for Hypothesis 2c.
Hypothesis 3a predicts that the incremental information of CFO over either book income
or taxable income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. Hence, while
2
2
the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
is predicted to be greater for HTP&LEQ firms than Non2
2
HTP&LEQ firms, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
will be lower for HTP&LEQ firms than Non2
2
HTP&LEQ firms. The mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
for HTP&LEQ firms (0.0425 and a 529.45%

increase in explanatory power) is higher than for Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0067 and a 9.51%
increase in explanatory power) at the 5% significance level. Contradictory to my prediction, the
2
2
mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP&LEQ firms (0.0389 and a 76.97% increase in explanatory

power) is greater than for Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0223 and a 70.09% increase in explanatory
power) though the difference is not statistically significant.
Hypothesis 3b predicts that the incremental information of CFO over the collective
information of taxable income and book income will be higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non2
2
HTP&LEQ firms. Hence, 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
is predicted to be significantly greater for

HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. This prediction is supported at the 1% significance
2
2
level. The means of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
are 0.0472 (a 129.78% increase in explanatory

power) and 0.0061 (a 7.52% increase in explanatory power), respectively, for HTP&LEQ firms
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and Non-HTP&LEQ firms. Therefore, the incremental information tests of the combined effects
of high tax planning and aggressive earnings management are strongly supported except for one
prediction.
In sum, the incremental information tests on the impacts of high tax planning and
aggressive earnings management on the value relevance of taxable income, book income, and
CFO are well supported except for two predictions. Furthermore, the incremental information
testing results are more consistent than those from the relative information tests.
2.6. Robustness Tests
To check the robustness of the results in Section 2.5, I conduct three additional tests.
First, to mitigate the measurement error in estimated taxable income related to foreign-source
earnings, following Blaylock, Lawson, and Mayberry (2020), I drop firm-years reporting nonzero foreign taxes (TXFO). The testing results are qualitatively similar to those reported in
Section 2.5.41 Second, I use cash ETR instead of GAAP current ETR to measure tax
aggressiveness. Then, I further use the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test to conduct the relative and
incremental information analyses.
2.6.1. Measuring tax aggressiveness using cash effective rates
The cash effective tax rate is another commonly used measure for tax aggressiveness
(e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008; Ayers et al., 2009; Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock, 2017).
Other things being equal, when time-value is considered, the cash ETR is a better measure for tax
aggressiveness than GAAP ETR. In this section, I use the average five-year cash ETR to measure

41

The results are not tabulated here but available if requested.
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tax aggressiveness and classify HTP firms. The calculation of the cash ETR follows Equation (1)
except for the numerator being replaced by cash tax paid (TXPD).
Table 4 presents the results of the relative information tests. Hypothesis 1a is strongly
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
supported as the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for HTP firms (0.6336) is lower than Non-HTP firms
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
(2.1186) at the 1% significance level. Consistent with Ayers et al. (2009), the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼

for HTP firms (0.2638) is significantly lower than Non-HTP firms (0.4460) at the 1% level.
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
Hypothesis 1b is also supported. The mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP firms (0.6321) is

significantly higher than Non-HTP firms (0.3373) at the 5% level. Finally, Hypothesis 1c is also
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
strongly supported as the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP firms (0.7020) is significantly higher

than Non-HTP firms (0.3495) at the 1% level.
Similar to the results in Section 2.5.3, Hypothesis 2a is not supported. Though the mean
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ firms (1.2848) is higher than Non-LEQ firms (0.9262), the difference is

not statistically significant. The underlying reason is the same as that explained in Section 2.5.3.
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
The standard deviations of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ firms (2.5190) is much greater than Non-LEQ
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
firms (1.6426). For the same reason, though the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for LEQ firms (4.4862) is

much greater than Non-LEQ firms (0.4870), the difference is not statistically significant.
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
Hypothesis 2b is not supported either as there is no difference in the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂

between LEQ firms and Non-LEQ firms. Finally, contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 2c, the
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
for LEQ firms (3.3448) is significantly higher than Non-LEQ firms

(0.7187) at the 1% level. This finding suggests that empirically earnings management reduces
the information content of CFO more than taxable income.
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Hypothesis 3a is partially supported. While there is no significant difference between
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
HTP&LEQ firms and Non-HTP&LEQ firms in the mean of 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
, the mean of
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP&LEQ firms (2.6145) is significantly higher than Non-HTP&LEQ firms
2
2
⁄𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
(0.4144) at the 5% level. Hypothesis 3b is strongly supported as the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for

HTP&LEQ firms (1.0035) is significantly higher than Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.3966) at the 1%
level.
Table 5 presents the results of the incremental information tests using cash ETR to define
2
aggressiveness in tax planning. Hypothesis 1a is strongly supported as the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
−
2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for HTP firms (0.0114) is significantly lower than Non-HTP firms (0.0246) at the 1%
2
2
level. Supporting Hypothesis 1b, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼
for HTP firms (0.0083)

is significantly higher than Non-HTP firms (0.0043) at the 5% level. Hypothesis 1c is also
2
2
supported as the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
for HTP firms (0.0056) is significantly higher than

Non-HTP firms (0.0026) at the 5% level.
Hypothesis 2a is not supported as there is no significant difference between LEQ and
2
2
Non-LEQ firms in 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
. Hypothesis 2b is marginally supported as the mean of
2
2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐵𝐼
for LEQ firms (0.0097) is higher than Non-LEQ firms (0.0028) at the

10% significance level. Hypothesis 2c is not supported. Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis
2
2
2c, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for LEQ firms (0.0200) is significantly higher than Non-

LEQ firms (0.0070) at the 5% level.
2
2
The testing results for Hypothesis 3a are mixed. The mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
for

HTP&LEQ firms (0.0967) is significantly higher than Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0044) at the 5%
2
2
level. Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 3a, the mean of 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
− 𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
for
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HTP&LEQ firms (0.0784) is higher than Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0190) at the 10% level.
2
2
Hypothesis 3b is strongly supported as the mean of 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
− 𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
for HTP&LEQ

firms (0.0859) is significantly higher than Non-HTP&LEQ firms (0.0042) at the 1% level.
Overall, when using cash ETR as the proxy for tax aggressiveness, the testing results are
qualitatively similar to those in Section 2.5.3 and Section 2.5.4 when GAAP current ETR is used
to measure tax aggressiveness.
2.6.2. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test
In this section, besides using cash ETR to measure tax aggressiveness, I further use the
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test to assess the differences in the medians of R2 ratios and incremental
R2s, respectively, for the relative and incremental information tests. Table 6 presents the testing
results. Regarding the effects of high tax planning, first, supporting Hypothesis 1a, the relative
and incremental information of taxable income to CFO is significantly lower for HTP firms than
Non-HTP firms at the 5% level. Second, consistent with Hypothesis 1b, the relative and
incremental information of CFO to the aggregate information contained in book income and
taxable income is significantly higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms at the 5% level.
Finally, Hypothesis 1c is also supported as the relative information of CFO to book income is
significantly higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms at the 1% level and the incremental
information of CFO over book income is significantly higher for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms
at the 5% level.
Concerning the effects of aggressive earnings management, first, Hypothesis 2a is
partially supported. While there is no significant difference between LEQ and Non-LEQ firms in
the relative information of book income to CFO, the incremental information of book income
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over CFO is significantly lower for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms at the 5% significance level.
Hypothesis 2b is also partially supported. While there is no significant difference between LEQ
and Non-LEQ firms in the relative information of CFO to the aggregate information contained in
book income and taxable income, the incremental information of CFO over the aggregate
information contained in book income and taxable income is significantly higher for LEQ firms
than Non-LEQ firms at the 5% level. Finally, Hypothesis 2c is not supported. Contradictory to
the prediction of Hypothesis 2c, the relative information of CFO to taxable income is lower for
LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms at the 5% significance level. Similarly, the incremental
information of CFO over taxable income is significantly lower for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ
firms at the 1% level. This finding suggests that aggressive earnings management has a stronger
negative impact on the informativeness of CFO than taxable income. One potential explanation
for this finding is that taxable income is “audited” by the tax authorities. Hence, its reliability
relative to either book income or CFO is increased for LEQ firms.
Concerning the combined effects of high tax planning and aggressive earnings
management, First, Hypothesis 3a is partially supported. While the relative and incremental
information of CFO to book income is significantly higher for HTP&LEQ firms than NonHTP&LEQ firms at the 1% level, there is no significant difference between HTP&LEQ firms
and Non-HTP&LEQ firms in the relative and incremental information of CFO to taxable income.
Second, Hypothesis 3b is strongly supported. The relative information of CFO to the collective
information contained in taxable income and book income is significantly higher for HTP&LEQ
firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms at the 5% level. And the incremental information of CFO over
the collective information contained in taxable income and book income is significantly higher
for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms at the 1% level.
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Overall, when using cash ETR as the proxy for tax aggressiveness, the results from the
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are qualitatively similar to those reported in Section 2.5.3 and
Section 2.5.4. For example, the testing results from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test for
Hypothesis 2a are exactly the same as those in the main tests, in which Hypothesis 2a is not
supported by the relative information test in Section 2.5.3 but supported by the incremental
information test in Section 2.5.4.
2.7. Conclusion
Extending Ayers et al. (2009), I examine tax planning, earnings management, and their
combined impacts on the variations in the relative and incremental information of taxable
income, book income, and CFO. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to
simultaneously compare the value relevance of these three performance measures. In contrast,
prior studies usually focus on only two of them: book income versus CFO or book income versus
taxable income. It is crucial to study these three performance measures together at the same time
because tax planning and earnings management may affect the information content of these three
performance measures systematically differently. Furthermore, this study investigates the
combined effects of tax planning and earnings management. Assessing the combined impacts of
tax planning and earnings management on the value relevance of these three performance
measures is non-trivial since it is not uncommon for firms to engage in both high tax planning
and aggressive earnings management.
Building upon Ayers et al. (2009), I first assign firm-years into six reporting-type groups
based on the five-year average GAAP current ETR and the absolute discretionary accruals
estimated from a modified cross-sectional Jones model. Then I run long-window association
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tests to assess and compare the value relevance of taxable income, book income, and CFO across
different reporting-type groups. Finally, I conduct both relative and incremental information tests
to assess the variations in the value relevance of taxable income, book income, and CFO when
firms engage in high tax planning, aggressive earnings management, or both.
For the effects of tax planning, first, I confirm one of Ayers et al.’s (2009) results that
high tax planning reduces the relative information of taxable income to book income. Second, I
postulate and show that high tax planning reduces the relative and incremental information of
taxable income to CFO but significantly increases the relative and incremental information of
CFO to the combined information set of taxable income and book income. Finally, I also find
that high tax planning increases the relative and incremental information of CFO to book
income. These results indicate that when firms engage in high tax planning, CFO become a
relatively more important performance measure for valuation with respect to either taxable
income or book income. The last finding corroborates Chen et al. (2012) that high tax planning
negatively affects the informativeness of book income. These findings are also consistent with
Balakrishnan et al.’s (2019) conclusion that high tax planning obscures the firm’s information
environment and thus reduces accruals and earnings quality.
For the negative effects of aggressive earnings management, first, confirming Ayers et al.
(2009), I find that aggressive earnings management reduces the incremental information of book
income over taxable income. Second, consistent with my predictions, aggressive earnings
management increases the incremental information of CFO over book income and the combined
information set of taxable income or book income, respectively. However, for the relative
information tests, neither of my predictions is statistically supported. Further analysis reveals that
this is mainly due to the high standard deviations of the means of the R2 ratios for LEQ firms.
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The relatively higher standard deviations of the means of the R2 ratios for LEQ firms suggest that
the association between the market-adjusted returns and the three performance measures is more
volatile for LEQ firms than Non-LEQ firms. This evidence is consistent with the notion that
investors have more difficulties assessing the information contained in taxable income, book
income, and CFO for firms aggressive in earnings management.
For the combined effects of high tax planning and aggressive earnings management, first,
I find that the relative and incremental information of CFO to book income is significantly
higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. Second, the relative and incremental
information of CFO to the collective information set of taxable income and book income is also
significantly higher for HTP&LEQ firms than Non-HTP&LEQ firms. These results support the
conjecture that CFO become a relatively more important performance measure for equity
valuation when firms engage in both high tax planning and aggressive earnings management.
This study contributes to the literature on tax planning and earnings management research
in several ways. The results of this study are of interest to investors, financial analysts, standard
setters, regulators, and academics in finance and accounting. First, I extend Ayers et al. (2009)
by adding CFO to the information set of taxable income and book income when investigating the
effects of tax planning and earnings management. I find that high tax planning increases the
relative and incremental information of CFO to book income, which corroborates Chen et al.’s
(2012) finding that high tax planning reduces the informativeness of book income after
controlling for earnings management. It is also consistent with Balakrishnan et al.’s (2019)
conclusion that high tax planning obscures a firm’s information environment and thus reduces
the quality of reported earnings.
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Second, limited attention has focused on the impacts of earnings management on the
informativeness of CFO, let alone compared the value relevance of book income and CFO when
firms engage in high tax planning or aggressive earnings management. I fill this void and find
consistent evidence that the incremental information of CFO to either book income or the
combined information contained in taxable income and book income is increased when firms
engage in either high tax planning or aggressive earnings management. These findings are
consistent with my conjecture that high tax planning or aggressive earnings management affects
the value relevance of taxable income, book income, and CFO differently. Among the three,
CFO are the least affected performance measure by either tax planning or earnings management.
Third, this study examines the combined effects of tax planning and earnings
management, a reporting setting largely neglected by prior empirical research in accounting. I
find consistent evidence that the relative and incremental information of CFO to book income
and the combined information of taxable income and book income, respectively, is significantly
increased for firms aggressive in both tax planning and earnings management. These findings are
consistent with my conjecture that tax planning and earnings management impair the value
relevance of book income more than CFO. When firms engage in both high tax planning and
aggressive earnings management, CFO become a relatively more important performance
measure for equity valuation.
Finally, I add another piece of evidence to the argument between conforming and
nonconforming earnings management and tax planning. The relatively small size of my
HTP&LEQ subsample suggests that, in general, there are limited strategies for nonconforming
tax planning and earnings management. However, some firms are still able to engage in both
high tax planning and aggressive earnings management within the same reporting period. For
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these firms, the mean effective tax rate is even lower than that of HTP firms, suggesting that they
are even more aggressive in tax planning than firms aggressive in tax planning only.
Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution. First, any empirical study
using discretionary accruals models to investigate earnings management is a joint test of earnings
management and the model’s ability to decompose total accruals into its nondiscretionary and
discretionary components accurately. One of the modified Jones model assumptions is that
accruals are a linear function of cash revenue growth and net PPE, an assumption that might not
hold for all firms. Second, my measures of tax aggressiveness, the current effective tax rate and
cash effective tax rate, cannot capture the effects of conforming tax planning and earnings
management strategies. Finally, my sample includes US public firms only, and hence, the results
might not be generalized to private firms and firms incorporated outside the US.
Regarding future studies, first, I find that the market-adjusted returns for HTP, LEQ, and
HTP&LEQ firms are all significantly higher than those of their corresponding Non-HTP, NonLEQ, and Non-HTP&LEQ counterparts, respectively. However, it is still not resolved in
accounting and finance whether tax planning and earnings management are systematic risks. I
leave this inquiry to a future study. Second, one of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act’s objectives is
to increase financial reporting quality. If this is the case, SOX will increase the value-relevance
of accounting numbers, especially reported GAAP earnings. Using the ERCs, my second study
will test whether the decreases in value-relevance of book income for LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms
are significantly lower in the post-SOX period than in the prior-SOX era. Finally, the
implementation of a 15% global minimum corporate tax may affect firms’ behaviour in both tax
planning and earnings management, especially large multinational enterprises. My third study
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will investigate how the 15% global minimum tax rate affects firms’ tax aggressiveness and
financial reporting aggressiveness.
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Figures

Figure 1
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Notes to Figure 1: Relevant and incremental information of taxable income, book income, and CFO in the absence
of high tax planning and aggressive earnings management.
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Figure 2
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Notes to Figure 2: High tax planning reduces the information content of taxable income the most, followed by book
income and then CFO.
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Figure 3
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Notes to Figure 3: Aggressive earnings management reduces the information content of book income the most,
followed by taxable income and then CFO.
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Figure 4
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Notes to Figure 4: High tax planning and aggressive earnings management reduce the information content of taxable
income and book income more significantly than CFO.
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Figure 5
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Notes to Figure 5: How high tax planning affects the value relevance of the three performance measures (the line
arrow describes the direct path, and the dashed arrow represents the indirect path of the impacts).
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Figure 6
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Notes to Figure 6: How aggressive earnings management affects the value relevance of the three performance
measures (the line arrow describes the direct path, and the dashed arrow represents the indirect path of the impacts).
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Figure 7
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CFO (the least negatively
affected among the three
performance measures)

Notes to Figure 7: How high tax planning and aggressive earnings management affect the value relevance of the
three performance measures (the line arrow describes the direct path, and the dashed arrow represents the indirect
path of the impacts).
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Figure 8
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Notes to Figure 8: Probability density function of signed discretionary accruals (HTP&LEQ firms versus LEQ
firms).
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Tables for Essay One
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and testing for differences in the means across different reporting-type groups
Variables
Mean
Std. Dev. 1st quartile
Median
3rd quartile
Significant difference
Panel A: Summary statistics of regression variables
Market-adjusted return
Overall sample1
0.0536
0.7610
-0.3168
-0.0575
0.2300
Non-HTP firms
0.0493
0.5323
-0.2299
-0.0219
0.2105
HTP>Non-HTP**
2
HTP firms
0.0636
0.5956
-0.2600
-0.0272
0.2355
Non-LEQ firms
0.0567
0.6817
-0.2797
-0.0409
0.2257
LEQ>Non-LEQ***
3
LEQ firms
0.0822
0.9945
-0.3834
-0.0911
0.2655
Non-HTP&LEQ firms
0.0500
0.5350
-0.2336
-0.0231
0.2127
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ***
4
HTP&LEQ firms
0.1094
0.7445
-0.2845
-0.0247
0.2845
∆Taxable income
Overall sample
-0.0044
0.2688
-0.0480
-0.0004
0.0356
Non-HTP firms
-0.0092
0.1314
-0.0432
-0.0040
0.0299
HTP>Non-HTP***
HTP firms
-0.0036
0.1861
-0.0371
0.0000
0.0306
Non-LEQ firms
-0.0040
0.2423
-0.0448
-0.0008
0.0331
No significant difference
LEQ firms
-0.0075
0.3718
-0.0751
0.0000
0.0584
Non-HTP&LEQ firms
-0.0084
0.1386
-0.0421
-0.0030
0.0299
No significant difference
HTP&LEQ firms
0.0003
0.2982
-0.0516
-0.0005
0.0441
∆Pretax book income
Overall sample
-0.0040
0.1521
-0.0500
-0.0004
0.0398
Non-HTP firms
-0.0092
0.0989
-0.0404
-0.0012
0.0286
HTP>Non-HTP***
HTP firms
-0.0050
0.0954
-0.0355
-0.0006
0.0279
Non-LEQ firms
0.0001
0.1305
-0.0426
0.0006
0.0374
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
LEQ firms
-0.0216
0.2261
-0.1143
-0.0083
0.0608
Non-HTP&LEQ firms
-0.0090
0.0970
-0.0397
-0.0014
0.0283
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ***
HTP&LEQ firms
0.0053
0.1434
-0.0499
0.0001
0.0461
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Table 1 (Continued)
Panel A: Summary statistics of regression variables (Continued)
Variables
Mean
Significant difference
Std. Dev. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
∆CFO
Overall sample -0.0030
0.1107
-0.0504
-0.0015
0.0452
Non-HTP firms -0.0047
0.0949
-0.0462
-0.0024
0.0385
No significant difference
HTP firms -0.0040
0.0965
-0.0439
-0.0023
0.0379
Non-LEQ firms -0.0023
0.0983
-0.0451
-0.0008
0.0417
LEQ<Non-LEQ**
LEQ firms -0.0063
0.1589
-0.0922
-0.0088
0.0746
Non-HTP&LEQ firms -0.0043
0.0939
-0.0453
-0.0023
0.0383
HTP&LEQ<Non-HTP&LEQ***
HTP&LEQ firms -0.0156
0.1443
-0.0897
-0.0144
0.0563
Panel B: Summary statistics of book current effective rates and absolute discretionary accruals
Book current effective tax rate
Overall sample 0.3203
0.1866
0.2296
0.3049
0.3622
Non-HTP firms 0.3695
0.1765
0.2824
0.3266
0.3837
HTP<Non-HTP***
HTP firms 0.1419
0.0867
0.0663
0.1471
0.2101
Non-LEQ firms 0.3177
0.1779
0.2332
0.3045
0.3594
LEQ>Non-LEQ***
LEQ firms 0.3410
0.2211
0.2261
0.3135
0.3820
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.3273
0.1835
0.2413
0.3088
0.3646
HTP&LEQ<Non-HTP&LEQ***
HTP&LEQ firms 0.1285
0.0886
0.0468
0.1276
0.2063
|Discretionary accruals|
Overall sample 0.0695
0.0847
0.0193
0.0436
0.0872
Non-HTP firms 0.0544
0.0637
0.0166
0.0374
0.0707
HTP>Non-HTP**
HTP firms 0.0564
0.0692
0.0167
0.0374
0.0720
Non-LEQ firms 0.0422
0.0413
0.0154
0.0333
0.0596
LEQ>Non-LEQ***
LEQ firms 0.1849
0.1173
0.1102
0.1552
0.2246
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.0516
0.0609
0.0161
0.0357
0.0669
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ***
HTP&LEQ firms 0.1540
0.0966
0.0924
0.1312
0.1809
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Table 1 (Continued)
Panel C: Summary statistics of firm characteristics
Variables
Mean
Std. Dev. 1st quartile
Taxable income
Overall sample 0.0290
0.2629
0.0000
Non-HTP firms 0.1005
0.1251
0.0363
HTP firms 0.0421
0.1373
0.0027
Non-LEQ firms 0.0461
0.2066
0.0000
LEQ firms -0.0093
0.3515
-0.0333
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.0900
0.1264
0.0273
HTP&LEQ firms 0.0477
0.1962
0.0007
Pretax book income
Overall sample 0.0217
0.2330
-0.0233
Non-HTP firms 0.1091
0.1129
0.0449
HTP firms 0.0867
0.0923
0.0331
Non-LEQ firms 0.0506
0.1720
0.0024
LEQ firms -0.0478
0.3116
-0.1569
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.1050
0.1088
0.0427
HTP&LEQ firms 0.1058
0.1234
0.0334
After-tax book income
Overall sample -0.0044
0.2119
-0.0212
Non-HTP firms 0.0699
0.0788
0.0289
HTP firms 0.0625
0.0723
0.0228
Non-LEQ firms 0.0229
0.1488
0.0003
LEQ firms -0.0676
0.2917
-0.1549
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.0683
0.0763
0.0279
HTP&LEQ firms 0.0839
0.1054
0.0236

Median

3rd quartile

0.0468
0.0869
0.0345
0.0534
0.0237
0.0768
0.0356

0.1206
0.1516
0.0818
0.1210
0.1200
0.1409
0.0969

0.0602
0.0985
0.0754
0.0680
0.0287
0.0941
0.0880

0.1327
0.1646
0.1267
0.1345
0.1282
0.1573
0.1541

0.0412
0.0649
0.0527
0.0464
0.0206
0.0626
0.0640

0.0903
0.1074
0.0898
0.0903
0.0932
0.1042
0.1239

Significant difference

HTP<Non-HTP***
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ<Non-HTP&LEQ***

HTP<Non-HTP***
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
No significant difference

HTP<Non-HTP***
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ***
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Table 1 (Continued)
Panel C: Summary statistics of firm characteristics (Continued)
Variables
Mean
Std. Dev. 1st quartile Median
Cash flows from operations
Overall sample 0.1127
0.1490
0.0463
0.1136
Non-HTP firms 0.1561
0.1139
0.0861
0.1439
HTP firms 0.1253
0.1027
0.0650
0.1161
Non-LEQ firms 0.1246
0.1271
0.0620
0.1209
LEQ firms 0.0803
0.1902
-0.0179
0.0785
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.1520
0.1104
0.0836
0.1396
HTP&LEQ firms 0.1162
0.1559
0.0099
0.1052
∆After-tax book income
Overall sample -0.0022
0.1393
-0.0376
-0.0004
Non-HTP firms -0.0065
0.0748
-0.0277
-0.0007
HTP firms -0.0060
0.0866
-0.0277
-0.0012
Non-LEQ firms 0.0015
0.1165
-0.0317
0.0002
LEQ firms -0.0176
0.2147
-0.1023
-0.0068
Non-HTP&LEQ firms -0.0070
0.0753
-0.0280
-0.0009
HTP&LEQ firms 0.0093
0.1373
-0.0374
-0.0002
Discretionary accruals
Overall sample 0.0017
0.1018
-0.0390
0.0049
Non-HTP firms 0.0091
0.0799
-0.0284
0.0079
HTP firms 0.0153
0.0830
-0.0243
0.0108
Non-LEQ firms 0.0054
0.0575
-0.0275
0.0056
LEQ firms -0.0141
0.1995
-0.1635
-0.0586
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 0.0091
0.0759
-0.0270
0.0080
HTP&LEQ firms 0.0518
0.1638
-0.0937
0.0907

3rd quartile
0.1875
0.2139
0.1767
0.1890
0.1852
0.2068
0.1998
0.0288
0.0193
0.0194
0.0266
0.0496
0.0192
0.0391
0.0473
0.0449
0.0477
0.0386
0.1471
0.0434
0.1595

Significant difference

HTP<Non-HTP***
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ<Non-HTP&LEQ***

No significant difference
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ***

HTP>Non-HTP***
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ***
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Table 1 (Continued)
Panel C: Summary statistics of firm characteristics (Continued)
Variables
Mean Std. Dev. 1st quartile Median
Total assets (in millions)
Overall sample 2,666
17,100
59
229
Non-HTP firms 4,128
21,618
130
475
HTP firms 4,054
24,993
87
383
Non-LEQ firms 3,114
17,822
76
301
LEQ firms 1,046
8,202
33
115
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 3,995
20,818
122
463
HTP&LEQ firms 1,514
5,455
47
186
Market value of equity (in millions)
Overall sample 3,210
17,600
54
245
Non-HTP firms 5,415
24,196
118
547
HTP firms 3,888
18,467
66
344
Non-LEQ firms 3,794
19,091
66
323
LEQ firms 1,458
10,700
32
123
Non-HTP&LEQ firms 5,090
22,808
109
517
HTP&LEQ firms 1,892
8,830
40
161

3rd quartile
1,000
1,874
1,745
1,306
411
1,857
669
1,110
2,284
1,585
1,454
516
2,216
707

Significant difference

No significant difference
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ<Non-HTP&LEQ***

HTP<Non-HTP***
LEQ<Non-LEQ***
HTP&LEQ<Non-HTP&LEQ***

Notes to Table 1:
1: The overall sample consists of 65,062 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016.
2: The subsample of high tax-planning (HTP) and Non-HTP firms consists of 36,039 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016 with 7,790 of them classified as
HTP firm.
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3: The subsample of low earnings-quality (LEQ) and Non-LEQ firms consists of 55,547 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016 with 10,647 of them classified
as LEQ firm.
4: The subsample of high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms consists of 33,731 firm-year observations from 1989 to
2016 with 1,082 of them classified as HTP&LEQ firm.
* **

, , and *** two-tailed t-test of the difference in means at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.

Market-adjusted return: the12-month buy-and-hold return of security i adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted return starting at the beginning of the fifth month of
fiscal year t.
∆Pretax book income: the change in pretax book income for firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t where pretax
book income is Compustat pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII).
∆After-tax book income: the change in after-tax book income for firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t where aftertax book income is income before extraordinary items (IB).
∆Taxable income: the change in estimated taxable income for firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t where taxable
book income is estimated as the sum of current federal income tax expense (TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO) grossed up by the top US statutory
federal tax rate for year t minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carry forward (TLCF).
∆CFO: the change in pretax CFO for firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t where CFO is cash from operations
(OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD).
Book current effective tax rate: equals current tax expense summed over five years from t-4 through t divided by pretax book income (PI) summed over five
years from t-4 through t, where current tax expense equals current federal income tax expense (TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO).
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|Discretionary accruals|: the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the difference between actual total accruals and expected total accruals
estimated cross-sectionally each fiscal year at the two-digit SIC industry.
Total assets: total assets (AT) at the beginning of fiscal year.
Market value of equity: calculated as the number of common share outstanding (CSHO) multiplied by share price (PRCC_F) at the beginning of fiscal year.
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Table 2 Relative information tests: distributions and differences in the means of R2 ratios across reporting-type groups
R2 ratios and Reporting-type

Mean

Std. Dev. 1st quartile

Median

3rd quartile

Difference between reporting-type
groups

R2∆TI / R2∆BI
HTP firms1

0.1964

0.1593

0.0661

0.1764

0.3131

Non-HTP firms

0.5305

0.3165

0.2800

0.5655

0.7310

LEQ firms2

0.3507

0.3973

0.0601

0.1476

0.4987

Non-LEQ firms

0.3149

0.2056

0.1337

0.2580

0.4570

HTP firms

0.5182

0.6329

0.1012

0.2293

0.6297

Non-HTP firms

1.4467

1.2997

0.4083

0.9748

2.1104

LEQ firms

1.4108

3.1790

0.0747

0.2735

1.8701

Non-LEQ firms

0.7383

0.7007

0.2086

0.3592

1.4649

HTP&LEQ firms3

1.2631

2.2164

0.0554

0.4302

1.7908

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

1.0972

0.8431

0.3305

0.9111

1.7119

HTP<Non-HTP***

No significant difference
R2∆TI / R2∆CFO
HTP<Non-HTP***

No significant difference

No significant difference
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Table 2 (Continued)
R2 ratios and Reporting-type

Mean

Std. Dev. 1st quartile

Median

3rd quartile Difference between reporting-type groups

R2∆CFO / R2∆BI
HTP firms

0.6402

0.4824

0.3486

0.5618

0.7359

Non-HTP firms

0.4955

0.2128

0.3264

0.5091

0.6652

LEQ firms

0.7595

0.8564

0.1708

0.3852

1.1614

Non-LEQ firms

0.6620

0.4476

0.3563

0.4888

0.7934

HTP&LEQ firms

4.6413

10.5875

0.3124

0.5593

2.5324

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.4922

0.2308

0.2737

0.4409

0.6257

HTP firms

0.6024

0.4541

0.3468

0.5550

0.6966

Non-HTP firms

0.4729

0.2005

0.3168

0.4591

0.6256

LEQ firms

0.5480

0.5418

0.1630

0.3049

1.0033

Non-LEQ firms

0.6152

0.4045

0.3231

0.4332

0.7639

HTP&LEQ firms

1.4039

2.8856

0.2285

0.4547

1.2263

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.4731

0.2193

0.2708

0.4170

0.5929

HTP>Non-HTP*

No significant difference

HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ**

R2∆CFO / R2∆BI+∆TI
HTP>Non-HTP*

No significant difference

HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ*

Notes to Table 2:
1: The subsample of high tax-planning (HTP) and Non-HTP firms consists of 36,039 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016 with 7,790 of them classified as
HTP firm.
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2: The subsample of low earnings-quality (LEQ) and Non-LEQ firms consists of 55,547 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016 with 10,647 of them classified
as LEQ firm.
3: The subsample of high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms consists of 33,731 firm-year observations from 1989 to
2016 with 1,082 of them classified as HTP&LEQ firm.
* **

, , and *** one-tailed t-test of the difference in means at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.

2
𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI).

2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI) and change in taxable income (∆TI).
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Table 3 Incremental information tests
Mean

Std.
Dev.

1st
quartile

Median

3rd
quartile

HTP firms1

0.0023

0.0032

0.0002

0.0009

0.0045

Non-HTP firms

0.0045

0.0070

0.0005

0.0010

0.0068

LEQ firms2

0.0104

0.0146

0.0009

0.0057

0.0111

Non-LEQ firms

0.0020

0.0021

0.0004

0.0014

0.0029

HTP firms

0.0116

0.0151

0.0028

0.0074

0.0148

Non-HTP firms

0.0073

0.0071

0.0013

0.0053

0.0104

LEQ firms

0.0122

0.0152

0.0008

0.0068

0.0186

Non-LEQ firms

0.0059

0.0068

0.0009

0.0030

0.010

HTP&LEQ firms3

0.0425

0.0522

0.0067

0.0213

0.0625

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.0067

0.0077

0.0012

0.0046

0.0097

HTP firms

0.0102

0.0127

0.0009

0.0065

0.0138

Non-HTP firms

0.0283

0.0269

0.0051

0.0180

0.0550

LEQ firms

0.0259

0.0440

0.0015

0.0057

0.0326

Non-LEQ firms

0.0107

0.0109

0.0018

0.0056

0.0210

HTP&LEQ firms

0.0389

0.0510

0.0083

0.0205

0.0514

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.0223

0.0210

0.0037

0.0118

0.0363

Incremental R2s and Reporting-type

Difference in the means

R2∆BI+∆TI - R2∆BI

R2

∆BI+∆CFO

-

R2

No significant difference
LEQ>Non-LEQ***

∆BI

HTP>Non-HTP**
LEQ>Non-LEQ**
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ**

R2∆CFO+∆TI - R2∆CFO
HTP<Non-HTP***
LEQ>Non-LEQ*4
No significant difference
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Table 3 Continued

Mean

Std.
Dev.

1st
quartile

Median

3rd
quartile

HTP firms

0.0115

0.0151

0.0035

0.0072

0.0146

Non-HTP firms

0.0063

0.0060

0.0014

0.0042

0.0104

LEQ firms

0.0125

0.0169

0.0011

0.0068

0.0172

Non-LEQ firms

0.0064

0.0082

0.0009

0.0026

0.0096

HTP&LEQ firms

0.0472

0.0636

0.0063

0.0193

0.0659

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.0061

0.0072

0.0010

0.0046

0.0080

Incremental R2s and Reporting-type

Difference in the means

R2∆BI+∆TI+∆CFO - R2∆BI+∆TI
HTP>Non-HTP**
LEQ>Non-LEQ*
HTP&LEQ>Non-HTP&LEQ**

Notes to Table 3:
1: The subsample of high tax-planning (HTP) and Non-HTP firms consists of 36,039 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016 with 7,790 of them classified as
HTP firm.
2: The subsample of low earnings-quality (LEQ) and Non-LEQ firms consists of 55,547 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2016 with 10,647 of them classified
as LEQ firm.
3: The subsample of high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms consists of 33,731 firm-year observations from 1989 to
2016 with 1,082 of them classified as HTP&LEQ firm.
4: Contradictory to the prediction of Hypothesis 2c.
* **

, , and *** one-tailed t-test of the difference in means at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
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2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income ((∆BI).

2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax CFO ((∆CFO).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income ((∆BI) and the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income ((∆BI) and the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).

2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂+∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO) and the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income ((∆BI), the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI),

and the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).
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Table 4 Relative information test (Using cash effective tax rate to classify HTP firms)
R2 ratios and Reporting-type

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

HTP firms1

0.2638

0.2457

0.0765

0.1810

0.3628

Non-HTP firms

0.4460

0.2805

0.1777

0.4718

0.6808

LEQ firms2

4.4862

16.396

0.0439

0.3577

0.9999

Non-LEQ firms

0.4870

1.0052

0.0746

0.2006

0.3448

HTP firms

0.6336

0.8253

0.1237

0.2730

0.6921

Non-HTP firms

2.1186

2.6030

0.3026

1.200

2.6131

LEQ firms

3.3448

7.4210

0.2667

0.9536

2.1038

Non-LEQ firms

0.7187

0.9076

0.1256

0.2838

1.1524

HTP&LEQ firms3

8.9047

33.1185

0.0930

0.8039

2.2791

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

1.7709

2.3959

0.2838

0.7787

2.0810

Difference in the means

R2∆TI/R2∆BI
HTP < Non-HTP***
No significant difference

R2∆TI/R2∆CFO
HTP < Non-HTP***
LEQ > Non-LEQ***4
No significant difference
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Table 4 Continued
R2 ratios and Reporting-type

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

HTP firms

0.7020

0.7086

0.3216

0.3905

0.7973

Non-HTP firms

0.3495

0.2207

0.1255

0.3477

0.4856

LEQ firms

1.2848

2.5190

0.1024

0.2965

0.865

Non-LEQ firms

0.9262

1.6426

0.2037

0.3571

0.8207

HTP&LEQ firms

2.6145

6.0250

0.3007

0.7034

2.3677

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.4144

0.2934

0.1428

0.3706

0.5923

HTP firms

0.6321

0.6577

0.2914

0.3657

0.6934

Non-HTP firms

0.3373

0.2146

0.1194

0.3319

0.4416

LEQ firms

0.4918

0.5834

0.0633

0.3036

0.8069

Non-LEQ firms

0.5208

0.3836

0.1911

0.3810

0.8176

HTP&LEQ firms

1.0035

1.1735

0.1933

0.5713

1.4675

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.3966

0.2780

0.1428

0.3548

0.5215

Difference in the means

R2∆CFO/R2∆BI
HTP > Non-HTP***
No significant difference
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ**

R2∆CFO / R2∆BI+∆TI
HTP > Non-HTP**
No significant difference
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ***

Notes to Table 4:
1: The subsample of high tax-planning (HTP) and Non-HTP firms consists of 37,510 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with 6,668 of them classified as HTP firm.
2: The subsample of low earnings-quality (LEQ) and Non-LEQ firms consists of 61,136 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with 8,319 of them classified as LEQ firm.
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3: The subsample of high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms consists of 36,958 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with
723 of them classified as HTP&LEQ firm.
4: Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 2c.
* **

, , and *** one-tailed t-test of the difference in means at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.

2
𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI).

2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI) and change in taxable income (∆TI).

Page 110 of 217

Table 5 Incremental information tests (Using cash effective tax rate to classify HTP firms)
Incremental R2s and Reporting-type

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

HTP firms1

0.0056

0.0062

0.0013

0.0041

0.0073

Non-HTP firms

0.0026

0.0028

0.0002

0.0016

0.0035

LEQ firms2

0.0169

0.0415

0.0010

0.0033

0.0131

Non-LEQ firms

0.0020

0.0031

0.0002

0.0009

0.0021

HTP firms

0.0083

0.0125

0.0021

0.0049

0.0089

Non-HTP firms

0.0045

0.0038

0.0007

0.0043

0.0073

LEQ firms

0.0089

0.0085

0.0017

0.0064

0.0126

Non-LEQ firms

0.0024

0.0030

0.0002

0.0009

0.0032

HTP&LEQ firms

0.0967

0.1453

0.0111

0.0409

0.1407

Non-HTP&LEQ firms3

0.0044

0.0038

0.0011

0.0043

0.0075

Difference in the means

R2∆BI+∆TI - R2∆BI
HTP > Non-HTP***4
No significant difference

R2∆BI+∆CFO - R2∆BI
HTP > Non-HTP**
No significant difference
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ**
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Table 5 Continued
Incremental R2s and Reportingtype
2
2
R ∆CFO+∆TI - R ∆CFO

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

HTP firms

0.0114

0.0134

0.0013

0.0076

0.0151

Non-HTP firms

0.0246

0.0231

0.0041

0.0149

0.0455

LEQ firms

0.0200

0.0330

0.0030

0.0098

0.0267

Non-LEQ firms

0.0070

0.0127

0.0006

0.0016

0.0091

HTP&LEQ firms

0.0784

0.1050

0.0041

0.0418

0.1059

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.0190

0.0187

0.0041

0.0110

0.0325

HTP firms

0.0083

0.0126

0.0014

0.0038

0.0098

Non-HTP firms

0.0043

0.0037

0.0004

0.0043

0.0068

LEQ firms

0.0097

0.0091

0.0018

0.0059

0.0151

Non-LEQ firms

0.0028

0.0033

0.0002

0.0009

0.0060

HTP&LEQ firms

0.0859

0.1142

0.0108

0.0440

0.1206

Non-HTP&LEQ firms

0.0042

0.0038

0.0012

0.0042

0.0073

Difference in the means

HTP < Non-HTP***
LEQ > Non-LEQ**4
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ*

R2∆BI+∆TI+∆CFO - R2∆BI+∆TI
HTP > Non-HTP**
LEQ > Non-LEQ*
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ***

Notes to Table 5:
1: The subsample of high tax-planning (HTP) and Non-HTP firms consists of 37,510 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with 6,668 of them classified as HTP firm.
2: The subsample of low earnings-quality (LEQ) and Non-LEQ firms consists of 61,136 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with 8,319 of them classified as LEQ firm.
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3: The subsample of high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms consists of 36,958 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with
723 of them classified as HTP&LEQ firm.
4: Contrary to my prediction.
* **

, , and *** one-tailed t-test of the difference in means at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.

2
𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI).

2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI) and change in taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income ((∆BI), the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI),

and the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).
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Table 6 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
R2 Ratios

Difference in medians

R2∆TI/R2∆CFO

Incremental R2s

Difference in medians

R2∆CFO+∆TI - R2∆CFO
HTP vs Non-HTP

LEQ vs Non-LEQ
HTP&LEQ vs NonHTP&LEQ

No significant difference
LEQ > Non-LEQ**4
HTP&LEQ3 < Non-HTP&LEQ**

R2∆CFO/R2∆BI

HTP vs Non-HTP

No significant difference

No significant difference

No significant difference

HTP vs Non-HTP

LEQ vs Non-LEQ
HTP&LEQ vs NonHTP&LEQ

No significant difference

LEQ vs Non-LEQ
HTP&LEQ vs NonHTP&LEQ
2
2
R ∆BI+∆TI+∆CFO - R ∆BI+∆TI

R2∆CFO / R2∆BI+∆TI
HTP vs Non-HTP
LEQ vs Non-LEQ
HTP&LEQ vs NonHTP&LEQ

No significant difference
LEQ < Non-LEQ**4
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ*

LEQ > Non-LEQ***4

LEQ vs Non-LEQ
HTP&LEQ vs NonHTP&LEQ
R2∆BI+∆CFO - R2∆BI

HTP vs Non-HTP

HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ**

No significant difference

HTP vs Non-HTP
LEQ vs Non-LEQ
HTP&LEQ vs NonHTP&LEQ

LEQ > Non-LEQ**
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ***

No significant difference
LEQ > Non-LEQ**
HTP&LEQ > Non-HTP&LEQ***

Notes to Table 6:
1: The subsample of high tax-planning (HTP) and Non-HTP firms consists of 37,510 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with 6,668 of them classified as HTP firm.
2: The subsample of low earnings-quality (LEQ) and Non-LEQ firms consists of 61,136 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with 8,319 of them classified as LEQ firm.
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3: The subsample of high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ) and Non-HTP&LEQ firms consists of 36,958 firm-years from 1989 to 2016 with
723 of them classified as HTP&LEQ firm.
4: Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 2c.
* **

, , and *** one-tailed t-test of the difference in means at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.

2
𝑅∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI).

2
𝑅∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income (∆BI) and change in taxable income (∆TI).

2
𝑅∆𝐵𝐼+∆𝑇𝐼+∆𝐶𝐹𝑂
: R2 from the regression of the market-adjusted return on the change in pretax book income ((∆BI), the change in estimated taxable income (∆TI),

and the change in pretax CFO (∆CFO).
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Appendix A: Main variables and required data from Compustat and CRSP
Main variables:
Estimated taxable income (TI): equals current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US
statutory tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carry forward (TLCF).
Current tax expense (CTE): equals the sum of current federal income tax expense (TXFED) and
current foreign tax expense (TXFO); if either current federal income tax expense (TXFED) or
current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE equals total income tax expense
(TXT) and the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as
the sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax
expense (TXDFO).
Pretax book income (BI): equals pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII).
CFO: equals cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD).
Market-adjusted return (Rit): the12-month buy-and-hold return of security i adjusted by the
CRSP value-weighted return starting at the beginning of the fifth month of fiscal year t.
Other required data:
Total assets (TA): total assets (AT).
Property, plant, and equipment (PPE): net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT).
After-tax book income: income before extraordinary items (IB).
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Chapter 3: Essay Two

The Impacts of Earnings Management and Tax Planning on the Persistence of Book Income and Its
Components
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Abstract
This study examines aggressive earnings management, high tax planning, and their
combined impacts on the persistence of book income and its components. First, I show that the
persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, and book income is lower for firms
aggressive in earnings management, suggesting that earnings management reduces the
informativeness, in general, and persistence, in particular, of discretionary accruals and book
income. Second, I demonstrate that the persistence of cash flows from operations and book
income is lower for tax-aggressive firms, which suggests that high tax planning reduces the
persistence of operating cash flows and thus the persistence of book income. Third, I show that
firms aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning exhibit the least persistent total
accruals, cash flows from operations, and book income, suggesting that, regarding earnings
persistence, these firms are systematically different from all other firms. Finally, I find that firms
aggressive in accrual-based earnings management exhibit less persistent cash flows from
operations, suggesting that firms aggressive in accrual-based earnings management tend to have
relatively higher levels of real earnings management. Overall, this study contributes to the
earnings management literature and tax planning literature by showing how earnings
management and/or tax planning affect the persistence of discretionary accruals and cash flows
from operations and thus the persistence of book income.
Keywords: earnings management, tax planning, earnings persistence, book income, taxable
income, and cash flows from operations
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3.1. Introduction
This study investigates aggressive accrual-based earnings management, high tax planning
and their combined impacts on the persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, cash
flows from operations (CFO), and book income.42 The motivation for this study comes from four
sources. First, persistence is an important feature for earnings quality and a key factor affecting
the value relevance of current earnings (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lipe, 1990; Richardson,
Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005; Li, 2008; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). Second, prior
research shows that accrued earnings are less persistent than cash earnings (Sloan, 1996) and that
discretionary accruals are less persistent than nondiscretionary accruals (Xie, 2001). However,
discretionary accruals can be either opportunistic (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Rao,
Teoh, and Wong, 1998; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004;
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) or informative (e.g., Guay, Kothari, and Watts, 1996;
Subramanyam, 1996; Dechow et al., 2010). While both Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) compare
the persistence of the different components of reported earnings, i.e., discretionary accruals
versus nondiscretionary accruals and cash earnings, respectively, the extant literature in earnings
management pays little attention to the potential differences in the persistence of discretionary
accruals between firms that are aggressive in earnings management and firms that are not so
aggressive in earnings management. This study fills this void by assessing and comparing the
differences in the persistence of discretionary accruals and thus the persistence of total accruals
and book income between these two firm-groups.

42

When it is not ambiguous, I use the term earnings management to refer to accrual-based earnings management
throughout this essay. I measure aggressiveness in earnings management based on the estimated absolute
discretionary accruals from a modified cross-sectional Jones model.
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Third, Hanlon (2005) finds that large book-tax differences (LBTDs) are associated with
less persistent one-year-ahead pretax book income and both its accrual and cash flow
components. Blaylock, Shevlin, and Wilson (2012) demonstrate that Hanlon’s (2005) finding
that firms with large positive book-tax differences (LPBTDs) have less persistent earnings is
mainly driven by upward earnings management. McGuire, Neuman, and Omer (2013) show that
firms with more sustainable tax planning strategies have more persistent pretax earnings, in
which sustainable tax planning strategies are proxied by the coefficient of variation (relative
standard deviation) for annual cash effective tax rates. However, very few studies in tax planning
have directly investigated the relationship between high tax planning and earnings persistence.
This study fills this gap by examining how high tax planning affects the persistence of operating
cash flows and thus the persistence of book income.
Finally, firms can be aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning within the
same reporting period (Frank, Lynch, and Rego, 2009). Nevertheless, no studies have ever
investigated the combined impacts of aggressive earnings management and tax planning on the
persistence of book income and its components. Firms aggressive in both earnings management
and tax planning are largely neglected by prior research examining the consequences of earnings
management and tax planning. In prior studies investigating the effects of earnings management
and tax planning, researchers tend to partition firms based on only one dimension, either the
aggressiveness in earnings management or the aggressiveness in tax planning, but not both. This
study examines the combined impacts of aggressive earnings management and high tax planning
on the persistence of book income and its accrual and cash flow components.
To test the effects of aggressive earnings management, tax planning, and their combined
impacts on the persistence of book income and its components, I divide my sample into four
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subgroups: (1) low earnings-quality (LEQ), a group of firms relatively aggressive in earnings
management, (2) high tax-planning (HTP), a group of firms relatively aggressive in tax planning,
(3) high tax-planning with low earnings-quality (HTP&LEQ), a group of firms relatively
aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning, and (4) All-Other, a group of firms
not so aggressive in either earnings management or tax planning.43
First, I compare the persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, and book income
between LEQ firms and All-Other firms. Though both assessing earnings persistence, this study
differs from Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) in a significant way. While Sloan (1996) and Xie
(2001) compare the persistence of earnings components of the same reported earnings, i.e.,
discretionary accruals versus nondiscretionary accruals and cash earnings, respectively, this
study compares the persistence of reported earnings and its accrual and cash flow components
between firms partitioned on their aggressiveness in earnings management, i.e., between firms
aggressive in earnings management and firms that are not so aggressive in earnings management.
Specifically, I compare the persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash
flows, and book income of LEQ firms with the persistence of discretionary accruals, total
accruals, operating cash flows, and book income of All-Other firms.
Xie (2001) finds that discretionary accruals are the least persistent component of reported
earnings, followed by nondiscretionary accruals, and then cash earnings. However, managers can
use discretionary accruals either opportunistically (e.g., Rao, et al., 1998; Teoh, Welch, et al.,
1998; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) or to convey their
private information about the firm’s long-term performance to the capital markets (e.g., Guay et

43

However, these firms may still engage in earnings management, tax planning, or both, but just not as aggressively
as the other three subgroups.
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al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Dechow et al., 2010). Based on these two seemingly
contradictory views on discretionary accruals, opportunistic versus informative, I postulate that
the discretionary accruals and thus reported book income of LEQ firms will be more
opportunistic than All-Other firms. Hence, I predict and show that the persistence of
discretionary accruals and thus the persistence of total accruals and book income is lower for
LEQ firms than for All-Other firms. In addition, I find that the persistence of operating cash
flows is also lower for LEQ firms than All-Other firms. One potential explanation for this finding
is that LEQ firms are not only aggressive in accrual-based earnings management but also
relatively aggressive in real earnings management, which directly affects operating cash flows.
Considering the impacts of high tax planning on the persistence of book income and its
components, I predict that the persistence of CFO will be lower for HTP firms than All-Other
firms because tax planning inevitably involves real activities that directly affect operating cash
flows. The results are consistent with this prediction. Furthermore, since the persistence of CFO
is reduced for HTP firms, the persistence of book income will also decrease for HTP firms. As
predicted, the persistence of book income is significantly lower for HTP firms than All-Other
firms.
Finally, since HTP&LEQ firms are aggressive in both earnings management and tax
planning, extending the predictions on earnings persistence for LEQ and HTP firms to
HTP&LEQ firms, I predict that the persistence of both discretionary accruals and CFO will be
significantly lower for HTP&LEQ firms than All-Other firms. The results strongly support this
prediction. Moreover, since the persistence of both accruals and cash earnings is reduced for
HTP&LEQ firms, I postulate that the persistence of book income for HTP&LEQ firms will be
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the lowest among the four subgroups. As predicted, HTP&LEQ firms exhibit the least persistent
book income among the four subgroups.
This study contributes to the research on earnings management and tax planning in
several ways. First, it extends the line of literature examining the relation between earnings
management and earnings persistence. While Xie (2001) finds that discretionary accruals are less
persistent than nondiscretionary accruals and cash earnings, respectively, this study demonstrates
that the discretionary accruals of firms aggressive in earnings management are less persistent
than the discretionary accruals of firms that are not so aggressive in earnings management. This
finding is consistent with the notion that aggressive earnings management reduces the
informativeness of discretionary accruals and book income, in which informativeness is
measured by the persistence of discretionary accruals and book income.
Second, I find some evidence that firms aggressive in accrual-based earnings
management not only exhibit less persistent accrued earnings but also have less persistent cash
earnings. This finding complements the literature examining the relation between accrual-based
earnings management and real earnings management by providing evidence that corroborates the
results and conclusions from prior studies. First, it is consistent with Zang’s (2012) finding that
managers trade off between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management
on the basis of their relative costs to each other.44 Second, it supports Cohen and Zarowin’s
(2010) evidence that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) firms engage in not only accrual-based
earnings management but also real earnings management around SEO. My finding generalizes

At first glance, this finding seems contradictory to Zang’s (2012) conclusion. However, in general, the cost of
accrual-based earnings management is lower than the cost of real earnings management. Hence, a high level of
accrual-based earnings management is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for real earnings management.
44
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Cohen and Zarowin’s (2010) conclusion beyond SEO firms to a larger population of firms,
roughly the 20% of US public firms deemed aggressive in earnings management by this study.
Third, it corroborates Badertscher’s (2011) findings that managers engage in accrual-based
earnings management in the early stages of overvaluation before moving on to real earnings
management, and finally to non-GAAP earnings management. Finally, this finding is also
consistent with one of the survey results of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) that, when
managing earnings, managers would rather manipulate real activities than engage in accrualbased earnings management even at the cost of lowering the firm’s long-term value.
Third, I investigate how high tax planning affects the persistence of CFO and thus the
persistence of book income, answering the call for research on the real effects of tax avoidance
by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). Hanlon (2005) finds that LBTDs are associated with less
persistent one-year-ahead pretax book income and its accrual and cash flow components.
Building upon Hanlon (2005), Blaylock et al. (2012) divide the subsample of firms with
LPBTDs further into three subgroups, the earnings management subsample, the tax avoider
subsample, and the BASE subsample. They demonstrate that Hanlon’s (2005) findings on
LPBTDs firms are mainly driven by the subgroup of firms whose LPBTDs are a result of upward
earnings management. However, Blaylock et al.’s (2012) results are based on the comparison of
earnings persistence of firms within the group of firms all having LPBTDs. Hence, their results
may not be generalized to other firms. Finally, McGuire et al. (2013) find that firms with more
sustainable tax strategies exhibit more persistent pretax earnings. Nevertheless, whether the
reported earnings of high tax-planning firms are more or less persistent than the reported
earnings of firms that are not so aggressive in tax planning is still not answered. I fill this gap by
directly examining the relationship between high tax planning and the persistence of earnings
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and its cash flow component. I propose and show that high tax planning, which is measured by
the five-year average GAAP current effective tax rate (ETR), reduces the persistence of CFO. To
the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to directly show that high tax planning reduces
the persistence of operating cash flows and book income.
Fourth, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the combined
impacts of aggressive earnings management and tax planning on the persistence of book income
and its components. I demonstrate that HTP&LEQ firms not only have less persistent accruals
and book income than All-Other firms but also exhibit the least persistent CFO and the least
persistent book income among the four subgroups. The latter finding suggests that, concerning
earnings persistence, HTP&LEQ firms are systematically different from either All-Other, HTP,
or LEQ firms. Therefore, when investigating the effects of earnings management and tax
planning, HTP&LEQ firms should be treated separately from all the other three groups.
Finally, the results that HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms all have less persistent cash
flows from operations than All-Other firms corroborate and explain Hanlon’s (2005) finding that
firms with LBTDs have less persistent operating cash flows. While Hanlon (2005) does not
further analyze why LBTDs lead to less persistent operating cash flows, my testing results
somehow solve this puzzle. Since LBTDs can be driven by tax planning, earnings management,
or both, HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms are all more likely than not to end up in the subgroup
of firms with LBTDs. Hence, Hanlon’s (2005) finding is mainly driven by the fact that HTP,
LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms all tend to have less persistent operating cash flows than All-Other
firms.
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My findings owe largely to the partitioning method that I use to divide the sample into
four subgroups. I partition my sample along two dimensions, both the aggressiveness in earnings
management and the aggressiveness in tax planning. This partitioning method is not complicated
but significantly increases the testing power by generating a relatively less “contaminated”
benchmark subgroup, All-Other. Since both aggressive earnings management and high tax
planning reduce the persistence of book income and its components, of course, due to different
underlying causes, partitioning the whole sample along only one of the dimensions results in the
benchmark subgroup containing firms aggressive on the other dimension.45 For example,
suppose the sample is partitioned based on the aggressiveness in earnings management alone. In
that case, the benchmark subsample will contain firms aggressive in tax planning, which also
reduces the persistence of book income. Hence, the testing power to find the difference in
earnings persistence between LEQ firms and Non-LEQ firms is reduced because the Non-LEQ
subgroup contains most HTP firms.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a literature review and
develops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the research methods. Section 3.4 presents the
sample selection, descriptive statistics, and testing results. Section 3.5 is robustness tests. Section
3.6 concludes and discusses the limitations of this study.
3.2. Literature review, predictions, and testable hypotheses
Earnings persistence is a widely used proxy and well-studied feature for earnings quality
(e.g., Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lipe, 1990; Richardson et al., 2005; Li, 2008; Dechow et al.,
2010). Though there is no agreed-upon definition of earnings quality, persistence is considered a

45

In Ayers et al. (2009), their LEQ subgroup contains most of the HTP firms, and vice versa.
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desirable characteristic of high-quality earnings by both the accounting academics (e.g., Penman
and Zhang, 2002; Barth and Hutton, 2004; Richardson et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010) and
practitioners (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2013). Earnings
persistence is made clear as a value-relevant characteristic of earnings by Miller and Rock (1985)
and Kormendi and Lipe (1987). Based on a two-period model, Miller and Rock (1985) show that
the price adjustment following a firm’s earnings announcement is positively correlated with the
size of the earnings surprise and the persistence of the earnings surprise. Kormendi and Lipe
(1987) show that the stock return induced by a current-period earnings innovation is a function
of both the size and the persistence of that innovation. One of the capital market implications of
Miller and Rock (1985) and Kormendi and Lipe (1987) is that, other things being equal, more
persistent earnings (earnings surprise or innovation) leads to a higher price (a higher price
adjustment or return) for the firm’s stock. As Dechow et al. (2010) have summarized: “More
persistent earnings are more decision useful inputs to equity valuation models” (p. 353).
3.2.1. Aggressive earnings management and the persistence of discretionary
accruals, total accruals, and book income
Sloan (1996) first documents the now-famous accruals anomaly, the negative association
between current total accruals and subsequent long-window stock returns. By decomposing
earnings into accrued earnings and cash earnings, Sloan (1996) demonstrates that the accrual
component of earnings is less persistent than the cash flow component of earnings.46 As a result,
reported earnings with a relatively higher portion of accruals are less persistent than earnings
with a relatively lower portion of accruals. However, investors seem to fixate on earnings and

Throughout this essay, I interchangeably use the terms “cash earnings,” “cash flows from operations,” and
“operating cash flows.”
46
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fail to realize the differential in the persistence of accrued earnings and cash earnings.
Consequently, the equity market overprices firms with a relatively higher portion of accruals in
current reported earnings. When this differential in earnings persistence is later reflected in
future reported earnings, the equity market makes price corrections for these overpriced firms,
resulting in lower abnormal returns for these stocks.
Building on Sloan (1996) and by decomposing total accruals further into discretionary
and nondiscretionary accruals, Xie (2001) demonstrates that the mispricing of accruals
documented by Sloan (1996) is due largely to the overpricing of discretionary accruals. Xie
(2001) shows that, among the three components of earnings, CFO are the most persistent
component, followed by nondiscretionary accruals and then discretionary accruals. Xie
concludes that his “finding is consistent with the market overpricing the portion of abnormal
accruals stemming from earnings management” (p. 370).
Xie (2001) uses the cross-sectional Jones model to separate discretionary accruals from
nondiscretionary accruals. However, since all accruals models have their limitations on properly
decomposing total accruals into their nondiscretionary and discretionary components, especially
for firms with extreme performances (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Guay et al.,
1996; Healy, 1996; Kothari et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010), the evidence in Xie (2001) might
not be so convincing that it is in fact driven by earnings management. Examining a sample of 32
firms subject to the SEC enforcement actions for overstating earnings, Dechow et al. (1995) find
that total accruals for these firms plunged following the year of the SEC announcement of
enforcement actions. Out of the 56 firm-year observations in their sample, firms have
subsequently restated earnings downward in 39 firm-years. Though earnings management is
largely unobservable, especially in the context of archival studies using large samples, it is
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relatively safe to conclude that these firms have, in fact, manipulated reported earnings. This
finding, that accruals had a sharp reversal in the year following the earnings overstatement,
provides more persuasive evidence supporting the notion that earnings management reduces the
persistence of the accrual component of earnings and thus the persistence of reported earnings.
There is ample evidence of opportunistic managerial manipulation of discretionary
accruals. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that firms manipulate reported earnings to avoid a
loss or earnings decrease. Teoh et al. (1998) find that initial public offering (IPO) issuers with
higher positive discretionary accruals tend to have lower stock returns in the subsequent three
years. Rao et al. (1998) demonstrate that IPO-year earnings and discretionary accruals are
unusually high followed by lower post-IPO earnings and negative discretionary accruals, and
that the unexpected high discretionary accruals explain the poor post-IPO earnings and stock
performance. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) show that discretionary accruals for firms whose
managers have sold their stocks through a secondary offering are more positive than those for
firms whose managers have not participated in a secondary offering. Finally, Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) find that high accruals are positively associated with CEOs’ stock selling and
options exercises.
While managers may use discretionary accruals opportunistically, they can also use
discretionary accruals to convey their private information about firms’ underlying long-term
performances to the capital markets. Prior studies show that discretionary accruals exhibit
positive persistence (Dechow et al., 2010). Subramanyam (1996) finds that the equity markets
positively price discretionary accruals. He demonstrates that “discretionary accruals predict
future profitability and dividend changes” (p. 249). Hence, he suggests that opportunistic
earnings management is not widespread. Guay et al. (1996) argue that “given that managerial
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discretion over accruals has survived for centuries, our prior is that the net effect of discretionary
accruals in the population is to enhance earnings as a performance measure” (p. 104). Therefore,
in general, discretionary accruals are value-relevant. However, firms falling into the highest
quintile of absolute discretionary accruals are more likely to have engaged in opportunistic
earnings management. Consequently, discretionary accruals of these firms will be more
“opportunistic” and thus less informative than those of other firms. Hence, I postulate that the
persistence of discretionary accruals, thus the persistence of total accruals and book income will
be lower for LEQ firms than All-Other firms.
3.2.2. High tax planning and the persistence of CFO and book income
Although there are no published studies, as far as I know, that directly investigate the
relation between tax aggressiveness and earnings persistence, Hanlon (2005), Blaylock et al.
(2012), and McGuire et al. (2013) indirectly link earnings persistence to tax planning. Hanlon
(2005) finds that LBTDs are associated with less persistent one-year-ahead pretax book income
and its accrual and cash flow components.
Based on Hanlon (2005), Blaylock et al. (2012) divide the subsample of firms with
LPBTDs further into three subgroups, the earnings management subsample, the tax avoider
subsample, and the BASE subsample. They show that Hanlon’s (2005) results are mainly driven
by the subgroup of firms whose LPBTDs are a result of upward earnings management. At first
glance, the Blaylock et al. (2012) results indicate that high tax planning does not affect earnings
persistence. Nevertheless, since their results are based on the comparison of earnings persistence
of firms within the group of firms that all have LPBTDs, their results may not be generalized to
other firms.
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Finally, McGuire et al. (2013) find that firms with more sustainable tax strategies tend to
have more persistent pretax earnings. However, firms adopting sustainable tax strategies are
unlikely to be classified as tax-aggressive firms since aggressive tax planning by nature is less
likely to be sustainable. Hence, the question of whether reported earnings for tax-aggressive
firms are more or less persistent than those of non-tax-aggressive firms is still not answered by
either Hanlon (2005), Blaylock et al. (2012), or McGuire et al. (2013).
Nevertheless, I argue that there are several reasons for high tax planning to reduce the
persistence of CFO and thus the persistence of book income. First, high tax planning involves
real activities, such as hiring tax experts, redesigning organizational structures, rearranging
business transactions, setting up tax shelters, and timing research and development (R&D)
expenditures to optimize the R&D tax credits, etc.47 Inevitably, these activities will affect the
firm’s operating cash flows and thus book income. Second, firms engaging in high tax planning
are more likely to have exhausted their tax planning opportunities. Hence, some of the currentyear tax planning schemes might not be available in the following reporting periods. For
example, Lease-In/Lease-Out (LILO) and Sale-in/Lease-Out (SILO) transactions were
designated as “listed transactions” by the IRS in 2000 and 2005, respectively.48 After 2000 and
2005, respectively, the tax costs and risk of engaging in LILO and SILO transactions are
significantly increased.
Third, uncertain tax positions for firms aggressive in tax planning might be riskier than
those of other firms. Hence, when audited by the tax authorities, these positions are less likely to

For example, the tax department of General Electric Company (GE) used to be acclaimed as the world’s best tax
law firm. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/pwcs-takeover-of-the-worlds-best-tax-law-firm
48
“IRS Commissioner’s Remarks Regarding LILO / SILO Settlement Initiative - August 6, 2008,”
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/irs-commissioners-remarks-regarding-lilo-silo-settlement-initiative-august-6-2008
47
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hold. If an uncertain tax position is disallowed by the tax authorities, the firm will have to pay
the “saved” tax with lagged interest and sometimes even a hefty fine in the following reporting
periods. For example, the IRS disallowed a $9.4 million deduction from a LILO transaction of
Branch Banking and Trust Company’s 1997 tax return.49 GeoEye Inc. disclosed a settlement of
$97.152 million and income taxes paid of $67.340 million in its 2008 Annual Report (Saavedra,
2013). As a result, the operating cash flows of firms aggressive in tax planning will be less
persistent than those of other firms. And consistent with the notion that riskier tax positions lead
to potential higher future cash tax payments, Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra (2017) show that
firms with higher uncertain tax benefits (UTBs) tend to hold larger cash balances.
Finally, some portion of the deferred tax expenses from previous and current year tax
planning activities, specifically deferral-based tax schemes, will be paid in the following
reporting period, which inevitably lowers the next-period operating cash flows.50 Based on these
arguments, I predict that the persistence of CFO and thus the persistence of book income will be
lower for those firms aggressive in tax planning than for other firms. Hence, my testable
hypothesis on how high tax planning affects the persistence of CFO, and thus the persistence of
book income is:
Hypothesis 1: The persistence of operating cash flows and reported earnings is lower for
HTP firms than All-Other firms.

Edward J. Schnee, “LILO Comes Up One Leg Short,” Journal of Accountancy, August 1, 2008,
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2008/aug/lilocomesuponelegshort.html
50
Of course, firms will continuously report deferred tax expenses every year, but I argue that the deferred portion of
tax expenses is less persistent for high tax planning firms.
49
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3.2.3. The combined impacts of earnings management and tax planning on the
persistence of book income and its components
Since HTP&LEQ firms are aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning,
the prediction and hypothesis I have developed so far all apply to this subgroup of firms. Hence,
the persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash flows, and book income
will be lower for HTP&LEQ firms than All-Other firms. Besides, while aggressive earnings
management reduces the persistence of discretionary accruals, high tax planning reduces the
persistence of operating cash flows. Their combined impacts will make the book income of
HTP&LEQ firms the least persistent among the four subgroups. Hence my two testable
hypotheses for the combined impacts of aggressive earnings management and high tax planning
on the persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash flows, and book
income are as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash
flows, and reported earnings is lower for HTP&LEQ firms than All-Other firms.
Hypothesis 3: The persistence of book income for HTP&LEQ firms is the lowest among
the four subgroups.
3.3. Research methods
3.3.1. Classification of HTP, LEQ, HTP&LEQ, and All-Other firms
To test my predictions and hypotheses, I divide my sample into four subgroups (Table 1
illustrates the reporting type classifications). First, HTP firms are firm-years in the lowest
quintile of the mean accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR but not the highest quintile of
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absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and the two-digit SIC industry.51 Second,
LEQ firms are firm-years ranked in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals but not
the lowest quintile of the current effective tax rate for each fiscal year and the two-digit SIC
industry. Third, HTP&LEQ firms are firm-years ranked in both the lowest quintile of the
accumulated five-year ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals at the twodigit SIC industry level for each fiscal year. Finally, All-Other firms are defined as firm-years
not classified as either an HTP, LEQ, or HTP&LEQ firm. These firms are, comparatively, neither
aggressive in earnings management nor tax planning.
3.3.2. Testing methods
First, to get the big picture on how high tax planning and/or earnings management affects
earnings persistence, I follow prior studies (e.g., Hanlon, 2005; Dichev and Tang, 2009;
Blaylock et al., 2012), and run the following pooled OLS model across the four subgroups:
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(1)

where PTBI equals pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII).52 To allow for crosssectional comparability, I scale all variables by beginning-year total assets (AT) (e.g., Sloan,
1996; Hanlon, 2005; Dichev and Tang, 2009; Blaylock et al., 2012). To test the information
contained in my partitioning variables, All-Other, HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ, I run Equation (1)
for each subgroup to see how the persistence coefficients (𝛼1 ) on current pretax book income for
the one-year-ahead pretax book income vary across the four subgroups. Following Dichev and
Tang (2009), standard errors are clustered at fiscal year. Based on my predictions, 𝛼1 is predicted

51
52

Please refer to Section 2.4.1. of Essay One for details.
All variables are defined in Appendix B.
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to be smaller for HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ subgroups, respectively, than for All-Other
subgroup. Furthermore, according to Hypothesis 3, 𝛼1 for the HTP&LEQ subgroup will be the
smallest among the four subgroups.
Second, I run a pooled OLS regression of Equation (2), in which the persistence
parameters are allowed to vary across the four subgroups partitioned on the firm’s
aggressiveness in tax planning and/or earnings management. This model directly tests all my
predictions on how high tax planning and/or earnings management affects the persistence of
book income. In Equation (2), my main interest is the coefficients on the interaction terms of
pretax book income and my partitioning variables, HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ, respectively.
Based on my prediction and hypotheses, 𝛽5, 𝛽6, and 𝛽7 are all predicted to be negative.
Furthermore, according to Hypothesis 3, 𝛽7 will be the smallest among the three.
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(2)

Third, I decompose pretax book income into its cash and accrual components and run the
OLS regression of Equation (3), where 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂 is calculated as CFO (OANCF) plus cash tax
paid (TXPD) minus extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT). This model tests all my predictions on how high tax planning
and/or earnings management affects the persistence of CFO and total accruals. For Equation (3),
my main interest is again the coefficients of the interaction terms, specifically 𝛾6, 𝛾8, 𝛾10, and
𝛾11. Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2) suggests that the persistence of CFO will be lower for HTP
(HTP&LEQ) firms than for All-Other firms. Hence, both 𝛾6 and 𝛾8 are predicted to be negative.
Finally, based on my predictions, the persistence of accrued earnings for either LEQ or
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HTP&LEQ firms will be lower than All-Other firms. Therefore, both 𝛾10 and 𝛾11 are expected to
be negative.
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝛾6 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾7 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾8 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾9 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 +
𝛾10 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾11 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(3)

Finally, I further decompose accruals into nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary
accruals and run the OLS regression of Equation (4) to test how the persistence of the three
components of book income varies across the four subgroups. In addition to variables previously
defined, 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶 is pretax nondiscretionary accruals (fitted values from a modified Jones
model) and 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶 is pretax discretionary accruals (the residuals of the modified Jones
model).53 Again, my main interest is the coefficients of the interaction terms, specifically 𝛿7 , 𝛿9 ,
𝛿14 , and 𝛿15 . According to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, respectively, HTP firms and
HTP&LEQ firms will have less persistent CFO. Therefore, both 𝛿7 and 𝛿9 are predicted to be
negative. Finally, LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms are predicted to have less persistent discretionary
accruals than All-Other firms. Hence, both 𝛿14 and 𝛿15 are expected to be negative.
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛿2 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿3 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿5 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝛿6 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿7 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿8 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿9 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝛿10 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿11 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿12 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝛿13 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿14 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿15 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

53

(4)

Please see Appendix B for the calculation of PTNDAC and PTDAC.
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3.4. Sample selection and testing results
3.4.1. Sample selection
I start my sample from the Compustat annual database of 2019 that includes US public
firms only.54 I begin my sample from 1988, the first year that the cash flow statement became
mandatory. Similar to Essay One, I (1) exclude fiscal year 2017 and after from my sample to
improve the comparability of all measures throughout the whole sample period, (2) remove firms
in the financial services (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), (3) delete
observations with a fiscal year-end change, and (4) winsorize all the financial statement variables
at the 1% and 99% levels. Furthermore, to mitigate the small denominator problems, I delete
observations with total assets of less than $1 million. Finally, I delete firm-years with missing
values in both HTP and LEQ.55 The final full sample contains 125,287 firm-year observations.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables for my overall sample and
subsamples. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Xie, 2001; Hanlon, 2005; Blaylock et al., 2012;
Blaylock et al., 2020), on average, total accruals (-0.078) are income decreasing. Similarly,
average nondiscretionary accruals (-0.079) are also negative. On average, discretionary accruals
(0.000) are close to zero. However, there are significant variations among the four subgroups.
Except for LEQ firms (-0.034), discretionary accruals are all income increasing, 0.113, 0.031,
and 0.015, respectively, for HTP&LEQ, HTP, and All-Other firms. Untabulated t-tests show that
the differences in the means of discretionary accruals between these subgroups are all significant

54

I use the same Compustat dataset for all three essays. Please see Section 2.5.1 in Essay One for more details on
the sample selection.
55
To keep as many observations as possible, I keep firm-years as long as either HTP or LEQ is non-missing.
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at the 1% level. Concerning performance, LEQ firms are the worst among the four subgroups
based on either book income (-0.279) or CFO (-0.015).56
Table 3 reports the Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal)
correlation coefficients between my main variables. As expected, HTP and LEQ, respectively,
are significantly positively correlated with HTP&LEQ at the 1% level. CFO is negatively
correlated with all other variables, except for book income, which suggests that firms with higher
CFO tend to have relatively lower accruals and are less likely to fall into either HTP, LEQ, or
HTP&LEQ subgroups.
3.4.2. Testing results
Table 4 presents the testing results of Equation (1). As predicted, 𝛼1 is smaller for HTP,
LEQ, and HTP&LEQ subgroup, respectively, than for All-Other subgroup. And there is a clear
descending trend in earnings persistence for the four subgroups, from All-Other (0.831) to HTP
(0.694), LEQ (0.525), and HTP&LEQ (0.368). Furthermore, the adjusted R2s of HTP (26.76%),
LEQ (41.54%), and HTP&LEQ (11.00%) are all smaller than that of All-Other (53.80%). Hence,
the results in Table 4 are qualitatively consistent with my prediction and hypotheses for the
impacts of aggressive earnings management and/or high tax planning on the persistence of pretax
book income.
Table 5 reports the testing results of Equation (2). First, consistent with the prediction of
Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 (𝛽5 = −0.137) is significantly negative at the 1%
level, suggesting that the persistence of pretax book income is lower for HTP firms than All-

56

Untabulated t-tests show that they are all significantly lower than their counterparts of the other three subgroups at
the 1% level.
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Other firms. Second, the coefficient on 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 (𝛽6 = −0.307) is significantly negative at
the 1% level, which indicates that pretax book income is less persistent for LEQ firms than AllOther firms. Third, supporting Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 (𝛽7 =
−0.463) is also significantly negative at the 1% level. Overall, the differences in the coefficients
on the interaction terms are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, it is strongly
supported that HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ firms, respectively, have lower persistent book
income than All-Other firms.
Finally, the prediction of Hypothesis 3, that the HTP&LEQ firms have the least persistent
earnings among the four subgroups, is also strongly supported. In untabulated F-tests, 𝛽7 is
significantly lower than 𝛽5 and 𝛽6, respectively, at the 1% and 5% significance level. When
setting the HTP&LEQ subgroup as the base group instead of the All-Other firms, the coefficients
on the interaction terms of book income with All-Other (0.458), HTP (0.310), and LEQ (0.146),
respectively, are all significantly positive at the 1% level.57 Overall, these results indicate that
both of my partitioning variables, HTP and LEQ, provide incremental information on the
persistence of book income beyond current book income, and HTP&LEQ contains differential
information on earnings persistence from which is contained in either LEQ or HTP.
Table 6 presents the testing results of Equation (3). First, 𝛾1 (0.873) is significantly
greater than 𝛾2 (0.614) at the 1% level, which suggests that, for All-Other firms, CFO are more
persistent than accrued earnings. This finding is consistent with prior research (e.g., Sloan, 1996;
Xie, 2001) that, on average, cash earnings is more persistent than accrued earnings. Second,
concerning the variations in the persistence of CFO, both 𝛾6 (-0.155) and 𝛾8 (-0.326) are

57

The results are no tabulated here but available if requested.
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significantly negative at the 1% level, which supports Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 that the
persistence of CFO is significantly lower for HTP and HTP&LEQ firms, respectively, than AllOther firms. Furthermore, in an untabulated F-test, 𝛾8 is significantly lower than 𝛾6 at the 1%
level, which indicates that HTP&LEQ firms have the least persistent CFO among the four
subgroups and suggests that the partitioning variable HTP&LEQ contains different incremental
information about the persistence of cash earnings from that contained in HTP.
Third, as to the variations in the persistence of total accruals, both 𝛾10 (-0.210) and 𝛾11
(-0.325) are significantly negative at the 1% level, which supports my predictions that both LEQ
and HTP&LEQ firms have less persistent accrued earnings than All-Other firms. Besides, in an
untabulated F-test, 𝛾11 is significantly lower than 𝛾10 at the 10% level, which indicates that
HTP&LEQ firms have the least persistent accruals among the four subgroups and suggests that
the partitioning variable HTP&LEQ contains differential incremental information about the
persistence of accrued earnings from that contained in LEQ. Overall, the results of Table 6
strongly support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. And they are also consistent with Hypothesis 3
that the persistence of book income for HTP&LEQ firms is the lowest among the four subgroups
because HTP&LEQ firms have the least persistent CFO and the least persistent total accruals
among the four subgroups.
Finally, the evidence that HTP and HTP&LEQ firms have less persistent CFO is
consistent with Hanlon’s (2005) finding that firms with large book-tax differences tend to have
less persistent one-year-ahead pretax operating cash flows. Hanlon (2005) does not further
analyze why large book-tax differences lead to less persistent operating cash flows. However, I
argue that Hanlon’s (2005) finding is, at least, partially driven by the less persistent operating
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cash flows of HTP and HTP&LEQ firms because these firms are more likely to end up in the
subgroup of firms with large book-tax differences.
Table 7 presents the testing results of Equation (4), in which I further decompose total
accruals into nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. First, consistent with Xie
(2001), among the three components of earnings, CFO (𝛿1 = 0.862) is the most persistent,
followed by nondiscretionary accruals (𝛿2 = 0.745), and then discretionary accruals (𝛿3 =
0.533) for All-Other firms. Untabulated F-tests show that the differences between these three
coefficients are all significant at the 1% level.
Second, regarding the variations in the persistence of CFO, the coefficients on 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗
𝐻𝑇𝑃 (𝛿7 = −0.151) and 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 (𝛿9 = −0.315) are all significantly negative at
the 1% level. Hence, consistent with the testing results of Equation (3), the prediction that the
persistence of CFO is lower for HTP and HTP&LEQ firms, respectively, than for All-Other firms
is strongly supported. In addition, the coefficient on 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄 (𝛿8 = −0.057) is also
significantly negative at the 10% level. One possible explanation for this finding is that LEQ
firms are also relatively more aggressive in real earnings management, which directly affects the
persistence of operating cash flows. This evidence is consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010)
that SEO firms engage in both accrual-based earnings management and real earnings
management around SEO. It is also consistent with Badertscher’s (2011) finding that managers
usually engage in accrual-based earnings management before moving on to real earnings
management. Hence, a higher level of accrual-based earnings management, though not
necessarily, may indicate a higher corresponding level of real earnings management.58 Moreover,

58

Badertscher (2011) finds that, in the early stages of overvaluation, managers tend to engage in accrual-based
earnings management before moving on to real earnings management, and finally non-GAAP earnings management,
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it supports one of Graham et al.’s (2005) survey results that, when managing earnings, managers
prefer real earnings management to accrual-based earnings management even at the cost of the
firm’s long-term value.
Third, regarding the variations in the persistence of discretionary accruals, the
coefficients on 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄 (𝛿14 = −0.174) and 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 (𝛿15 = −0.244) are
all significantly negative at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the prediction that the
persistence of discretionary accruals is lower for LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms, respectively, than
All-Other firms.
Finally, though I have no predictions on the variations of the persistence of
nondiscretionary accruals for the four subgroups, the coefficients on 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄 (𝛿11 =
−0.127) and 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 (𝛿12 = −0.446) are all significantly negative at the 1%
level. Besides, the coefficient on 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 (𝛿10 = −0.108) is significantly negative at
the 5% level. Untabulated F-tests show that 𝛿12 is significantly lower than either 𝛿10 or 𝛿11 at the
1% significance level, which indicates that the persistence of nondiscretionary accruals is the
lowest for HTP&LEQ firms among the four subgroups. These results suggest that the
partitioning variables, HTP, LEQ, and HTP&LEQ, may capture some negative information about
the firm’s underlying performance beyond the information about the firm’s earnings
management activities.59

one of the most flagrant and costly forms of earnings management. These results imply that, in general, a high level
of accrual-based earnings management is a necessary condition for real earnings management.
59
Another possible explanation for these results is that the modified Jones model partitions the total accruals into its
nondiscretionary and discretionary components with errors.
Page 142 of 217

3.5. Robustness Tests
Though pretax book income is an important performance measure, after-tax book income
is what investors ultimately care about. In this section, I use one-year-ahead after-tax book
income as the dependent variable and current after-tax book income and its components as the
independent variables to assess how aggressive earnings management and/or high tax planning
affects the persistence of book income and its components. The regression models are as follows:
𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(5)

𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜋2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜋3 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜋4 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜋5 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 +
𝜋6 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜋7 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(6)

𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝜑2 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝜑3 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜑4 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑5 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝜑6 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜑7 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑8 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑9 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 +
𝜑10 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑11 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(7)

𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝜔2 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝜔3 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝜔4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔5 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝜔6 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔7 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔8 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔9 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝜔10 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔11 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔12 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝜔13 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔14 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔15 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(8)

where ATBI is measured as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (IB);
ATCFO is after-tax CFO defined as operating cash flows (OANCF) minus cash flows from
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets
(AT); ATTAC is after-tax total accruals calculated as ATBI minus ATCFO; ATNDAC (ATDAC) is
after-tax nondiscretionary accruals (after-tax discretionary accruals) defined as the fitted values
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(residuals) from the modified Jones model in Section 3.1; and all other variables are defined in
Section 3.
The testing results of Equation (5), Equation (6), Equation (7), and Equation (8) are
presented in Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11, respectively. In general, the results are
very similar to those reported in Section 3.4.2. For example, regarding the testing results of
Equation (8), Table 11 shows that, first, after-tax CFO are the most persistent earnings
component, followed by after-tax nondiscretionary accruals and then discretionary accruals.
Second, consistent with Hypothesis 1, CFO are less persistent for HTP firms than All-Other
firms. Third, as predicted, discretionary accruals are less persistent for LEQ firms than All-Other
firms. Fourth, consistent with Hypothesis 2, discretionary accruals and CFO are less persistent
for HTP&LEQ firms than All-Other firms. Finally, confirming the result in Table 5, the
coefficient on 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄 (𝜔8 = −0.188) is significantly negative at the 1% level, which
supports the notion that a high level of accrual-based earnings management is generally
associated with a relatively higher level of real earnings management. This result is consistent
with the empirical results of prior studies (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010;
Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012).
Regarding the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that the HTP&LEQ firms exhibit the least
persistent earnings among the four subgroups, untabulted F-tests show that 𝜋7 is significantly
lower than 𝜋5 and 𝜋6 , respectively, at the 1% level. When setting HTP&LEQ subgroup as the
base group instead of All-Other, the coefficients on the interaction terms of after-tax book
income with All-Other (0.496), HTP (0.323), and LEQ (0.180), respectively, are all significantly
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positive at the 1% level.60 Hence, Hypothesis 3 is also strongly supported. Overall, all my
hypotheses and predictions are strongly supported when one-year-ahead after-tax book income is
used as the dependent variable and current after-tax book income and its components as the
independent variables.
3.6. Conclusions
In this study, I examine aggressive earnings management, high tax planning, and their
combined impacts on the persistence of book income and its accrual and cash components. To
test my predictions and hypotheses, I divide my sample into four subgroups, HTP, LEQ,
HTP&LEQ, and All-Other, then use a set of widely adopted regression models (e.g., Hanlon,
2005; Dichev and Tang, 2009; Blaylock et al., 2012) to test these predictions.
First, I predict and show that the persistence of discretionary accruals, total accruals, and
book income for firms aggressive in earnings management (LEQ firms) is lower than for AllOther firms. Second, I predict and demonstrate that firms aggressive in tax planning (HTP firms)
have less persistent operating cash flows and book income than All-Other firms. Third, I predict
and show that firms aggressive in both earnings management and tax planning (HTP&LEQ
firms) exhibit less persistent discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash flows, and
book income than All-Other firms. Finally, I predict and show that HTP&LEQ firms have the
least persistent book income among the four subgroups. Besides, I find some evidence that LEQ
firms exhibit less persistent operating cash flows than All-Other firms and strong evidence that
HTP&LEQ firms have the least persistent operating cash flows among the four subgroups of my
sample.

60

The results are not tabulated here but available if requested.
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This study makes several contributions to the earnings management literature and tax
planning research. First, it extends our understanding on the relation between earnings
management and the persistence of discretionary accruals by demonstrating that the discretionary
accruals of LEQ and HTP&LEQ firms are less persistent than those of HTP and All-Other firms.
While prior studies show that discretionary accruals are less persistent than nondiscretionary
accruals and cash earnings, my results suggest that aggressive earnings management reduces the
persistence of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, this finding is consistent with Marquardt and
Wiedman’s (2004) finding that discretionary accruals of firms participating in SEO are not even
priced in the year of offering. One of the implications of this finding to the capital markets is
that, when pricing a firm’s discretionary accruals and book income, investors should take into
account its aggressiveness in earnings management.
Second, this study finds evidence that firms aggressive in earnings management also
exhibit less persistent cash earnings. This finding fits in the big picture of the line of literature
investigating the relationship between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings
management by suggesting that a high level of accrual-based earnings management may indicate
a relatively high level of real earnings management. It is consistent with the results from prior
studies: (1) firms use accrual-based earnings management before moving on to real earnings
management (Badertscher, 2011); (2) SEO firms engage in both accrual-based earnings
management and real earnings management around seasoned equity offerings (Cohen and
Zarowin, 2010); and (3) managers prefer real earnings management to accrual-based earnings
management when managing earnings (Graham et al., 2005).
Third, this study directly examines the relation between high tax planning and earnings
persistence, answering the call for more research on the real effects of tax avoidance by Hanlon
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and Heitzman (2010). I predict and show that the persistence of CFO and book income is
significantly lower for HTP firms than for All-Other firms, which suggests that high tax planning
reduces the persistence of CFO and thus the persistence of book income.
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine the combined
impacts of aggressive earnings management and high tax planning on the persistence of book
income and its components. I propose and show that HTP&LEQ firms (1) exhibit less persistent
discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash flows, and book income than All-Other
firms, and (2) have the least persistent book income among the four subgroups of firms. Besides,
the testing results show that HTP&LEQ firms also have the least persistent operating cash flows
among the four subgroups. These findings suggest that the indicator variable, HTP&LEQ may
have captured some negative information about the firm’s underlying performance beyond the
information on its earnings management and tax planning. Furthermore, the finding that
HTP&LEQ, HTP, and LEQ firms all exhibit less persistent operating cash flows corroborates and
partially explains Hanlon’s (2005) finding that firms with large book-tax differences have less
persistent one-year-ahead pretax book income and its accruals and cash flow components
because firms aggressive in earnings management and/or tax planning are more likely to fall into
the subgroup of firms with large book-tax differences.
Due to the importance of earnings persistence for stock valuation, the results of this study
are of interest to investors, financial analysts, and accounting professionals. Specifically, when
pricing a firm’s stock, investors should take into account its aggressiveness in earnings
management and tax planning.61 However, these results should be interpreted with caution. Since

61

In the future, I will conduct a study to investigate whether investors correctly, at least directionally, interpret the
differences in the persistence of CFO, discretionary accruals, and book income between HTP, LEQ, HTP&LEQ, and
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my sample includes public firms that are incorporated in the US, these findings might not be
generalized to other firms. Finally, the finding that HTP&LEQ firms have the least persistent
total accruals, operating cash flows, and reported book income among the four subgroups
suggests that HTP&LEQ may capture some negative information about firms’ underlying
performances beyond the information on aggressiveness in earnings management and tax
planning. It is worth investigating the underlying reasons for this finding in future studies.

All-Other firms. For example, I predict that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) on CFO (discretionary accruals)
will be significantly lower for HTP firms (LEQ firms) than All-Other firms.
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Tables for Essay Two
Table 1 Classification of reporting-type

Effective tax rate2

1st
quintile
1st
quintile
2nd
quintile
3rd
quintile
4th
quintile
5th
quintile

Absolute discretionary accruals1
2nd
3rd
4th
quintile
quintile
quintile

5th quintile

HTP4

HTP&LEQ3

All-Other6

LEQ5

Notes to Table 1:
1: Firm-years are ranked into quintiles based upon their respective absolute discretionary accruals estimated from
a modified Jones model in the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry and fiscal year.
2: Firm-years are ranked into quintiles according to their respective book current effective tax rates for each fiscal
year and two-digit SIC industry.
3: HTP&LEQ: firm-years falling into both the lowest quintile of current effective tax rate and the highest quintile
of absolute discretionary accruals.
4: HTP: firm-years falling into the lowest quintile of current effective tax rate but not the highest quintile of
absolute discretionary accruals.
5: LEQ: firm-years falling into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals but not the lowest quintile of
current effective tax rate.
6: All-Other: firm-years falling into neither the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals nor the lowest
quintile of current effective tax rate.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variable
PTBIt+1

Median

3rd quartile

110,290

-0.043

0.35

-0.087

0.035

0.112

PTBIt

125,287

-0.059

0.38

-0.099

0.033

0.113

PTCFOt
PTTACt

106,520
106,520

0.079
-0.078

0.20
0.20

0.017
-0.115

0.095
-0.056

0.174
-0.008

PTNDACt

105,630

-0.079

0.10

-0.103

-0.066

-0.036

PTDACt

105,630

0.000
0.17
-0.044
Panel B: All-Other firm-years
38,702
0.091
0.13
0.032

0.009

0.060

0.089

0.155

PTBIt

42,199

0.105

0.11

0.040

0.094

0.160

PTCFOt

41,533

0.152

0.12

0.081

0.140

0.211

PTTACt

41,533

-0.047

0.09

-0.088

-0.047

-0.009

PTNDACt

40,942

-0.063

0.06

-0.090

-0.060

-0.033

PTDACt

40,942

0.013

0.053

PTBIt+1

10,382

0.015
0.09
-0.026
Panel C: HTP firm-years
0.056
0.13
0.008

0.058

0.112

PTBIt

11,465

0.083

0.10

0.027

0.069

0.122

PTCFOt

10,754

0.120

0.11

0.058

0.110

0.172

PTTACt

10,754

-0.036

0.10

-0.081

-0.041

-0.002

PTNDACt

10,455

-0.068

0.07

-0.096

-0.063

-0.035

PTDACt

10,455

0.022

0.067

PTBIt+1

20,285

0.031
0.10
-0.017
Panel D: LEQ firm-years
-0.181
0.52
-0.282

-0.031

0.087

PTBIt

24,222

-0.279

0.66

-0.433

-0.079

0.095

PTCFOt

18,464

-0.015

0.29

-0.110

0.021

0.139

PTTACt

18,464

-0.147

0.42

-0.306

-0.085

0.093

PTNDACt

18,464

-0.113

0.18

-0.139

-0.079

-0.036

PTDACt

18,464

-0.034

0.38

-0.224

0.003

0.194

PTBIt+1

N

Panel A: Overall sample
Mean Std. Dev. 1st quartile
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (Continued)
Variable
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
1st quartile
Panel E: HTP&LEQ firm-years
PTBIt+1
1,254
0.051
0.17
-0.020

Median

3rd quartile

0.056

0.129

PTBIt

1,386

0.118

0.15

0.031

0.093

0.175

PTCFOt

1,244

0.088

0.18

-0.023

0.071

0.185

PTTACt

1,244

0.030

0.20

-0.087

0.026

0.128

PTNDACt

1,244

-0.083

0.12

-0.119

-0.070

-0.031

PTDACt

1,244

0.113

0.21

-0.047

0.129

0.217

Notes to Table 2:
1.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

2.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) minus
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

3.

PTTAC: Pretax total accruals calculated as PTBI minus PTCFO.

4.

PTNDAC: Pretax nondiscretionary accruals are fitted values from a modified cross-sectional Jones model
(see Appendix B for detailed calculation).

5.

PTDAC: Pretax discretionary accruals are the residuals estimated from a modified cross-sectional Jones
model (see Appendix B for detailed calculation).

6.

ABPTDAC: Absolute value of PTDAC.
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Table 3 Correlation Tables
Pearson below/Spearman above Diagonal
HTP

LEQ
0.04

***

HTP&LEQ

PTCFO
-0.13***

PTTAC
0.04***

PTNDAC

PTDAC

0.31

PTBI
-0.11***

-0.03***

0.07***

***

HTP

1

LEQ

0.04***

1

0.48***

0.03***

-0.09***

0.12***

-0.01

0.13***

HTP&LEQ

0.31***

0.48***

1

0.01**

-0.07***

0.09***

-0.03***

0.10***

***

***

***

***

0.14***

0.19***

-0.41***

-0.12***

-0.32***

1

0.36***

0.71***

1

-0.29***

-0.32***

1

0.03

0.02

***

PTBI

-0.08

1

0.69

PTCFO

-0.11*** -0.10***

-0.08***

0.69***

1

PTTAC

0.05***

0.17***

0.13***

0.36***

-0.43***

***

***

***

***

***

PTNDAC

-0.04

-0.03

-0.05

0.13

PTDAC

0.07***

0.18***

0.16***

0.27***

-0.12

-0.35***

0.27

0.32

***

0.79***

Notes to Table 3:
1.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

2.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

3.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

4.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.

5.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

6.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) minus
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

7.

PTTAC: Pretax total accruals calculated as PTBI minus PTCFO.
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8.

PTNDAC: Pretax nondiscretionary accruals are fitted values from a modified cross-sectional Jones model
(see Appendix B for detailed calculation).

9.

PTDAC: Pretax discretionary accruals are the residuals estimated from a modified cross-sectional Jones
model (see Appendix B for detailed calculation).
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Table 4 Testing results of Equation (1)
Variable
Prediction
All-Other
PTBIt
+
0.831***
t-statistic
(30.96)
Constant
?
-0.016***
t-statistic
(-5.51)
Observations
82,783
2
Adj. R
53.80%

HTP
0.694***
(28.48)
0.001
(0.35)
9,182
26.76%

LEQ
0.525***
(10.38)
-0.054***
(-5.85)
19,085
41.54%

HTP&LEQ
0.368***
(6.17)
0.007
(1.15)
1,255
11.00%

Notes to Table 4:
1.

Equation (1):
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

5.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

6.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.

7. All-Other: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year is not classified as either HTP, LEQ, or HTP&LEQ,
and 0 otherwise.
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Table 5 Testing results of Equation (2)

Variable

Prediction

PTBIt+1

+

0.831***
(30.96)

HTPt
t-statistic

?

0.017***
(6.88)

LEQt
t-statistic

?

-0.038***
(-4.73)

HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

?

0.022***
(4.06)

PTBIt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

-0.137***
(-4.94)

PTBIt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.307***
(-11.10)

PTBIt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

-0.463***
(-7.67)
-0.016***
(-5.51)

PTBIt
t-statistic

2

Adj. R

?

112,305
50.52%

Notes to Table 5:
1.

Equation (2):

𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.
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5.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

6.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 6 Testing results of Equation (3)
Variable

Prediction

PTBIt+1

PTCFOt

+

t-statistic
PTTACt

+

0.873***
(47.39)
0.614***
(22.43)
0.022***
(5.90)
-0.019***
(-3.65)
0.020***
(3.83)
-0.155***
(-5.85)
-0.033
(-1.12)
-0.326***
(-7.24)
0.007
(0.17)
-0.210***
(-8.16)
-0.325***
(-5.33)
-0.026***
(-7.63)
95,791
49.80%

t-statistic
HTPt
t-statistic

?

LEQt
t-statistic

?

HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

?

PTCFOt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

PTCFOt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTCFOt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTTACt*HTPt
t-statistic

?

PTTACt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTTACt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

Adj. R2

?

Notes to Table 6:
1.

Equation (3):

𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾6 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛾7 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾8 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾9 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾10 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡
+ 𝛾11 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
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2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) minus
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

5.

PTTAC: Pretax total accruals calculated as PTBI minus PTCFO.

6.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

7.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

8.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 7 Testing results of Equation (4)
Variable
PTCFOt
t-statistic
PTNDACt
t-statistic
PTDACt

Prediction

PTBIt+1

+

0.862***
(47.34)

+

0.745***
(20.66)

+

0.533***
(19.21)

t-statistic

0.014***

HTPt
t-statistic

?

LEQt
t-statistic

?

HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

?

PTCFOt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

PTCFOt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTCFOt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTNDCt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

PTNDACt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTNDACt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTDACt*HTPt
t-statistic

?

PTDACt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

PTDACt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

-0.244***

?

(-4.27)
-0.015***
(-4.69)

2

Adj. R

(3.78)
-0.008*
(-1.77)
0.010*
(1.78)
-0.151***
(-6.02)
-0.057*
(-1.88)
-0.315***
(-6.98)
-0.108**
(-2.18)
-0.127***
(-3.34)
-0.446***
(-4.71)
0.045
(1.10)
-0.174***
(-6.60)

94,078
50.13%
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Notes to Table 7:
1.

Equation (4):

𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛿2 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿3 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿5 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿6 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡
+ 𝛿7 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿8 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿9 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿10 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛿11 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿12 𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿13 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛿14 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿15 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) minus
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

5.

PTNDAC: Pretax nondiscretionary accruals are fitted values from a modified cross-sectional Jones model
(see Appendix B for detailed calculation).

6.

PTDAC: Pretax discretionary accruals are the residuals estimated from a modified cross-sectional Jones
model (see Appendix B for detailed calculation).

7.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

8.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

9.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year is ranked in both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 8 Testing Results of Equation (5)
Variable
Prediction
All-Other
ATBIt
+
0.835***
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

?

Adj. R2

HTP

LEQ

HTP&LEQ

(28.39)
-0.018***
(-6.60)
82,788

0.661***
(27.52)
-0.002
(-0.59)
9,182

0.519***
(10.04)
-0.061***
(-6.29)
19,085

0.338***
(7.81)
-0.003
(-0.59)
1,255

52.24%

21.86%

40.92%

9.70%

Notes to Table 8:
1.

Equation (5):
𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

ATBI: After-tax book income measured as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
(IB) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

5.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

6.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.

7.

All-Other: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year is not classified as either HTP, LEQ, or HTP&LEQ,
and 0 otherwise.

Page 165 of 217

Table 9 Testing Results of Equation (6)
Variable
Prediction
ATBIt

ATBIt+1

+

0.835***
(28.38)

HTPt
t-statistic

?

0.016***
(6.92)

LEQt
t-statistic

?

-0.043***
(-5.13)

HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

?

0.015***
(3.04)

ATBIt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

-0.174***
(-6.01)

ATBIt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.316***
(-11.55)

ATBIt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

-0.496***
(-9.76)
-0.018***
(-6.60)
112,310

t-statistic

?

Adj. R2

49.27%

Notes to Table 9:
1.

Equation (6):
𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜋2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜋3 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜋4 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜋5 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 +

𝜋6 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜋7 𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

ATBI: After-tax book income measured as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
(IB) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.
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5.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

6.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 10 Testing Results of Equation (7)
Variable
Prediction

ATBIt+1

ATCFOt

+

t-statistic
ATTACt

0.890***
(32.54)

+

0.623***
(16.66)

HTPt
t-statistic

?

0.027***
(7.88)

LEQt
t-statistic

?

-0.030***
(-4.14)

HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

?

0.022***
(4.64)

ATCFOt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

-0.214***
(-7.57)

ATCFOt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.173***
(-5.67)

ATCFOt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.391***
(-10.70)

ATTACt*HTPt
t-statistic

?

-0.036
(-0.92)

ATTACt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.261***
(-11.69)

ATTACt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

-0.339***
(-6.79)
-0.035***
(-10.42)
111,768
51.09%

t-statistic

Adj. R2

?

Notes to Table 10:
1.

Equation (7):
𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝜑2 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝜑3 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜑4 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑5 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑6 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗

𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜑7 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑8 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑9 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜑10 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝜑11 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
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2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

ATBI: After-tax book income measured as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
(IB) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

ATCFO: After-tax CFO calculated as operating cash flows (OANCF) minus cash flows from extraordinary
items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

5.

ATTAC: After-tax total accruals calculated as ATBI minus ATCFO.

6.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

7.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

8.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 11 Testing Results of Equation (8)
Variable
Prediction

ATBIt+1

ATCFOt

+

t-statistic
ATNDACt

0.881***
(32.50)

+

t-statistic
ATDACt

0.721***
(14.36)

+

0.562***
(15.43)

HTPt
t-statistic

?

0.021***
(5.03)

LEQt
t-statistic

?

-0.020***
(-2.90)

HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

?

0.020***
(3.46)

ATCFOt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

-0.214***
(-7.68)

ATCFOt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.188***
(-6.39)

ATCFOt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.378***
(-10.30)

ATNDCt*HTPt
t-statistic

-

-0.121**
(-2.25)

ATNDACt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.166***
(-4.61)

ATNDACt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.365***
(-5.93)

ATDACt*HTPt
t-statistic

?

-0.026
(-0.65)

ATDACt*LEQt
t-statistic

-

-0.230***
(-9.02)

ATDACt*HTP&LEQt
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

-0.281***
(-5.29)
-0.026***
(-6.59)
109,644
51.09%

t-statistic

Adj. R2

?
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Notes to Table 11:
1.

Equation (8):
𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝜔2 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝜔3 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝜔4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔5 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔6 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +

𝜔7 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔8 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔9 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔10 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 +
𝜔11 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔12 𝐴𝑇𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜔13 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔14 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 +
𝜔15 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃&𝐿𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

ATBI: After-tax book income measured as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
(IB) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

ATCFO: After-tax CFO calculated as operating cash flows (OANCF) minus cash flows from extraordinary
items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).

5.

ATNDAC: After-tax nondiscretionary accruals defined as the fitted values from the modified Jones model
in Section 3.1.

6.

ATDAC: After-tax discretionary accruals defined as the residuals from the modified Jones model in Section
3.1.

7.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current ETR but not in the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for each fiscal year and
two-digit (SIC) industry, and 0 otherwise.

8.

LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute discretionary
accruals but not the lowest quintile of current ETR for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0
otherwise.

9.

HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current ETR and the highest quintile of absolute discretionary accruals for
each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry, and 0 otherwise.
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Appendix B: Definition of Variables
1. PTBI: Pretax book income equals pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII)
scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
2. TI: Estimated taxable income equals current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US
statutory tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforward
(TLCF) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
3. Current tax expense (CTE): The sum of current federal income tax expense (TXFED) and
current foreign tax expense (TXFO); if either current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) or current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE equals to total
income tax expense (TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if
TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the sum of deferred federal income tax expense
(TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).
4. PTCFO: Pretax CFO equals cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD)
minus extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginningyear total assets (AT).
5. PTTAC: Pretax total accruals equal to PTBI minus PTCFO.
6. PTNDAC: Pretax nondiscretionary accruals are fitted values from the following modified
Jones model:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 ⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + [𝛼1 (1⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 )] + 𝛼2 [(∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 )⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 ]
+ 𝛼3 (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 ⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
where ΔSalesit is the change in sales (SALE) for firm i from fiscal year t - 1 to t; ΔRECit is
the change in accounts receivable (RECT) for firm i from fiscal year t - 1 to t; PPEit is net
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property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) for firm i in fiscal year t; TAit - 1 is total assets
(AT) for firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t.
7. PTDAC: Pretax discretionary accruals are the residuals estimated from the above
modified Jones model.
8. HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current effective tax rate but not the highest quintile of
absolute discretionary accruals at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0
otherwise.
9. LEQ: Indicator variable equals to 1 if firm-year falls into the highest quintile of absolute
discretionary accruals but not the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year GAAP
current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0
otherwise.
10. HTP&LEQ: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year falls into both the lowest quintile of
mean accumulated five-year GAAP current effective tax rate and the highest quintile of
absolute discretionary accruals estimated from a modified Jones model at the two-digit
SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
11. All-Other: Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm-year is not classified as either HTP, LEQ,
or HTP&LEQ, and 0 otherwise.
12. ATBI: After-tax book income measured as earnings before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations (IB) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
13. ATCFO: After-tax CFO calculated as operating cash flows (OANCF) minus cash flows
from extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) scaled by beginning-year
total assets (AT).
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14. ATNDAC: After-tax nondiscretionary accruals defined as the fitted values from the
modified Jones model in Section 2.3.1.
15. ATDAC: After-tax discretionary accruals defined as the residuals from the modified Jones
model in Section 2.3.1.
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Chapter 4: Essay Three

High Tax Planning and the Predictive Ability of Taxable Income for Future Performance
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Abstract
Prior research suggests that taxable income contains information about earnings persistence,
earnings growth, and stock price changes. Specifically, Blaylock, Lawson, and Mayberry (2020)
show that taxable income positively predict firms’ future performance. Still, little is known about
the impacts of tax planning on the informativeness of taxable income. I postulate and
demonstrate that high tax planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable income for firms’
future performance. This study contributes to the literature examining the informativeness of
taxable income and enhances our understanding on how tax planning affects the information
content of taxable income, specifically, its predictive ability for firms’ future performance. This
study also has implications for fundamental analysis as predicting firms’ future performance is
the central task of fundamental analysis. My findings suggest that, when using taxable income to
predict firms’ future performance, analysts should take into account the level of firms’ tax
aggressiveness.

Keywords: high tax planning, earnings persistence, fundamental analysis, book income, taxable
income, and cash flows from operations
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4.1. Introduction
While book income and operating cash flows are two traditional primary summary
measures of firms’ financial performance (e.g., Wilson, 1986; Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley,
1987; Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998), recent studies suggest that taxable
income contains information about earnings quality (e.g., Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005;
Blaylock, Shevlin, and Wilson, 2012; Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley, 2012) and serves as an
alternative performance measure (e.g., Hanlon, Laplante, and Shevlin, 2005; Ayers Jiang, and
Laplante, 2009; Blaylock, Lawson, and Mayberry, 2020).62 Still, little is known on how tax
planning affects the informativeness of taxable income. In particular, there is no empirical
evidence on the impacts of high tax planning on the predictive ability of taxable income for
firms’ future performance.63 The main objective of this study is to fill this void by investigating
how high tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income for future performance.
The interest in the informativeness of taxable income is mainly triggered by the enlarging
difference between book income and taxable income beginning from the 1990s (e.g., Mills and
Newberry, 2001; Manzon and Plesko, 2001; Desai, 2003; Leve and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon and
Shevlin, 2005). Unlike accrual-based book income, taxable income is generated on the basis of a
combination of accrual and cash rules. Furthermore, for the accrual components, such as
depreciation expenses, tax codes have a set of rules much stricter than those of generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). For example, while the depreciation expenses are based

62

Similar to prior research in corporate taxation (e.g., Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005;
Ayers et al., 2009; Blaylock et al., 2020), taxable income in this study is estimated from the financial statements.
63
Since there is no agreed-upon definition of tax aggressiveness, following Ayers et al. (2009), I use the term “high
tax planning” to refer to firms with relatively higher levels of tax aggressiveness. However, by no means do I imply
that these firms have engaged in any illegal tax avoidance activities. As pointed out by Hanlon and Heitzman
(2010), tax aggressiveness is a continuum spanning from perfectly legitimate tax planning strategies, such as
investing in tax-exempt municipal bonds, to noncompliance activities, such as tax sheltering/evasion.
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on management judgements and estimates under GAAP, they are regulated under the tax code.
Since the calculation of taxable income involves fewer management judgements and estimates,
managers have less leeway to manipulate taxable income than book income. Therefore, as a
benchmark performance measure, taxable income is generally more reliable than book income,
even though prior research shows that book income is much more value-relevant than taxable
income (e.g., Hanlon et al., 2005; Ayers et al., 2009).
Recent studies find that taxable income contains information about future earnings, such
as earnings persistence and growth, and is correlated with price and stock return. Lev and Nissim
(2004) show that the tax-to-book income ratio can predict earnings growth up to five years.
Hanlon (2005) demonstrates that large book-tax differences (BTDs) are associated with less
persistent book income and its accrual and cash flow components. Blaylock et al. (2012) further
demonstrate that the negative association between large positive book-tax differences (LPBTDs)
and earnings persistence documented by Hanlon (2005) is more pronounced in the subgroup of
firms whose LPBTDs result from upward earnings management. Furthermore, Anderson,
Banker, Rahiminejad, and Warsame (2020) show that, besides earnings management and tax
planning, the association between BTDs and earnings persistence is also affected by firms’
investment expenditures. In combination, these findings support the notion that taxable income,
as a benchmark performance measure, contains information about earnings persistence and
earnings growth. Nevertheless, since BTDs can be driven by either earnings management, tax
planning, or even firms’ investment decisions, these studies do not provide direct evidence on the
impacts of tax planning on the informativeness of taxable income.
To compare the value relevance of book income and taxable income, Hanlon et al. (2005)
find that, while individually both measures have significant explanatory power for stock returns,
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book income has significantly higher explanatory power than taxable income. In addition, they
show that both measures contain incremental information to each other. From the perspective of
forecasting future performance, Blaylock et al. (2020) demonstrate that taxable income
positively predicts firms’ future performance after controlling for book income and its
components, which indicates that taxable income contains incremental information about firms’
future performance beyond book income and cash flows. In combination, these two studies
provide direct evidence of the informativeness of taxable income.
Nevertheless, just as opportunistic earnings management reduces the information
contained in book income (e.g., Elliott and Hanna, 1996; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998;
Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004), high tax planning may negatively affect the informativeness of
taxable income. Positing that taxable income is an alternative measure of firms’ economic
performance, Ayers et al. (2009) show that the relative and incremental information of taxable
income to book income is lower for firms aggressive in tax planning than for all other firms.
Their finding is consistent with the notion that high tax planning reduces the value-relevant
information contained in taxable income and thus weakens the association between the change in
current taxable income and contemporary stock return. Since taxable income distorted by high
tax planning is not a good indicator of a firm’s fundamentals, it is not a good predictor of its
future performance either. Hence, I argue that high tax planning will reduce the predictive ability
of taxable income for firms’ future performance. As a result, the predictive ability of taxable
income for firms’ future performance is lower for high tax-planning (HTP) firms than for NonHTP firms.
Using a sample of firm-year observations (49,789) from 1988 to 2016, I examine how
high tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income for future operating
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performance. Following Ayers et al. (2009), I divide my sample into two subgroups, HTP and
Non-HTP. HTP firms are defined as firm-years in the lowest quintile of the accumulated fiveyear GAAP current effective tax rate (ETR) for each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry. NonHTP firms are firm-years falling into the other four quintiles. I use cash flows from operations
(CFO) as the measure of firms’ underlying performance mainly because a firm’s value is
ultimately determined by its discounted cash flows. I start with regressions of one-, two-, and
three-year-ahead pretax CFO, respectively, on taxable income, HTP (indicator variable equals
one if the observation is classified as HTP and zero otherwise), and the interaction of HTP with
taxable income. Consistent with Blaylock et al. (2020), I find that taxable income is positively
associated with one-, two-, and three-years-ahead pretax CFO. I also find that the predictive
ability of taxable income for one-, two-, and three-years-ahead pretax CFO is significantly lower
for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms, which is consistent with my hypothesis that high tax
planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable income for firms’ future performance.
To examine the incremental predictive ability of taxable income for firms’ future
performance beyond book income and CFO, following Blaylock et al. (2020), I add book income
and CFO to each regression. Furthermore, I control for size and leverage, two well-known
factors that are associated with firms’ performance. Consistent with Blaylock et al. (2020), both
book income and CFO are positively associated with firms’ future performance. More
importantly, taxable income is positively associated with one-, two-, and three-years-ahead
pretax CFO for Non-HTP firms, and such positive association is again significantly attenuated
for HTP firms. This finding suggests that both book income and CFO cannot completely mute
the positive association between taxable income and firms’ future performance, which is
consistent with Blaylock et al. (2020) that taxable income contains incremental information
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about firms’ future performance beyond book income and CFO. This finding also suggests that
the predictive ability of taxable income for one-, two-, and three-years-ahead pretax CFO is
significantly lower for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms, which is consistent with the notion
that high tax planning significantly reduces the predictive ability of taxable income for future
performance.
Overall, this study contributes to the literature examining the information content in
taxable income estimated from financial statements (e.g., Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005;
Ayers et al., 2009; Blaylock et al., 2020). In particular, first, this study extends the results of
Blaylock et al. (2020) that taxable income positively predicts future performance by showing that
high tax planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable income. To put it another way, though,
on average, taxable income positively predicts firms’ future performance, its predictive ability is
significantly lower for high tax-planning firms. Second, the finding that high tax planning
reduces the predictive ability of taxable income has implications for fundamental analysis since
the prediction of future performance is pivotal for fundamental analysis. My finding suggests
that, when using taxable income to predict future performance, analysts should take into
consideration firms’ level of aggressiveness in tax planning. Finally, this study contributes to the
literature investigating how tax planning affects the informativeness of taxable income.
Specifically, my results complement and extend Ayers et al.’s (2009) finding that high tax
planning reduces the value relevance of taxable income. While Ayers et al. (2009) show that
high tax planning weakens the association between the change in taxable income and the
contemporaneous stock return, I demonstrate that high tax planning reduces the predictive ability
of taxable income for future performance. In sum, my finding adds another piece to the puzzle of
how tax planning affects the informativeness of taxable income.
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The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a literature review and
develops the hypothesis. Section 4.3 describes the testing methods. Section 4.4 presents the
sample selection, descriptive statistics, and testing results. Section 4.5 shows the results of
robustness tests. Section 4.6 concludes and discusses the limitations of this study.
4.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
While book income is traditionally the primary summary measure of firms’ financial
performance, taxable income has recently been recognized as an alternative performance
measure (e.g., Hanlon et al., 2005; Ayers et al., 2009; Blaylock et al., 2020). Lev and Nissim
(2004) find that the tax-to-book income ratio has a positive association with subsequent
abnormal stock returns over their whole sample period even though the magnitude of the
association decreases in the post-SFAS No. 109 period. They demonstrate that the tax-to-book
income ratio can predict earnings growth up to five years. However, similar to the accruals
anomaly, the forward-looking information contained in the tax-to-book income ratio was largely
ignored by investors in the 1980s but was impounded, though not fully, into prices in the 1990s.
Hanlon (2005) finds that large book-tax differences (BTDs) are associated with lower
persistent book income and its accrual and cash components. She concludes that “book-tax
differences contain information about the underlying cash flow stream as well as accruals” (p.
139). In the Canadian context, Deslandes and Landry (2007) also find that BTDs are negatively
associated with future pretax book income.
To better understand the relation between LPBTDs and earnings persistence, Blaylock et
al. (2012) divide the subsample of firms with LPBTDs further into three subgroups, the earnings
management subgroup, the tax avoider subgroup, and the BASE subgroup. They find that
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Hanlon’s (2005) result, the negative association between LPBTDs and earnings persistence, is
mainly driven by the subgroup of firms whose LPBTDs are a result of upward earnings
management. For the same purpose, Anderson et al. (2020) demonstrate that, while high
discretionary accruals reduce earnings persistence for the LPBTDs, LNBTDs, and the middle
BTDs quintiles, the lower earnings persistence for the LPBTDs (LNBTDs) quintiles than for the
middle BTDs quintiles is driven by firms with high spending in capital expenditures (research
and development). Their results suggest that, besides earnings management and tax planning,
firms’ decisions on investment expenditures also affect the association between BTDs and
earnings persistence. Overall, these findings indicate that, as a benchmark for book income,
taxable income contains information about earnings quality, specifically earnings growth and
earnings persistence.
To argue that conforming book income and taxable income into one measure, especially
if book income is conformed to the tax codes, will result in the loss of information content to the
capital markets, Hanlon et al. (2005) assess and compare the information content of book income
with that of taxable income. They show that, while both the change in book income and the
change in taxable income are significantly associated with contemporaneous stock returns, the
explanatory power is significantly higher for book income than for taxable income. They also
find that both measures contain incremental information to each other.
From the perspective of fundamental analysis, Blaylock et al. (2020) demonstrate that
taxable income positively predicts firms’ future performance, proxied by pretax book income,
pretax operating cash flows, and “Street” pretax earnings, after controlling for current pretax
book income and its accrual and cash flow components. This finding provides direct evidence
that taxable income contains incremental information about firms’ future performance over book
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income and cash flows. It is consistent with the notion that taxable income captures firms’
economic fundamentals that are not reflected in book income and cash flows.
While it is established that taxable income serves as an alternative performance measure
and Blaylock et al. (2020) show that taxable income positively predicts future performance, to
the best of my knowledge, no studies have examined whether and how high tax planning affects
the predictive ability of taxable income for future performance. Though providing no direct
evidence, three studies investigating the consequences of tax planning are closely related to my
research question of how high tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income for
future performance. First, McGuire, Neuman, and Omer (2013) find that firms with more
sustainable tax strategies, proxied by the coefficient of variation (relative standard deviation) for
annual cash effective tax rates, tend to have more persistent pretax book income and its accrual
and cash components. Second, Mayberry, McGuire, and Omer (2015) demonstrate that the
smoothness, particularly the discretionary smoothness, of taxable income reduces the association
between price changes and the changes in taxable income, especially the discretionary
component of changes in taxable income. Mayberry et al. (2015) suggest that managerial
discretionary smoothing of taxable income “reducing the information contained in the unique
economic shocks experienced by taxable income” (p. 162). Mayberry et al. (2015) also find that
firms with smoother taxable income tend to be more aggressive in tax planning in the following
periods.
However, the coefficient of variation or smoothness of taxable income measures firms’
tax planning features from a perspective that is completely different from the traditional tax
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aggressiveness measures, such as GAAP ETR, GAAP current ETR, or cash ETR.64 Furthermore,
firms with more sustainable tax strategies and smoother taxable income are less likely to fall into
the HTP subgroup because, other things being equal, the tax planning strategies of HTP firms are
unlikely to be sustainable.65 If firms with more sustainable tax strategies and smoother taxable
income are more likely to fall into the Non-HTP subgroup, based on the findings of McGuire et
al. (2013) and Mayberry et al. (2015), Non-HTP firms will have more persistent book income
than HTP firms. Nevertheless, if these firms are more likely to fall into the HTP subgroup, HTP
firms will have more persistent book income. Therefore, whether high tax planning will reduce
the predictive ability of taxable income for firms’ future performance is ultimately an empirical
question.
Third, exploiting two unique reporting settings in which firms engage in either aggressive
earnings management or high tax planning, Ayers et al. (2009) find that, on the one hand, the
relative and incremental information of estimated taxable income to that of book income is
significantly higher for firms aggressive in earnings management than for all other firms. On the
other hand, the relative and incremental information of estimated taxable income to that of book
income is significantly lower for high tax-planning firms than for all other firms. The latter
finding is consistent with the notion that high tax planning deteriorates the ability of taxable
income to faithfully capture firms’ fundamentals and thus reduces the explanatory power of
changes in current taxable income for contemporary stock returns.

64

Another commonly used measure of tax aggressiveness is the FIN 48 reserve (Blouin, 2014).
In my sample, the standard deviation of taxable income for HTP firms (0.18) is greater than that of Non-HTP
firms (0.14), indicating that HTP firms tend to have less persistent taxable income than Non-HTP firms.
65
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As a benchmark for book income, taxable income contains information about earnings
quality, such as earnings persistence and growth, serves as an alternative measure of firms’
fundamental performance to book income, and contains value-relevant information about stock
prices and returns. Extending Ayers et al.’s (2009) finding that high tax planning reduces the
value relevance of taxable income, I conjecture that high tax planning will reduce the predictive
ability of taxable income for future performance. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that
earnings management distorts reported book income and thus reduces the informativeness of
book income. Following the same logical reasoning, high tax planning deteriorates the ability of
taxable income to faithfully capture firms’ economic performance and makes taxable income less
informative about firms’ fundamentals, which ultimately reduces its ability to predict firms’
future performance. Hence, I propose the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The predictive ability of taxable income for firms’ future performance is
significantly lower for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms.
4.3. Research methods
4.3.1. Defining HTP firms and Non-HTP firms
To test my hypothesis, I divide my sample into two subgroups, HTP firms and Non-HTP
firms. The definitions of HTP firms and Non-HTP firms are the same as those in Essay One.66
By definition, HTP firms are relatively more aggressive in tax planning than Non-HTP firms.

66

Please refer to Section 2.4.1.1. of Essay One for details.
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4.3.2. Testing models
I use one-, two-, and three-years-ahead CFO as the proxy for future performance since,
first, a firm’s value is ultimately determined by its discounted cash flows. Second, the
importance of cash flows is emphasized by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
According to FASB, one of the main objectives of financial reporting is “to help investors,
creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows”
(Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 5, 1984). Third, Nallareddy, Sethuraman, and
Venkatachalam (2020) demonstrate that CFO is a much better predictor of future CFO than
earnings. Finally, cash flow is widely used by prior researchers as a proxy for future performance
(e.g., Badertscher, Collins, and Lys., 2012; Blaylock et al., 2020).
To test how high tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income for future
performance, I start from a crude model and run the following pooled OLS regression of
Equation (1), in which the coefficient on taxable income is allowed to vary based on the
aggressiveness of tax planning:
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(1)

where 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂 is pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid
(TXPD); k equals 1, 2, and 3, respectively; TI is taxable income calculated as current tax expense
(CTE) grossed up by the top US statutory tax rate minus the change in the unused portion of net
operating loss carryforward (TLCF); HTP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm-year
falls into the lowest quintile of accumulated five-year GAAP ETR for each fiscal year and twodigit SIC industry, otherwise 0; finally both 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂 and TI are scaled by beginning-year total
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assets (AT).67 Based on the results of prior studies (e.g., Ayers et al., 2009; Blaylock et al., 2020),
the coefficient on taxable income (𝛼1 ) is expected to be significantly positive. However, the
primary interest for Equation (1) is on the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛼3 ,
which is expected to be significantly negative based on the hypothesis.
However, Equation (1) does not control for any other variables that are known for being
correlated with firms’ performance, specifically, the two traditionally performance measures,
book income and cash flows. Furthermore, since taxable income here is estimated from the
financial statements, it is possible that the information contained in taxable income has already
been captured by reported book income and cash flows. To put it another way, taxable income
may not contain any incremental information over book income and cash flows. Hence, I control
for both book income and cash flows and run the pooled OLS regression model of Equation (2),
which simultaneously assesses the incremental predictive ability of taxable income over book
income and cash flows and how high tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable
income. In Equation (2), PTBI is pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI)
minus minority interest (MII).68 Following Blaylock et al. (2020), I control for industry (at the
two-digit SIC level) and fiscal year.
In addition, I control for firm size (the natural log of market value of equity) and leverage
(total liability, LT, divided by total assets), two well-known factors that affect firms’
performance. In general, while the business risk is lower for larger firms, it is higher for firms
with higher leverage. Therefore, while the coefficient on Size (𝛽8) is expected to be positive, the
coefficient on Lever (𝛽9) is expected to be negative. Based on the results of prior studies, e.g.,
67

Appendix C provides detailed description of all variables.
This measure of pretax book income is consistent with prior studies, e.g., Hanlon (2005), Ayers et al. (2009), and
Blaylock et al. (2020).
68
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Ayers et al. (2009) and Blaylock et al. (2020), the coefficients on taxable income (𝛽1), book
income (𝛽2), and CFO (𝛽3 ) are all expected to be significantly positive. Finally, the primary
interest of Equation (2), the coefficient on the interaction term of 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛽5, is expected to
be significantly negative based on my hypothesis.
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝑡 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(2)

4.4. Sample selection and empirical results
4.4.1. Sample selection
The criteria for sample selection are the same as those in Essay Two.69 The final sample
contains 49,789 firm-year observations with non-missing values in all required variables.
4.4.2. Empirical results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of my final sample.70 For the overall sample, the
mean of CFO (0.146) is significantly higher than book income (0.102) and taxable income
(0.087), respectively, at the 1% level. This result is likely driven by depreciation expenses.
Second, book income is also significantly higher than taxable income at the 1% level. Though
this can be driven by the differential treatments on depreciation expenses between GAAP and the
tax code, it is consistent with the findings of prior research that the positive BTDs are likely the
results of earnings management and/or tax planning.

69
70

Please refer to Section 2.5.1 of Essay One and Section 2.4.1 of Essay Two for details.
All variables in Table 2 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Page 189 of 217

Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the main variables.71 While Pearson
correlation coefficients are below the diagonal, Spearman correlation coefficients are above the
diagonal. First, taxable income, book income, and CFO are all negatively correlated with HTP.
This finding is expected because, other things being equal, better financial performance, whether
measured by taxable income, book income, or cash flows, leads to higher ETR, and thus the firm
is less likely to fall into the HTP subgroup. Second, while Size is positively correlated with
taxable income, book income, and CFO, respectively, it is negatively correlated with HTP, which
suggests that large firms tend to outperform other firms and thus are less likely to fall into the
HTP subgroup. Finally, Lever is negatively correlated with taxable income, book income, and
CFO, respectively, but positively correlated with HTP, which suggests that firms with higher
leverage tend to underperform other firms and are more likely to fall into the HTP subgroup.
Table 3 presents the testing results of Equation (1). Column (1) reports the predictive
ability of taxable income for one-year-ahead cash flows. The coefficient on taxable income, 𝛼1
(0.365), is significantly positive at the 1% level, which suggests that taxable income positively
predicts future performance for the base group, Non-HTP firms. This result is consistent with
Blaylock et al. (2020) that, on average, taxable income positively predicts firms’ future
performances. My main interest, the coefficient on 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛽3 (-0.298), is significantly
negative at the 1% level, which supports the hypothesis that the predictive ability of taxable
income is significantly lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms. Columns (2) and (3) present
the predictive ability of taxable income for two- and three-years-ahead cash flows, respectively.
Consistent with Blaylock et al.’s (2020) results, the predictive ability of taxable income
decreases as the forecasting horizon is extended. The coefficient on taxable income decreases

71

All correlation coefficients are significant (p < 0.01).
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from 0.365 for one-year-ahead cash flows to 0.286 and 0.232, respectively, for two- and threeyear-ahead cash flows. However, consistent with the Hypothesis, the coefficients on 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛽3s, are all negative at the 1% significance level, -0.298, -0.257, and -0.202, respectively,
for one-, two-, and three-years-ahead forecasting horizons. In sum, Table 3 demonstrates that
taxable income positively predicts firms’ future performance for Non-HTP firms but high tax
planning significantly reduces its predictive ability for HTP firms.
Table 4 presents the results of Equation (2). First, as expected, while the coefficients on
Size (firm size), 𝛽8, are all significantly positive at the 1% level for one-, two, and three-yearsahead forecasting horizons, the coefficients on Lever (leverage), 𝛽9, are all significantly negative
at the 1% level. Second, consistent with the results of prior studies, the coefficients on book
income are all positive at the 1% significance level, 0.219, 0.101, and 0.054, respectively, for
one-, two-, and three-years-ahead forecasting horizons. Similarly, the coefficients on cash flows
are also positive at the 1% significance level, 0.412, 0.392, and 0.347, respectively, for one-,
two-, and three-years-ahead forecasting horizons. In addition, the coefficients on cash flows are
all significantly greater than their counterparts on book income, which suggests that, in my
sample, the predictive ability of cash flows is higher than book income for one-, two-, and threeyears-ahead CFO. This is consistent with the finding of Finger (1994) that, in the short run (one
to two years), CFO are superior to earning in predicting future CFO and supports the latest
conclusion of Nallareddy et al. (2020) that cash flows are a much better predictor of future cash
flows than earnings.
Third, after adding book income, cash flows, and other control variables to Equation (1),
the coefficients on taxable income are still significant at the 1% level, 0.031, 0.030, and 0.025,
respectively, for one-, two-, and three-years-ahead forecasting horizon, which indicates that, for
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Non-HTP firms (the base subgroup), taxable income is positively associated with future CFO.
These results support the finding of Blaylock et al. (2020) that taxable income positively predicts
future performance after controlling for book income and its components. Finally, consistent
with the prediction of my hypothesis, the coefficients on the interaction term of 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝛽5s, are all significantly negative at the 1% level for one-, two-, and three-years-ahead
forecasting horizons, -0.054, -0.066, and -0.046, respectively. Therefore, the results of Table 4
strongly support the hypothesis that the predictive ability of taxable income for future
performance is significantly lower for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms, which indicates that
high tax planning reduces the information contained in taxable income about firms’ future
performance. Furthermore, these results extend and supplement Blaylock et al. (2020) by
showing that, while taxable income does positively predict firms’ future performance, its
predictive ability is significantly impaired by high tax planning.
In sum, the results of Equation (1) show that taxable income positively predicts firms’
future performance for Non-HTP firms but its predictive ability is significantly lower for HTP
firms than for Non-HTP firms. The results of Equation (2) indicate that, after controlling for
book income, cash flows, and other variables, taxable income still positively predicts firms’
future performance for Non-HTP firms but its predictive ability is significantly reduced for HTP
firms. In combination, these results strongly support the hypothesis that the predictive ability of
taxable income for future performance is significantly lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms,
which is consistent with the notion that high tax planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable
income for future performance. Nevertheless, since the incremental predictive power of taxable
income over book income and cash flows is limited, the information loss due to high tax
planning for capital market participants is moderate. This finding is consistent with the
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conclusion of Ayers et al. (2009) that “the incremental information loss to investors from tax
planning is quite modest” (p. 34).
4.5. Robustness tests: Net income as the performance measure
Using CFO as the proxy for firms’ underlying economic performance is consistent with
the statement of the FASB that one of the main objectives of financial reporting is to help capital
market participants predict future cash flows. However, book income is traditionally the primary
measure of firms’ economic performances and is generally considered a better performance
measure than CFO (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1998). Therefore, I use net income to
measure firms’ economic performances to rerun Equation (1) and Equation (2). Specifically, I
use earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (IB) as the dependent
variable for two reasons. First, IB is an after-tax performance measure about which investors
ultimately care. Second, IB excludes nonrecurring items, which are transitory, sometimes even
manipulated, and thus less value relevant.
The results of Equation (1) are presented in Table 5. The coefficients on taxable income,
𝛽1s, are all significantly positive at the 1% level for one-year-ahead (0.267), two-years-ahead
(0.180), and three-years-ahead (0.132) net income, respectively. My main interest, the
coefficients on 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛽3s, are all significantly negative at the 1% level for one-yearahead (-0.216), two-years-ahead (-0.162), and three-years-ahead (-0.119) forecasting horizon,
respectively, supporting the hypothesis that the predictive ability of taxable income is
significantly lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms.
Table 6 presents the results of Equation (2). After controlling for book income, CFO,
size, leverage, fiscal year, and industry, the coefficients on taxable income, 𝛽1s, are still
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significant at the 1% level for one-year-ahead (0.019) and two-years-ahead (0.014) net income,
respectively, and at the 5% level for three-years-ahead (0.010) net income. Most importantly, the
coefficients on the interaction term of 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛽5s, are all significantly negative at the 1%
level for one-, two-, and three-years-ahead forecasting horizons, -0.035, -0.040, and -0.029,
respectively. Therefore, the hypothesis that the predictive ability of taxable income for future
performance is significantly lower for HTP firms than Non-HTP firms is also strongly supported
when net income is used as the proxy for firms’ economic performances.
4.6. Conclusion
This study examines whether tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income
for firms’ future performance. Recent studies show that taxable income contains information
about future earnings and is associated with stock price and return. Blaylock et al. (2020) provide
direct evidence that taxable income positively predicts firms’ future performance. However,
Ayers et al. (2009) propose and show that high tax planning weakens the association between the
change in taxable income and the contemporaneous stock return, which suggests that high tax
planning reduces the value-relevant information contained in taxable income. Nevertheless, there
is no empirical evidence of whether tax planning affects the predictive ability of taxable income
for firms’ future performance.
On the basis of Ayers et al.’s (2009) finding that high tax planning reduces the value
relevance of taxable income and the argument that taxable income of high tax-planning firms
does not faithfully capture firms’ underlying performance and thus is not a good indicator of
firms’ future performance, I propose and show that the predictive ability of taxable income for
future performance is significantly lower for HTP firms than for Non-HTP firms. This finding
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extends Blaylock et al.’s (2020) result that taxable income is positively associated with firms’
future performance after controlling for book income and CFO. While Blaylock et al. (2020)
show that taxable income positively predicts firms’ future performance, I demonstrate that high
tax planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable income. In addition, my result supplements
Ayers et al.’s (2009) finding that high tax planning reduces the value relevance of taxable
income. I present that, from a different perspective, high tax planning reduces the information
about firms’ future performance contained in taxable income. This study enhances our
understanding of the consequences of tax planning and adds another piece to the puzzle of how
tax planning affects the informativeness of taxable income. Further, since the prediction of firms’
future performance is critical for fundamental analysis, this study also has implications for
fundamental analysis. My finding suggests that, when using taxable income to predict future
performance, analysts should consider the aggressiveness level of firms’ tax planning strategy.
Finally, though high tax planning reduces the predictive ability of taxable income for future
performance, consistent with the conclusion of Ayers et al. (2009), my results suggest that the
information loss due to high tax planning is limited. The results of this study are of interest to
investors, financial analysts, public accountants, regulators, and academics in accounting and
finance.
However, this study should be viewed in light of its limitations. Relative to the whole
population of public US firms, firms in my sample are comparatively healthier in financial
performance because, to be included in my sample, both firms’ five-year current tax expense and
pretax book income must be positive. As a result, the results might not be generalized to other
firms, such as firms incorporated outside the US, private firms, and financially distressed US
public firms. Moreover, this study only examines the impacts of high tax planning on the
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predictive ability of taxable income for future performance. However, since taxable income is
estimated from financial statements, earnings management is also likely to affect the predictive
ability of taxable income for future performance. Furthermore, firms can be aggressive in both
tax planning and earnings management (Frank, Lynch, and Rego, 2009) in the same reporting
period. Hence, my subsample of HTP firms inevitably contains some firms also aggressive in
earnings management. I leave examining the combined impacts of high tax planning and
aggressive earnings management on the predictive ability of taxable income to a future study.
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Tables for Essay Three
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable
N
Overall sample
PTCFOt
49,789

Mean

Std. Dev.

1st quartile

Median

3rd quartile

0.146

0.12

0.076

0.134

0.204

TIt

49,789

0.087

0.15

0.022

0.072

0.137

PTBIt
Size
Leverage
PTCFOt+1

49,789
49,789
49,789
42,146

0.102
5.999
0.478
0.148

0.11
2.28
0.27
0.11

0.038
4.380
0.313
0.079

0.090
6.063
0.478
0.136

0.155
7.562
0.619
0.205

PTCFOt+2

36,463

0.149

0.11

0.081

0.138

0.205

PTCFOt+3
31,824
Non-HTP firm-years
PTCFOt
39,585

0.151

0.11

0.083

0.139

0.205

0.153

0.12

0.082

0.141

0.212

TIt

39,585

0.099

0.14

0.033

0.084

0.149

PTBIt
Size
Leverage
PTCFOt+1

39,585
39,585
39,585
33,835

0.106
6.140
0.471
0.154

0.12
2.25
0.22
0.11

0.041
4.568
0.310
0.085

0.096
6.186
0.471
0.142

0.162
7.658
0.610
0.211

PTCFOt+2

29,518

0.155

0.11

0.086

0.143

0.211

PTCFOt+3
25,981
HTP firm-years
PTCFOt
10,204

0.155

0.11

0.088

0.144

0.210

0.121

0.11

0.059

0.111

0.174

TIt

10,204

0.039

0.18

-

0.028

0.076

PTBIt
Size
Leverage
PTCFOt+1

10,204
10,204
10,204
8,311

0.084
5.456
0.505
0.123

0.10
2.35
0.39
0.11

0.029
3.703
0.331
0.060

0.070
5.459
0.510
0.113

0.124
7.122
0.652
0.176

PTCFOt+2

6,945

0.125

0.11

0.064

0.115

0.179

PTCFOt+3

5,843

0.129

0.11

0.066

0.117

0.182

Notes to Table 1:
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1.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

2.

TI: Estimated taxable income calculated as current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US statutory
tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT), in which CTE equals the sum of current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO). If either current federal income tax expense (TXFED) or
current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as total income tax expense
(TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the
sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).

3.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

Size: Firm’s size calculated as the natural log of total assets (AT).

5.

Lever: Firm’s leverage calculated as total liability (LT) divided by total assets (AT).

Table 2 Correlation Tables
Pearson below/Spearman above Diagonal
HTP
TI
PTBI
PTCFO
Size
***
***
***
HTP
1
-0.259
-0.107
-0.121
-0.115***
TI
-0.161***
1
0.795***
0.597***
0.180***
PTBI
-0.079***
0.613***
1
0.691***
0.241***
PTCFO
-0.109***
0.462***
0.686***
1
0.261***
Size
-0.121***
0.113***
0.220***
0.238***
1
***
***
***
***
Lever
0.051
-0.127
-0.201
-0.147
0.136***

Lever
0.059***
-0.239***
-0.270***
-0.204***
0.201***
1

Notes to Table 2:
1.

***

2.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-

Significant at the 1% level.

year GAAP current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0
otherwise.
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3.

TI: Estimated taxable income calculated as current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US
statutory tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF)
scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT), in which CTE equals the sum of current federal income tax
expense (TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO). If either current federal income tax
expense (TXFED) or current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as total
income tax expense (TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is
missing, I set TXDI as the sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign
income tax expense (TXDFO).

4.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled
by beginning-year total assets (AT).

5.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) scaled
by beginning-year total assets (AT).

6.

Size: Firm’s size calculated as the natural log of total assets (AT).

7.

Lever: Firm’s leverage calculated as total liability (LT) divided by total assets (AT).
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Table 3 Regression analyses: Equation (1)
Prediction
(1)
Variable
PTCFOi,t+1
TIi,t

(2)
PTCFOi,t+2

(3)
PTCFOi,t+3

+

0.365***
(86.89)

0.286***
(62.34)

0.232***
(48.29)

HTPi,t
t-statistic

?

0.005***
(3.40)

0.001
(0.90)

-0.001
(-0.63)

HTPi,t*TIi,t
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Observations

-

-0.298***
(-38.82)
0.115***
(158.73)
42,146

-0.257***
(-30.65)
0.123***
(152.49)
36,463

-0.202***
(-22.58)
0.128***
(149.46)
31,824

16.42%

10.65%

7.70%

t-statistic

?

Adj. R2

Notes to Table 3:
1.

Equation (1):
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

2.

***

3.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) scaled by

Significant at the 1% level.

beginning-year total assets (AT).
4.

TI: Estimated taxable income calculated as current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US statutory
tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT), in which CTE equals the sum of current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO). If either current federal income tax expense (TXFED) or
current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as total income tax expense
(TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the
sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).

5. HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 4 Regression analyses: Equation (2)
Prediction
(1)
Variable
PTCFOi,t+1
TIi,t
t-statistic
PTBIi,t
t-statistic
PTCFOi,t
t-statistic
HTPi,t
t-statistic
TIi,t*HTPi,t
t-statistic
Sizei,t
t-statistic
Leveri,t
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Industry F.E.
Year F.E.
Observations
Adj. R2

+
+
+
?
+
?

0.031***
(6.70)
0.219***
(33.62)
0.412***
(78.01)
-0.006***
(-5.16)
-0.054***
(-8.00)
0.004***
(16.93)
-0.011***
(-5.31)
0.015*
(1.84)
Yes
Yes
42,146
43.84%

(2)
PTCFOi,t+2

(3)
PTCFOi,t+3

0.030***
(5.52)
0.101***
(12.94)
0.392***
(62.58)
-0.006***
(-4.57)
-0.066***
(-8.49)
0.004***
(15.40)
-0.013***
(-5.12)
0.032***
(3.30)
Yes
Yes
36,463
32.21%

0.025***
(4.29)
0.054***
(6.30)
0.347***
(49.55)
-0.007***
(-4.35)
-0.046***
(-5.39)
0.004***
(14.00)
-0.021***
(-7.30)
0.040***
(3.75)
Yes
Yes
31,824
25.81%

Notes to Table 4:
1.

Equation (2):
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝑡 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

PTCFO: Pretax CFO calculated as cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

4.

TI: Estimated taxable income calculated as current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US statutory
tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) scaled by
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beginning-year total assets (AT), in which CTE equals the sum of current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO). If either current federal income tax expense (TXFED) or
current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as total income tax expense
(TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the
sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).
PTBI: Pretax book income for firm i in fiscal year t calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority
interest (MII) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
5.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

6.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.

7.

Size: Firm’s size for firm i in fiscal year t calculated as the natural log of total assets (AT).

8.

Lever: Firm’s leverage for firm i in fiscal year t calculated as total liability (LT) divided by total assets
(AT).
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Table 5 Robustness Test for Equation (1): Net Income as the Dependent Variable
Prediction
Variable
TIi,t

+

t-statistic
HTPi,t

?

t-statistic

(1)

(2)

(3)

ATBIi,t+1

ATBIi,t+2

ATBIi,t+3

0.267***

0.180***

0.132***

(92.40)

(56.09)

(39.36)

***

***

0.011

0.005

0.000

(11.32)

(4.36)

(0.27)

-0.216***

-0.162***

-0.119***

(-40.81)

(-27.65)

(-19.11)

0.040***

0.049***

0.054***

t-statistic

(80.27)

(86.61)

(90.74)

Observations

42146

36463

31824

2

17.59%

8.50%

5.18%

TIi,t*HTPi,t

-

t-statistic
Constant

?

Adj. R

Notes to Table 5:
1.

Using net income as the dependent for Equation (1):
𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

2.

***

3.

ATBI: Earning before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (IB) scaled by beginning-year total

Significant at the 1% level.

assets (AT).
4.

TI: Estimated taxable income calculated as current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US statutory
tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT), in which CTE equals the sum of current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO). If either current federal income tax expense (TXFED) or
current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as total income tax expense
(TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the
sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).

5.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 6 Robustness Test for Equation (2): Net Income as the Dependent Variable
Prediction
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variable
ATBIi,t+1
ATBIi,t+2
ATBIi,t+3
***
***
TIi,t
+
0.019
0.014
0.010**
t-statistic
PTBIi,t

+

t-statistic
PTCFOi,t

+

t-statistic
HTPi,t
t-statistic
TIi,t*HTPi,t
t-statistic
Sizei,t
t-statistic
Leveri,t
t-statistic
Constant
t-statistic
Industry F.E.
Year F.E.
Observations
Adj. R2

?
+
?

(5.48)
0.305***
(64.76)
0.134***
(34.90)
0.000
(0.05)
-0.035***
(-7.16)
0.002***
(13.94)
-0.006***
(-3.80)
0.002
(0.36)
Yes
Yes

(3.57)
0.162***
(28.14)
0.144***
(31.01)
-0.002**
(-2.07)
-0.040***
(-6.92)
0.002***
(10.15)
-0.008***
(-3.99)
0.013*
(1.84)
Yes
Yes

(2.36)
0.104***
(16.36)
0.126***
(24.37)
-0.004***
(-3.87)
-0.029***
(-4.55)
0.002***
(9.03)
-0.013***
(-6.24)
0.016**
(2.06)
Yes
Yes

42146
38.87%

36463
21.99%

31824
15.50%

Notes to Table 6:
1.

Using net income as the dependent for Equation (2):

𝐴𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑗 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽𝑡 𝐹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2.

*

Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.

3.

ATBI: Earning before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (IB) scaled by beginning-year total
assets (AT).

4.

TI: Estimated taxable income calculated as current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top US statutory
tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) scaled by
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beginning-year total assets (AT), in which CTE equals the sum of current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) and current foreign tax expense (TXFO). If either current federal income tax expense (TXFED) or
current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as total income tax expense
(TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the
sum of deferred federal income tax expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).
PTBI: Pretax book income for firm i in fiscal year t calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority
interest (MII) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
5.

PTBI: Pretax book income calculated as pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).

6.

HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean accumulated five-year
GAAP current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level and fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.

7.

Size: Firm’s size for firm i in fiscal year t calculated as the natural log of total assets (AT).

8.

Lever: Firm’s leverage for firm i in fiscal year t calculated as total liability (LT) divided by total assets
(AT).
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions
1. PTCFO: Pretax CFO equals cash from operations (OANCF) plus cash tax paid (TXPD)
scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
2. TI: Estimated taxable income equals to current tax expense (CTE) grossed up by the top
US statutory tax rate minus the change in unused portion of net operating loss
carryforward (TLCF) scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
3. Current tax expense (CTE): The sum of current federal income tax expense (TXFED) and
current foreign tax expense (TXFO); if either current federal income tax expense
(TXFED) or current foreign income tax expense (TXFO) is missing, CTE is calculated as
total income tax expense (TXT) minus the deferred income tax expense (TXDI). In
addition, if TXDI is missing, I set TXDI as the sum of deferred federal income tax
expense (TXDFED) and deferred foreign income tax expense (TXDFO).
4. PTBI: Pretax book income equals pretax book income (PI) minus minority interest (MII)
scaled by beginning-year total assets (AT).
5. ATBI: Earning before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (IB) scaled by
beginning-year total assets (AT).
6. Size: Firm’s size calculated as the natural log of total assets (AT).
7. Lever: Firm’s leverage calculated as total liability (LT) divided by total assets (AT).
8. HTP: Indicator variable equals 1 if firm-year falls into the lowest quintile of mean
accumulated five-year GAAP current effective tax rate at the two-digit SIC industry level
and fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
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